163 Ind. 360 | Ind. | 1904
The appellee was a passenger upon appellant’s railroad, and was injured while being so carried. The complaint alleged that the accident and injury were caused by the negligence of the appellant in running its car at a high and dangerous rate of speed. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled. The answer was a general denial. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff below, a motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment was rendered on the verdict. Error is assigned upon these rulings.
The objections taken to the complaint are that it does not charge that the act of negligence complained of was the proximate cause of the injury, and that it does not aver that the servant of the appellant in charge of the car at the time of the injury was acting; within the scope of his employment. There is no merit in either point. It appears from the complaint that the appellee was a passenger for hire, and was being carried over appellant’s road. Tie occupied a seat in the car, and was exercising ordinary care for his own safety. The appellant negligently ran its car at a high and dangerous rate of speed into a switch main
In the common law forms of declarations against a carrier for an injury to a passenger through the negligence of the carrier the allegation generally was that the defendant “so carelessly, improperly, negligently, and unskilfully, drove and managed the said [coach] that * * * by and through the mere carelessness, negligence, unskilfulness, and misconduct, of the said defendant, the said [coach] was overturned, by means of which said several premises the right arm of the said plaintiff became and was fractured and broken,” etc. 2 Chitty, Pleading (13th
The proximate cause of an accident or injury is sometimes described as the immediate cause, the nearest cause, the actual or direct cause, or the efficient cause. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lucas (1889), 119 Ind. 583, 6 L. R. A. 193; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Buck (1884), 96 Ind. 346, 49 Am. Rep. 168; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Williams (1892), 131 Ind. 30; Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Houlihan (1901), 157 Ind. 494, 503, 54 L. R. A. 787.
It was said by Mr. Justice Strong in Insurance Co. v. Boon (1877), 95 U. S. 117, 130, 24 L. Ed. 395: “The proximate cause is the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets the other causes in operation. The causes that are merely incidental or instruments of a superior or controlling agency are not the proximate causes and the responsible ones, though they may be nearer in time to the result. It is only when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is, of course, to be charged with the disaster. A careful consideration of the authorities will vindicate this rule. Mr. Phillips, in his work on insurance, §1097, in speaking of a nisi prius case of a vessel burnt by the master and crew to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy (Gordon v. Rimmington [1807], 1 Camp. 123), says, the ‘maxim causa próxima spectatur affords no help in these cases, but is, in fact, fallacious; for if two causes conspire, and one must be chosen, the more scientific inquiry seems to be, whether one is not the efficient cause, and the other merely instrumental or merely incidental, and not which is nearer in place or time to the consummation of the catastrophe.’ ”
It is evident from the allegations of the complaint that there was but one efficient cause of the accident. The other events were the results and natural consequences of that cause. 21 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 485, 486.
The appellant owed to the appellee the duty of carrying
In regard to the objection that it does not appear that the servant in charge of the car was acting within the scope of his employment, it is sufficient to say that the averment “that the defendant through ’ and by its servant
The reasons for which a new trial was demanded, discussed by counsel for appellant, are, (1) that the damages assessed by the jury are excessive;’ (2) that the court erred in refusing to give instructions numbered one and two asked for by the appellant, and in giving instructions numbered five, six, seven, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve; and (3) that it erred in admitting certain evidence.
While the amount of the damages assessed by the jury was large, the injury was serious. The earning capacity of the appellee was- upwards of $100 per month, and the effects of the accident are likely to be permanent. The facts proved fully justified the jury in assessing the sum allowed, and we find no indication in the record that in awarding it they were subject to any improper influence. It is true that evidence was introduced by the appellant which tended to show that the injuries of the appellee were probably aggravated by his failure to refrain from labor, and to take proper care of himself. But the question of the amount of damages sustained by the appellee,, considered in connection with all the facts relating to his care or lack of care of himself, was one to be determined by the jury, and their decision is not so evidently erroneous and extravagant as to require us to interfere and set it aside.
The first instruction tendered and requested by the appellant was properly refused. After stating that the appellee could not recover for any aggravation of his injuries caused by his own neglect or imprudence, it con
The concluding part of the instruction under review was as follows: “If the defendant is liable at all in this action, it is liable only to the extent that the plaintiff would be damaged by its alleged negligent acts in case he gave to his injuries all reasonable and necessary medical attention until he could be cured.” The court, by its ninth instruction, covered every aspect of the duty of the appellee to heal himself of his injuries, to take proper care of his health, and to do nothing to aggravate his condition, or protract the period of his recovery. 1 It informed the jury that he could recover nothing for the results of a neglect of these duties, and it concluded with the very .words of instruction number one tendered by the appellant.
Instruction number two, requested by appellant, was in these words: “If you find from the evidence in this cause that the car upon which the plaintiff w'as riding was thrown from the track by some stone or other obstruction, and that the defendant was not negligent, as charged in the complaint, in the operation of the car, then I instruct you that the defendant would not be liable in this action, even though the evidence does not show in what manner’ the stone or obstruction was placed on or by the track so as to 'derail the ear.” So far as this instruction was applicable to the issues made by the pleading and to the evidence in the cause, it amounted to nothing more than a statement that, if the plaintiff had failed to prove his complaint, and
The fifth instruction given by the court is objected to on the ground that it informed the jury, in substance, that when an accident happens to a passenger, a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier arises, and that in such case it is incumbent on the carrier to produce evidence which will excuse its prima, facie failure of duty. The rule stated in the instruction has received the sanction of this court in numerous cases, and We perceive no reason for abrogating or modifying it. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Newell (1885), 104 Ind. 264, 274, 54 Am. Rep. 312, and cases cited; Brighton v. White (1891), 128 Ind. 320; Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. v. Sheeks (1900), 155 Ind. 74, 94-96, and cases cited.
The suggestion of counsel that-the jury is to determine from the facts proved whether the accident resulted from the negligence of the appellant or from want of care of the appellee is without force in this case. The appellee was entirely passive, and there was no pretense, and there could be none, that any act or omission of his had anything to do with the accident or injury. The facts proved authorized but one presumption or inference, which was that the accident and the consequent injury to the appellee were o'eca
It was stated in Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Sheeks, supra, at page 95: “While the burden is upon the passenger suing to maintain the affirmative of the issue, still under such eireiimstances, the mere happening of the accident is at least prima facie evidence of the negligence upon the part of the company or carrier, and it will be incumbent upon the latter to produce evidence which will excuse the prima, facie failure of duty on its part; or, in other words, it has the burden of proving, in order to rebut the presumption of negligence, under the circumstances, that the accident could not have been avoided by the exercise of the highest practical care and diligence.”
Proof of the accident and injury to the appellee, while being carried as a passenger by the appellant, in its car, over its road, in connection with the formal matters, stated in the complaint, raised a presumption of negligence on the part of the appellant, and it then devolved on the appellant to show by the evidence in the cause a legal excuse for the accident. If the accident was caused by a stone in the switch, and if this fact, under the circumstances in proof, could be considered sufficient to relieve the appellant from liability for the injury to the appellee, the burden of proving that a stone was in the switch, that its presence was the proximate cause of the accident, and such facts connected with the obstruction as exonerated the company from legal responsibility, was upon the appellant, and it was required to show by the evidence that the accident so occasioned
Similar objections are urged against the 'sixth instruction, and for like reasons that instruction must be sustained.
The seventh instruction has been considered and approved in another part of this- opinion, and requires no further discussion.
The ninth instruction given by the court, and which related to the duty of the appellee to take proper care of himself after the injury, and which admonished the jury that he could recover nothing for any aggravation of his injury and disability occasioned by his own neglect of proper care, has also been considered in connection with the second instruction asked for by the appellant and contains a correct statement of the law.
The tenth instruction given was confined to a statement of the law- relating to the measure of damages, and we find nothing objectionable in it.
The eleventh instruction, while inaccurate in its attempted definition of the phrase “burden of proof,” was harmless in that respect. It properly declared that, if the evidence upon any question in the case was evenly balanced, the decision of’the jury on that question should be against the party having the burden of proving such issue.
By the twelfth instruction, the jury were told, that if all other things were exactly equal in all respects, the witnesses of equal intelligence and credibility, having equal opportunities of knowledge, testifying with equal candor, intelligence, and fairness, the weight of the evidence under such circumstances should be considered to be on the side having the greater number of witnesses. The jury were further cautioned in this instruction as follows: “But it does not necessarily follow that the Weight of evidence is
The refusal of the court to strike from the testimony of the appellee the words, “they were going so fast,” did not constitute reversible error. Whether competent or incompetent, the statement could not have exercised a material influence upon the jury in deciding the issues of the case. They had all the facts before them, including testimony as to the speed of the car, and if the evidence objected to was the expression of an opinion, and not the statement of a fact, it could not prevail against the proof; if a just inference from the facts, it could do no harm.
The statement of Dr. Tinsley, that the sprain and injury of the appellee would be aggravated by riding on a locomotive, was not harmful to the appellant. On the contrary, it was calculated to reduce appellee’s damages; for, as the jury were properly told by the court, the appellee could recover nothing on account of the aggravation of his injury by any act or neglect of his own.
The expression of pain and suffering, or the indication of such condition by groans or inarticulate cries, was com
This case is a very plain one both on the law and the evidence. The plaintiff, a locomotive engineer, forty-eight years old, having employment, and earning $104 per month, was a passenger on appellant’s railroad, and paid his fare. He took his seat in the car, and was guilty of no fault or want of care. The car was run in the darkness of the early morning of November 15, 1900, at a speed of twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, and dashed into or against a switch. It was thrown from the track, and came in violent collision with a pole standing eighty-three feet from the road. The plaintiff was thrown to the floor and against a stove, and other passengers, one of whom weighed 225 pounds and another 140 pounds, fell on him. The feet of the man weighing 225 pounds struck him in the back. The plaintiff was badly injured “by and through the mere carelessness, negligence, unskilfulness, and misconduct of the defendant,” without the slightest fault or negligence on his part. His injuries confined him to his bed for two months, and to his house for a month longer. He suffered great pain, and the effect of the injury is
Judgment affirmed.