456 So. 2d 592 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1984
Lead Opinion
This matter was presented to us as a petition for writ of prohibition seeking, essentially, review of a trial court order which enjoined the Orange County Supervisor of Elections, Betty Carter, from placing appellant’s name on the ballot in a Republican primary election. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c) we elected to treat this as an appeal. We expedited consideration and disposition.
The order appealed declared appellant ineligible to seek the Republican party nomination for sheriff because he was in “violation” of Section 99.021(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). That statute provides:
In addition, any person seeking to qualify for nomination as a candidate of*593 any political party shall, at the time of subscribing to the oath or affirmation, state in writing:
1. The party of which he is a member.
2. That he is not a registered member of any other political party and has not been a candidate for nomination for any other political party for a period of 6 months preceding the general election for which he seeks to qualify.
3. That he has paid the assessment levied against him, if any, as a candidate for said office by the executive committee of the party of which he is a member. Appellant concedes he cannot lawfully be
a Republican candidate because he did not register as a Republican until July, 1984.
By this appeal he challenges the authority, or “standing” as it is known in legalese, of Edward Dodds, appellee here and plaintiff below, to file the lawsuit to seek to have Ingham’s name not on the ballot. Ingham says Dodds is merely a citizen, albeit a member of the Republican executive body, and thus cannot be one to sue. It is certainly an interesting proposition and as much as we would like to answer this novel question, one of first impression in Florida, we must decline to do so. No matter which way we rule Ingham will not be a candidate, he doesn’t qualify; he concedes that. The question is moot.
Appeal dismissed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I disagree that this case is moot. If the trial court erred in ordering Ingham removed from the ballot for the Republican primary election in Orange County, that order should be reversed, giving Ingham the right to be a candidate for the election. We should not speculate as to whether further court litigation may result, but instead should address 'the merits of the issue of plaintiff Dodds’ standing to bring this action.
Had Dodds, for example, been a resident of Juneau, Alaska on an extended visit to Disney, I doubt any court in Florida would rule that he has standing to question a Florida candidate’s qualification to be on a Florida primary ballot. However, the parties concede that Dodds is a resident of Orange County, and a registered Republican voter qualified, to vote for the office of sheriff in the primary election in question. In my view he has standing to enforce section 99.021(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), by filing this lawsuit. In view of the absence of any articulated caselaw on this subject,
. See Evers v. Lacy, 257 So.2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Orange County v. Gillespie, 239 So.2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 825 (Fla.1970); Ballard v. Cowart, 238 So.2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).
