124 Minn. 271 | Minn. | 1914
Proceedings under the authority conferred by chapter 258, p. 355, Laws 1913, to condemn a tract of state school land for the use and benefit of Independent School District of the city of Virginia, this state, for instruction and experimentation in agriculture. The land so sought to be taken being the property of the state, notice of the proceeding was served upon the attorney general as required by section 2524, K. L. 1905. The attorney general appeared at the hearing and moved for a dismissal on the ground, among •others, that the school lands of the state are not subject to condemnation for the purpose stated or otherwise, that the proceeding is •one to acquire rights in such lands contrary to the provisions of the state Constitution, to the effect that no state school lands shall be sold otherwise than at public sale, (section 2, art. 8, Const.) and, therefore, that the court is without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding. The motion was denied and the state appealed.
It is clear that no such implied grant can be spelled out of any of the statutes of the state enacted prior to 1872. But the legislature of that year apparently recognized’ the right as an existing one, and by necessary implication it was granted by section 15 of chapter 53 of the laws of that year. That statute was amendatory of the then existing statutes • granting the general power, of eminent domain to certain public service corporations and prescribing the procedure thereof, and the amendment, among other things, provided, in respect to the notice of hearing that, “in cases where the enterprise shall be located through or upon school or University lands, or any other lands belonging to this state, such notice shall be served upon the secretary of state or his assistant, and the commissioners shall
By this enactment, which is found unchanged in 2606, G. S. 1894, the legislature appreciated the fact that it might in particular instances be necessary to take state lands for some other public use, and for the purpose of protecting its rights in such a case required that the notice of the proceeding be served upon the secretary of state; and by the requirement that the commissioners assess damages to it in the same manner as to persons and corporations, not only recognized the right as of one of probable necessity, but by necessary implication granted the same.
The statute was in effect so construed in In re St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co. 34 Minn. 227, 25 N. W. 345, where the amended statute was cited in support of the decision that university lands might be condemned for railroad purposes. The court held that since the land there involved was not used for the purposes of the University it was liable “to be appropriated in same manner as lands of private persons.” The distinction between used and unused state land was further emphasized in University of Minnesota v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co. 36 Minn. 447, 31 N. W. 936. The distinction is in accord with the general doctrine that land already devoted to a public use cannot in proceedings in eminent domain, without express or implied grant, be taken for another and inconsistent public use. So that in the light of the act of 1872 and its application in the decisions referred to, the conclusion necessarily follows, as we view the question, that the right of condemnation of state land was granted by that statute by necessary implication. We so hold.
We follow and apply that decision, for it seems clear that a disposal of state lands in condemnation proceedings, where the value thereof is appraised and paid substantially as in the case of a public sale, is equivalent to a sale of that character and answers every purpose of the Constitution. Every right of the state, intended to be protected by the-Constitution, is as fully protected in one as in the other mode of disposal. No greater rights can be acquired in the
The obvious purpose of the constitutional restriction that “no portion of said lands shall be sold otherwise than at public sale,” was to prevent private salesj and effectually to preclude secret transactions with speculators. In other words, the intention was to surround the disposal of the lands with publicity, thus avoiding private or secret dealings, which often result disastrously to the best interests of the state. And a reading of all the provisions of the section of the Constitution in which this restriction is found tends to the conclusion that it was contemplated that title to such lands might be acquired otherwise than at public outcry, for it is therein provided that the proceeds of the sales “or other disposition” shall become a perpetual fund for the benefit of the schools of the state. While this clause cannot be said to have been included in the Constitution with a view to possible condemnation proceedings, it can be said that it was in the mind of the framers of the instrument that the lands, or some of them, might be disposed of in the due course of law otherwise than at public auction’. And we think that so long as the disposal is attended with publicity and in conformity with the requirements of the law in respect to the particular proceedings in which the title is sought to be acquired, the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution is complied with and not violated.
This covers all that need be said and the conclusion reached disposes of all questions raised. And for the reasons stated we hold that under chapter 258, p. 355, Laws 1913, the tract of land in question may be acquired by respondent school district for the educational purposes there prescribed.
Order affirmed.