153 Ind. 10 | Ind. | 1899
Suit to enjoin appellee from entering upon the station grounds of appellant to solicit customers for his hack. The question arises upon appellant’s exception to the conclusion, of law upon the facts specially found.
The facts are briefly these: Appellant is a corporation composed of various railway companies, and organized under the act of March 2, 1885. Acts 1885, p. 30, §§5232-5250 Burns 1894, §§3964 a-s Horner 1897. Appellee is the driver of a public conveyance, commonly called a hack, engaged in the business of transporting persons without discrimination from place to place in and about Indianapolis. Appellant owns the union passenger station at Indianapolis. It acquired the ground partly by condemnation' and partly by purchase. The station building faces north. The tracks are south of the building under a train-shed. At the north
Prom this finding it does not appear that appellee’s conduct was boisterous, or that he was interfering with appellant in the discharge of its duties to the passengers of the proprietary and associate railway companies, or that he was annoying or interfering with the passengers, or that he was refusing to comply with any rule or regulation of appellant’s that applied to all hackmen.
Appellant has the undoubted right to make rules and regulations concerning the use of its station and grounds. Lucas v. Herbert, 148 Ind. 64, 37 L. R. A. 376. The term, rules and regulations, however, implies uniformity in operation, not discrimination for the pecuniary advantage of the promulgator. The question is not what rules, uniform in application and promulgated by appellant impartially in the interests of the traveling public and without a money consideration to itself, might be held reasonable and what unreasonable, but whether appellant may, under the guise of rules, exclude from its station grounds all hackmen but one and thus protect a contract from which it derives a revenue.
A collection of authorities is made in Lucas v. Herbert, supra. To them may be added In re Palmer and London, etc., R. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 194; Parkinson v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 554; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 136, 41 Atl. 246, 42 L. R. A. 157; and State v. Reed, (Miss.) 24 South. 308, 43 L. R. A. 134.
The majority of the English cases appear to sustain, and the majority of the American to deny, the right of a railway company to grant such an exclusive privilege. See the note of Mr. Freeman in 22 Am. St. 699-702, and the note of Mr. Lewis in 5 Am. Railroad & Corp. Rep. pp. 715-724.
In some of the cases constitutional and statutory provisions enter into the determination, but in the main the question is decided from the points of view of the powers of the corporation and of public policy.
Appellant acquired its grounds through the sovereign right of eminent domain, whether by purchase or by condemnation; for it could not obtain a broader right by grant than by force. Taking the land by the right of the' State, for the purposes of public business, appellant should not be permitted to grant special privileges and immunities that the State could not.
The city of Indianapolis is given the right to regulate the use of its streets by hacks. The city would hardly undertake to exclude all but one hack from the stand on McCrea street in order to make good a rental for the exclusive privilege. The State entrusted appellant with the right to regulate the use of its facilities, not to increase its revenues by creating a monopoly.
Appellant is chartered to furnish depot and switching facilities to its proprietary and associate companies in connection with the transportation of persons and property on their railroads, not to engage in the hack business upon the streets of Indianapolis. True, appellant only rented its grounds to the transfer company. But the only use of the grounds, of advantage to the transfer company, is to base thereon the use of the streets for revenue. If appellant has authority to grant that advantage to another, it may take it to itself.
The passengers’ payment for transportation includes payment for their common use of the station facilities. If they are not entitled to have appellant use those facilities disinterestedly for their advantage, they are at least entitled to
Appellant sought from a court of equity the extraordinary remedy of injunction. It has failed to show, any ground for equitable interposition. Judgment affirmed.