59 How. Pr. 10 | NY | 1880
The note which was placed by the plaintiff in the hands of the defendant for collection was payable at the Bank of Lowville, and it was consequently the duty of the defendant to present it to that bank for payment. The first question which arises in the case is whether the defendant was guilty of any negligence in the manner of presentment, from which the plaintiff sustained damage. It must be borne in mind that there were no indorsers on the note and that all that was to be done was to demand payment. The defendant instead of sending the note to an agent or correspondent at Lowville for presentment, sent it by mail, directly to the bank where it was payable. This appears to *104
be an ordinary method of transacting such business, and the defendant was bound only to adopt the ordinary mode. It is sanctioned in England in the cases of Heywood v. Pickering (9 L.R. [Q.B.], 428); Prideaux v. Criddle (4 id., 461); Bailey
v. Bodenham (16 C.B. [N.S.], 295); Hare v. Henly
(10 id., 65), and in this State in Shipsey v. Bowery Nat. Bank
(
The draft was not sent forward until the twenty-eighth, the note being due on the twenty-seventh. But it does not *105 appear that this was an unreasonable delay, nor was it even shown that there was any mail after business hours on the twenty-seventh by which the draft could have been sent. The Bank of Lowville was entitled to the whole of the business day of the twenty-seventh within which to pay the note.
Up to this stage no negligence on the part of the defendant is shown. Then was there any shown in collecting the draft? At what time the defendant received the draft, or what was done with it, appears only from the admissions in the answer, which show that the defendant received the draft on Saturday, December twenty-ninth, after business hours, and sent it in the usual course of business to the clearing-house in the city of New York on Monday morning, December thirty-first, and it was returned to the defendant through the clearing-house in the usual course of business on the second of January not good. It also appears that the defendant gave immediate notice of non-payment to the plaintiff.
The allegation of negligence lies at the foundation of this action, and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to point out in what respect the defendant has been negligent. So long as it has pursued the ordinary and reasonable methods of making the collection, it is free from fault and we fail to see in what respect they have been departed from. Sending the draft through the clearing-house for collection was the usual and proper mode.Turner v. Bank of Fox Lake (3 Keyes, 425). The plaintiff however resorts to another ground of liability and contends that by sending the note to the Bank of Lowville the defendant constituted that bank its agent to receive payment of the note, and is therefore liable for the proceeds as having been received by the Bank of Lowville, the last-named bank being deemed to have received the proceeds by charging the amount of the note against its customer, the maker, and by this circuitous mode of reasoning the defendant is sought to be made liable for the solvency of the Bank of Lowville.
We do not think that any such agency was created. The *106
note, in so far as relates to its presentment at the bank, and the duties of the bank in respect to it, was equivalent to a check drawn by the maker upon the bank where the note was made payable. (Ætna Nat. Bank v. Fourth National Bank,
The case is also defective in respect to the question of damages. It is by no means clear that the maker of the note is discharged. Where a note is payable at a bank an entire failure to present it for payment, does not discharge the maker. (Walcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 J.R., 248; Green v. Goings,
7 Barb., 652; Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cow., 271.) If the maker has not sufficient funds in the bank the omission to present it is of no consequence. If he has funds then he can plead it by way of tender and is relieved from liability only for interest and costs. And even if the bank fails with the funds in its hands, this is no defense to the note. (Ruggles v. Patten,
On both grounds we think the order appealed from should be reversed and the judgment of nonsuit affirmed.
FOLGER and ANDREWS, JJ., concur; CHURCH, Ch. J., concurs on question of damages; MILLER, EARL and DANFORTH, JJ., dissent.
Order reversed and judgment affirmed.