Ingalls v. Herrick

108 Mass. 351 | Mass. | 1871

Colt, J.

It was ruled as matter of law, in this case, that the jury would not be authorized upon this evidence to find a delivery of the baled flocks, sufficient to pass a title valid as against creditors of the seller.

There was evidence tending to show that the bargain for the sale was made with one Bosworth, an agent of the seller. A receipted bill of parcels, signed by the seller himself, which contained a description of the bales by number, mark and weight, was afterwards delivered by the agent to the plaintiff. The sub■iecfrmatter of the sale was all the baled flocks then stored in the seller’s factory. It was thus a completed contract of sale, and as between the parties the title passed to the plaintiff. Was there evidence to go to the jury of a delivery sufficient as to creditors ? This is the only question, and in disposing of it we must take the sale to have been made in good faith and for a valuable consideration.

Upon this question, there was evidence tending to show that the flocks were bought for resale; that the bales were large, not easily moved, and requiring room for storage; that the plaintiff, having no convenient place, agreed with Bosworth, at the time of the.bargain, to let them remain where they were, and pay storage, and directed him to obtain samples of the flocks, which he, the plaintiff, could take with him to New York to sell by; and that Bosworth accordingly opened the bales, took out samples of two kinds of flocks, sewed up the bales, and gave the samples to the plaintiff at the time he delivered the bill of parcels. The plaintiff bought upon his own previous knowledge of the article, having seen the flocks at the store-room of the factory a week or two before. The samples were not required or used by him in reference to his own purchase, and Bosworth, in taking them from the bales, acted under the directions and as the agent of the plaintiff, and with reference to future sales by him. It was a significant act of ownership and possession on the part of the plaintiff, after the sale was agreed on, through Bosworth, acting in this respect as his agent. There is something more, therefore, here disclosed, than a mere contract of sale without delivery or possession under it. And we are of opinion, under the law heretofore laid down by the court, that the case should have been submitted, with proper instructions, to the jury.

It was early held that the possession of personal chattels by the vendor after an alleged sale is not conclusive evidence of fraud. Upon proof that the sale was made in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and that the possession after the sale was in pursuance of some agreement not inconsistent with honesty in the transaction, the vendee might hold against creditors, Brooks v. Powers, 15 Mass. 244. It was declared by Morton, J., in Shurtleff v. Willard, 19 Pick. 202, 211, that, whatever the rule upon this point may be in England or elsewhere, it is perfectly well settled in a series of cases here, that the possession of the vendor is only evidence of fraud, which, with the manner of the occupation, the conduct of the parties, and all other evidence bearing upon the question of fraud, is for the consideration of the jury. It is certain that slight evidence of delivery is sufficient; and if the buyer with the consent of the seller obtains possession before any attachment or second sale, the transfer is complete without formal delivery. Shumway v. Rutter, 8 Pick. 443. A delivery of a portion in token of the whole is a sufficient constructive delivery as against creditors, although the goods are in the possession of various persons. Legg v. Willard, 17 Pick. 140. In Hardy v. Potter, 10 Gray, 89, the jury were told that, although the plaintiff only took a bill of sale, yet, if prior to the attachment he had been to the place where the lumber was, and had exercised acts of ownership over it, by virtue of his purchase, that would constitute a delivery of it good against a subsequent attachment. And this instruction was held not open to exception, although the evidence was that the purchaser had only been to Beverly and seen the lumber there. See also Phelps v. Cutler, 4 Gray, 137; Tuxworth v. Moore, 9 Pick. 347 ; Bullard v. Wait, 16 Gray, 55 ; Ropes v. Lane, 9 Allen, 502, and 11 Allen, 591.

The fact that the possession of the property is retained by the vendor by agreement, and does not follow the bill of sale, is held by this court to be, in most of the cases, evidence of fraud, to go to the jury. In many of the states, the fraud is held to be an inference of law resulting inevitably from the possession. And such was supposed to be the earlier English rule, as laid down in Edwards v. Harben, 2 T. R. 587; but the only point there decided was, that an absolute conveyance without possession, if there be nothing but that, is in point of law fraudulent. In the more recent cases, it has been declared that the continued possession by the vendor, of goods sold, is a fact to be considered by the jury, as evidence of fraud, and is not in law a fraud in itself., Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Ad. 498. Benjamin on Sales, 363.

There was evidence here of delivery, which should have bees submitted to the jury.

Exceptions sustained.