168 Mich. 380 | Mich. | 1912
This suit was brought to recover damages for the-death of plaintiff’s decedent, claimed to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. The facts of the case are as follows: Plaintiff’s decedent, William Quigley, was on November 6, 1906, at work as a brakeman for defendant company on a spur branch of its railroad known as Gates’ branch, which extended from a station on its main line called South Branch, into the timber towards the north about 10 or 12 miles. The sole purpose of this spur track was to bring out forest products to the main line, and on it no regular trains or trains of any kind were operated according to any schedule or timetable. This spur track was connected with the main line by a switch and all along its line it had been customary at any time, when requested, to take in cars which had been ordered for loading, and place them at any place where the person ordering the car might designate. It
On this day the work train and construction crew had been engaged in extending this spur track further north towards a mill, and had been so employed for two or more days. This work train contained cars for sleeping and eating accommodations for the construction men and train crew, and for the purpose of keeping them supplied with food it was necessary to go to South Branch for supplies. The engine tender and way car were making a trip for this purpose at the time of this accident. The way car was being pushed by the engine which was headed towards South Branch. This could have been changed when this one switch was reached and the engine and tender placed ahead, but it was decided before starting that the engine should push the way car the entire distance. Plaintiff’s decedent had ridden down with this train with the cars in the same order two days before when loaded cars were found on the track and taken to South Branch. He also knew that while they were extending the branch, cars would from time to time be put in on this track as usual. On the night in question he was told by the engineer who was in charge of the train to keep a sharp lookout for cars or anything else on the
The trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff, upon which a judgment was entered. Defendant asks this court for a reversal of this judgment, assigning errors upon certain rulings and instructions of the trial court during the trial.
The contentions of the defendant, are:
(1) That such a logging branch of a railroad as the one in this case is inherently different from a railroad in general use; that it does not come within the ordinary rules and principles governing main traveled lines of a commercial road; that a railroad company is not held to so great a degree of care to employés working upon such a branch as to those who work upon the main line of the road.
(2) That as a matter of law upon the undisputed facts in the case plaintiff cannot recover because of the contributory negligence of plaintiff’s decedent.
(3) That plaintiff’s decedent, because of his familiarity with the work, the instructions he had received, and the notice he had of existing conditions, assumed this as one of the risks of his employment.
The negligence relied upon by the plaintiff is not because of any unsafe condition of the track, but in leaving
It appears undisputed from this record that the universal custom and practice in operating trains upon spur branches similar to this one is wholly different from that upon main lines, and is identical with the manner in which this spur branch was operated; that it is customary to leave cars standing upon the track as in this case without lanterns or other markers upon them, without torpedoes or fuses on either side of them, all of which are usual and required upon lines with scheduled trains, stations, depots, etc. The reasons for such custom and practice are obvious. The cars are isolated in a region sparsely inhabited or
The propositions contained in such request are established in this case. Such spur lines are inherently different from the main lines, or those parts of railroads operated the same as main lines, and the reasons and conditions which require the ordinary rules '.and principles governing the latter relative to care of employés do not apply to the former. A system of warning and notice of dangers to its operatives had been adopted, which appears to have conformed with the general custom and practice upon branches
The question of the contributory negligence of plaintiff’s decedent need not be considered.
The judgment is reversed, and no new trial granted.
By a stipulation Stone, J., is substituted for the late Hooker, J., who sat in the case.