21 Iowa 370 | Iowa | 1866
This action is brought upon a judgment of the Circuit Cohrt of Greene county, in the State of Indiana, of which the following is a copy:
“The State oe Indiana ex rel.
Mary A. Stone
v.
“ Williamson Helmer.
Bastardy.
“ Comes now the plaintiff, by Bernes & Hill, her attorneys; and it appearing from the Iranscript of the proceedings had before the justice below that said defendant had been arrested and made his escape from the officer*371 before the trial in said justice’s court, and upon motion of plaintiff’s attorney said defendant is thrice called, comes not, but makes default. It is therefore considered that the matters and things in the complaint herein be taken as confessed against said defendant; and this cause is set down for trial by the court without the intervention of a jury; and, tho evidence being heard, the court finds that said defendant is the father of the child mentioned in the complaint herein, and that the relatrix herein is the mother of said child; that said defendant be charged with the education and maintenance of said bastard child. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the plaintiff recover of said defendant the sum of five hundred dollars, together with the costs herein laid out and expended, to be levied without regard to valuation laws. And it is further considered that when said sum of five hundred dollars shall be collected, that the same be paid unto this court for the benefit of said Dastard child, to be paid out according to the order of this court. It is further considered that whenever the defendant shall come within the reach of process of this court, that the clerk issue a warrant for his arrest, and when arrested shall stand committed till the judgment and costs be paid or replevied. Eecord signed April 19, 1861.
“JAMBS A. SCOTT, Judge."
An exemplified copy of tbis judgment, duly authenticated, was all the evidence introduced on the trial of the action. The only questions properly raised, preserved and presented for oür determination by the transcript, relate alone to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment of the court.
There is much of truth in the legal proposition upon which this claim rests; but the error is in its application. If the mother of the bastard child, begotten and born in the State of Indiana, had come to Iowa and sought by legal proceedings to compel the defendant, its father, to support it, and to give bond therefor, and otherwise comply with the requirements of the statutes of Indiana,- the
But where the local jurisdiction has attached, and the courts of that State or sovereignty have properly taken cognizance of the matter, and rendered judgment for such penalty, such judgment is entitled to “full faith and credit ” in every other State. If the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, it is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff therein to maintain an action thereon in another State. And the courts of such other State will not inquire into the facts upon which it was based, nor whether the cause of action would have been enforced by them. Healy v. Root, 11 Pick., 389; Connecticut v. Bradish, 14 Mass., 296. It is sufficient that a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered the judgment; such judgment is entitled to the same faith and credit in every other State as in that wherein it was rendered. Const, of U. S., art. 4, § 1.
The law of Indiana regulating prosecutions in cases of bastardy, after providing for the filing of the complaint before a justice of the peace and for the trial, bail, judg
It is very apparent, from this statute (properly before us) and the judgment record, that the court had jurisdiction of both the subject-matter and the person of the defendant. And although it may be true that the judgment was so irregular as that on appeal it would have been reversed, yet such irregularity would not avoid the judgment, nor could it be made available in any collateral attack upon it.
The judgment is in direct terms for the recovery of the sum of five hundred dollars; and, if it be true, as claimed,
III. The petition claimed in this case thirty-three dollars and forty -cents for the cost incurred in the recovery of the judgment sued on, and it also contained averments sustaining such claim. But it appears from the bill of exceptions that the judgment record set out s%vpra was all the evidence introduced on the trial of the cause. The judgment record does not show the amount of such costs, and, as there is a denial of the averment of the petition, the plaintiff could not recover such costs without proof of the amount. There was no such proof by sufficient and competent evidence, the certificate of the clerk being the only evidence, and to the extent of the costs the judgment is erroneous.
The excess may, at plaintiff’s option, be remitted, or the judgment will be at appellee’s costs.
Beversed.