| Ark. | Jun 27, 1910
(after stating the facts). It is insisted by counsel for appellant that the evidence did not warrant the verdict of the jury.
In discussing the principle of law applicable to cases of this sort, in Grand Lodge of A. O. U. W. v. Banister, 80 Ark. 190" date_filed="1906-10-01" court="Ark." case_name="Grand Lodge of Ancient Order of United Workmen v. Banister">80 Ark. 190, the court said: “In the first place, there is a presumption against suicide or death by any other unlawful act, and this presumption arises even where it is shown by proof that death was sell-inflicted — it is presumed to have been accidental until the contrary is made to appear. This rule is founded upon the natural human instinct or inclination of self-preservation, which renders self-destruction an improbability with a rational being.” To the same effect, see Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of America, 8 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 1111, and case note; Lindahl v. Supreme Court Independent Order of Foresters, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 916; Tackman v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 974.
Hence we see that if reasonable men, viewing the facts, which are undisputed, might come to different conclusions as to whether the deceased committed suicide, then the facts, although undisputed, were properly submitted to the jury.
A careful consideration of the facts and circumstances adduced in evidence irresistibly lead us to the conclusion that the death of Watt was by suicide. All the physical facts point that way, and they are inconsistent with any other reasonable theory. It is conceded that all the circumstances point with certainty to the conclusion that Watt shot himself; but counsel for appellee claim that the jury might have found that it was accidental, and rely on the Banister case cited supra as sustaining their contention that the court properly left it to the jury to 'decide whether his death resulted from accident or suicide.
We are of the opinion that the facts in the case at bar tending to establish suicide are much stronger than in the Banister case. There it was shown that Banister was very nervous and excitable, always being in fear of burglars -when aroused from sleep. The killing occurred at night after he had retired and from the physical facts it was not impossible that he might have inflicted the wound by accident in restlessly tossing ■ in slumber or upon awakening suddenly and in affright. He was shot in the temple. He had never talked of killing himself. Here the facts are essentially different. Watt had about one year previous to his death attempted to kill himself. On the very day of the unfortunate occurrence, he had at 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning, a time when people usually sleep soundest, talked with his wife about the self-destruction of both her and himself. After she had risen next morning, and before he had left his bed, she heard the click of his pistol. The fact that they looked at each steadily for a minute -and said nothing, as she says they did do, indicates that his later remark that he was changing his pistol from one pillow to another was a subterfuge. If that was his purpose, there was no occasion for the pistol to click, and no occasion for them to look each other steadily in the eye without saying anything. He shortly after-wards arose and went down town, carrying the pistol with him. While she says he was cheerful when he returned at noon, he was still talking of death. He referred to the death of his friend. Then the immediate facts attending his death of themselves shut out the theory of accidental shooting. He was found lying on his back stretched out on the bed, and there appeared no disarrangement of the bed clothes. His undershirt was on fire where the bullet entered his body in the region of his heart. It went through his body on down through .the mattress and on to the floor, and its course could be traced from the position in which he lay. The condition of the body when it was found and the cburse of the bullet, coupled with his recent statements and acts in regard to self-destruction, are conditions and circumstances inconsistent with any other reasonable cause of death than that of suicide.
The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the cause dismissed.