44 Ind. 76 | Ind. | 1873
Complaint by the appellee against the appellant, alleging, in substance, that, on, etc., the defendant was the owner of a railroad running through the counties of Dearborn and Decatur, in said State, on which she was running a locomotive and train of cars; that said locomotive and train of cars, while being run as aforesaid through the county of Dearborn, through the fault, mis
A demurrer was filed to the complaint, which was overruled, and the defendant excepted. Issue, trial, verdict, and judgment for the plaintiff.
It is objected that the complaint does not set forth with sufficient particularity and certainty the negligence imputed to the defendant. We think, upon an examination of form No. 14, prescribed by the legislature, in connection with the statute on the subject of forms (2 G. & H. 373, 377), that the complaint is sufficient.
We proceed with the case made by the evidence, as it is claimed that the verdict is not sustained thereby.
The plaintiff, by his agents or servants, was moving a drove of one hundred and fifteen mules to Cincinnati, along a highway that was crossed by the defendant’s railroad. When the mules arrived at the crossing, they were stopped and held back by those having them in charge, and a hand was sent on ahead to ascertain train time, who learned that the up train would be due in a few minutes, and that the down train was behind time, but how much does not appear. . The mules were held back until the up train had passed, when they were started across, the parties having them in- charge having examined and listened, and not hearing any approaching train. When about one-half of the mules had crossed the track, the whistle of the down train Was heard. The mules “strung out” a good deal, as mules will, according to the testimony, and the drove covered about one hundred yards in length in crossing the track; and although the hands were hurrying them across as fast as possible, before they could do so the train came on and did the injury complained of.
There is some discrepancy in respect to the speed at which the train was running. William H. Moore testifies that he got on at Indianapolis, where the train was two or three hours late, but don’t recollect whether any time was made up or not. Attention was called to the speed, but can’t say whether before or after the accident. Can’t say it was running faster than passenger trains usually do on a down grade. General Foley was on the train, got on at Greensburg. He says: “ The train was behind time, but I don’t know how much. I have travelled a good deal over this road. The train was running very fast, so much so as to attract the attention of passengers. The speed of the train, I thought, was much greater than ordinary. The train always goes rapidly on these heavy down grades, but this was running more rapidly than usual.”
The plaintiff was on the train. He says: " The train was behind time an hour or two. I travelled over this road a
The engineer on the train, James Watson, says: “We were running at the usual card time, twenty-five to thirty miles per hour. There were five cars. I was about fifty yards from the mules when I saw them. I signaled down breaks immediately, and felt the breaks applied, (In this he is corroborated by Gen. Foley, and others.) Could not check the train; it was impossible to check the train there. I did all in my power to check the train, but it was impossible to do so. It would take a quarter of a mile to stop the train on that grade.” A fireman testifies that they were running at about the usual speed.
Two questions arise on the facts and evidence. 1st. Was the plaintiff through those having the mules in charge, guilty of any negligence that contributed to the injury? 2d. If the plaintiff was not guilty of such negligence, did th‘e injury occur through the negligence and want of care on the part of the defendant ?
The jury found by their verdiet that the plaintiff was not guilty of such negligence, and we think they were justified in so finding. He, or rather those having charge of the mules, did, as it seems to us, all that could be reasonably expected of ordinarily careful and prudent men. When they came to the crossing, they did not rush carelessly across, but stopped the drove and sent ahead to make inquiries in respect to the time for the passing trains. The up train having passed, and having learned that the down train was behind time, but not knowing how much, but having examined and listened for its approach and not hearing it, we think it quite reasonable for them to have supposed that they might safely undertake to cross with their drove. It does not appear that the men in charge of the mules knew where the trains passed each other, or where there was a switch at which they could pass; but they knew that before the down ti-ain could arrive at the crossing, both traiqs must meet at a
We proceed to the second question. Was the defendant, through her agents, guilty of negligence? The jury, by their verdict, have found that she was.
The train, by which the injury was done, was running, doubtless, at a high rate of speed, and was not so held in check that it could have been stopped after the mules were discovered by those having it in charge, and before reaching the crossing. It was, perhaps, not necessary that it should have been thus held in check. Warner v. The New York Central Railroad Co., 44 N. Y. 465.
There was, as we have seen, a heavy down grade, commencing about four hundred yards above the crossing, and we think it clear enough from the evidence that it was impossible for the engineer to stop the train after discovering the mules before reaching the crossing. Owing to the curve in the line of the railway, a person standing at the crossing could see up the road only about two hundred yards.
We are led to inquire what signals the defendant gave of the approach of her train to the crossing. There does not appear to have been any ringing of the bell. The whistle was blown, but how far before reaching the crossing cannot
William Hamilton, a son of the plaintiff, who was with the drove, says: “It gave one long whistle1 about seventy-five or one hundred yards from the crossing. Could see the train before the whistle sounded.”
James Watson, the engineer on the train, on behalf of the defendant, testified: “I was about fifty yards from the mules when I saw them. I signaled down breaks immediately and felt the breaks applied. Could not check the train. It was impossible to check the train there.” Another witness, testifying on behalf of the defendant, says: “I was fireman on this train. I was about forty yards from this crossing when I saw the mules. I was out on the engine in
This is the only evidence on the subject of the whistle being blown; and we think the jury may well have inferred from it that the whistle was not blown at all until the train was about rounding the curve and within one or two hundred yards of the crossing. We have no statute, that we are aware of, that requires railroad companies to blow their whistle or ring their bell, before reaching the crossing of a highway; but that duty may devolve upon them without any statute. Ordinary care may require it. In this case, the speed at which the train was moving, the curvature of the road, rendering it impossible for those in the management of the train to see the crossing at any considerable distance from it, and for persons at the crossing to see an approaching train at any considerable distance off, the heavy down grade, rendering it difficult or impossible to stop the train within a short distance, and the fact that the train was behind time, leaving persons desirous of crossing the track upon the highway without any notice of the precise time at which the train might be expected, rendered it quite proper that a signal should be given of the approach of the train, at such reasonable distance from the crossing as would have enabled persons crossing or about to cross to guard against collision or accident. The jury have found by their verdict that this omission was negligent, and we are not disposed to disturb their verdict. See Beisiegel v. The New York Central Railroad Co., 34 N. Y. 622. We cannot say but that, if the whistle of the approaching train had been blown a half a mile before reaching the crossing (the usual distance, as was testified, of sounding the whistle before reaching a station), the mules might have been separated and removed from the track so ' as to have avoided the collision.
The judgment below is affirmed, with costs.