178 Iowa 145 | Iowa | 1916
This is an action brought by the Independent School District of Switzer for the purpose of determining the validity of the organization of the Consolidated Independent School District of Hartford, and the rights of the defendants herein to act as directors and officers of said district, and, further, to determine the right of defendants and said school district to exercise authority over the SE % of Section 33, and the SW % of Section 34, Township 77, Range 22 west of the 5th P. M.
It is claimed that the land above described belongs to and is a part of the plaintiff district; that defendants have no authority or right to control the same. The prayer of plaintiff’s petition was that a decree be-entered, adjudging that the Consolidated Independent School District of Hartford has never been legally organized, and does not exist in law or fact; that the territory above described be decreed to belong to the plaintiff district for school purposes; that a temporary injunction be issued, restraining said consolidated district and the defendants from levying or collecting taxes for school purposes .from said territory, and from exercising any jurisdictionover said territory for school purposes.
The facts are that the plaintiff is an independent school district, and claims to have within its borders, as a school district, 2% sections of land, including the half section in controversy. This half section was a part of plaintiff’s territory until about the month of April, 1912. About this time, the Independent School District of Hartford, Richland Township, Warren County, was organized. When organized, it included within its territory the town of Hartford, considerable surrounding territory, and the land in controversy. This land was tahen from the plaintiff district, leaving the plaintiff district, after the organization of the Independent District of Hartford, with but 1% sections of land. This organ
“When a petition describing the boundaries of contiguous territory containing not less than sixteen sections within one or more counties is signed by one third of the electors .residing on such territory, and approved by the county superintendent, if of one county, and the superintendent of each if of more than one county, and by the state superintendent of public instruction if the county superintendents do not agree, and filed with the board of the school corporation in which the portion of the proposed district having the largest number of voters is situated, requesting the establishment of a consolidated independent district, it shall be the duty of said board, within ten days, to call an election in the proposed consolidated district, for which they shall give the same notices*149 as are required in Section 2746 of tbe Code, and 2750 of tbe Supplement to the Code, 1907, at which election all voters residing in the proposed consolidated district shall be entitled to vote by ballot for or against such separate organization. ’ ’
This, petition was signed by more than one third of the electors residing in such territory, and was approved by the county superintendent of schools of Warren County. Upon the filing and approval of said petition, the president of said board called a special meeting of the board for June 8, 1914, on which date the board met, all the members of the board being present except one Halderman. At this meeting an election was called for June 25, 1914. On this date the election was held, and the requisite number of votes was east in favor of the consolidation of said territory, described in said petition, into a consolidated independent district. It is admitted that all the provisions of the section herein set out were complied with, except as noted hereafter.
It appears that the territory proposed to be consolidated contained the requisite number of sections; that there was included in the requisite number of sections, and as a part of said new district, the SE 14= of Section 33 and the SW °f Section 34, now claimed by the plaintiff. All the territory included in this new Consolidated Independent District of Hartford was in Warren County. The lands in dispute in Sections 33 and 34 were also in Warren County. This disputed territory was a part of the school district of Swan, at the time the petition was filed, at the time it was approved by the county superintendent of Warren County, at the time the board met on June 8th, and up to the 22d day of June, 1914. On this day, the boards of directors of the Independent School District of Switzer and the Independent School District of Swan met, and, by concurrent action, the half section of land in controversy in Sections 33 and 34 was transferred and conveyed from the Swan district to the Switzer district, thus making the territory of the Switzer district contain 2% sections. The action of the consolidated independent school
It is claimed that the action of the Swan and Switzer districts, in transferring this half section to the plaintiff district, gave to the Switzer district 2*4 sections; that the action of the Consolidated Independent District of Hartford, in taking this half section, reduced the Switzer district, in violation of the statute. The' portion of the statute relied upon is found in Section 2794-a, Code Supp., 1913, and reads as follows:
“No school corporation from which territory is taken to form such a consolidated independent corporation shall, after the change, contain less than four government sections.”
Upon the facts above disclosed, the district court dismissed plaintiff’s petition. From this, plaintiff appeals.
The ease is triable- do novo■ here. The facts, however, are not in dispute.
“Such special meetings may be held as may be determined by the board, or called by the president, or by the secretary upon the written request of a majority of the members of the board, upon notice specifying the time and place, delivered*151 to each, member in person, but attendance shall be a waiver of notice. ’ ’
In Barclay v. School Township, 157 Iowa 181, this court, construing this section, said:
“The personal delivery of some form of a notice is required. . . . On account of the failure to give proper notice to Anderson (one of the board of directors), the special meeting of the board was not lawfully called, and its action . . . was therefore invalid.”
The statute expressly requires that some notice be delivered to each member in person.
J. F. Brown, president of the Hartford school board, testified that, when the petition for the consolidated district was filed, he called the members of the board together on June 8th. That was at a special meeting. “I notified, them by phone. My recollection is that Mr. Halderman was sick, and was not able to answer the phone, and his wife answered the phone when I called there.”
Halderman testifies that he was sick from the 30th of May for probably two weeks thereafter, and not able to leave his home at all; that he was sick in bed most of the time, and was not able to go to the meeting at Hartford on June 8th.
His wife testified that she remembered having the conversation with Mr. Brown over the phone in June. Mr. Brown told her that there was going to be a school meeting, and “wanted to know if I thought my husband would be able to attend, and I told him he would not be. He was confined at the house at the time, and not attending to any business.” She says it seems to her that the board was to meet on the day on which Mr. Brown called her over the phone; that he called her in the morning, and that the board was to meet that night. She says, however, that she does not remember that Mr. Brown told her the time when the meeting would convene, and that she does not remember where Mr. Brown said the meeting would be. She was asked this question:
' ‘ Did you tell Mr. Halderman that Mr. Brown said that*152 tbe meeting would be -in Hartford in the sehoolhouse at 8 o’clock? A. I don’t know whether I did or not, because I don’t remember, but I told Mr. Halderman whatever Mr. Brown told me. I don’t remember anything, only that he said there was going to be a school meeting. Mr. Brown called sometime in the forenoon, I am positive of that. I don’t know that I just told Mr. Halderman at the time. I don’t think I stopped to tell him just then. I knew he was not able to go. I told him afterwards. I remember of telling him, because he said I done right, because he was not able to attend the school business, let alone his own, and he said he was going to drop out of the school business as soon as the time came when he could.”
Halderman lived only 2^ miles from Hartford. The statute does not fix the length of notice, nor the character of notice, nor how it shall be delivered. The evidence is not very full touching the delivery of this notice to Halderman. The record discloses that, if it had been delivered at any time within two weeks prior to the 8th, he could not have been present. We think there was sufficient evidence of the receipt of notice over the telephone.
This court, in Gallagher v. School Township, 173 Iowa 610, construed this statute touching the character of notice required, and said:
"All members, except F. M. Sexton, attended, and he had notice by telephone in ample time to enable him to attend, and he failed to be there, not owing to the kind of notice — i. e., oral, over the phone — but for that he was working on the road and reached home, as he testified, too late to attend. The sufficiency of this notice is challenged, it being contended that Section 2757 of the Code Supplement, providing that the president may call a meeting of the board of directors ‘upon notice specifying the time and place, delivered to each member,’ exacts written notice. The mere fact that it must be delivered does not require this construction, for notice by woi’d of mouth may be delivered quite as effectually as one in writ*153 ing. What this exacts is that it actually reach the several members, so that each shall be informed of the time and place of meeting. . . . For this purpose, oral notice would be as effective as written, and there is nothing in the context indicating that' one was intended rather than the other. ’ ’
We think this case disposes of plaintiff’s contention on this point. The court below, in disposing of this question, said:
“In this case, under the record, there can be no serious doubt that TIalderman had actual notice or information or knowledge of the time and place of the special meeting, prior to the time of the meeting, the only question .being as to the character of the notice, and the manner of its delivery. ’ ’
And the court held that the character of the notice and the manner of its delivery made a sufficient compliance with the statute. . In this holding of the court, we concur.
The next question relied upon by appellant involves the construction of that portion of Section 2794-a of the Supplement to the Code which provides:
school districts : formation of district: consolidated district: petiperiñténJent," “When a petition describing the boundanés of contiguous territory containing not . . , ,. ., . less than sixteen sections within one or more counties is signed by one third of the electors residing on such territory, and approved by the county superintendent, if of one county, and the superintendent of each if of more than one county. ’•*
It appears from the statement of facts that all of the territory included in this Consolidated Independent District of Hartford is in the county of Warren, and that the petition was approved' by the county superintendent of schools of Warren County. This would seem to be an answer to plaintiff’s contention. The plaintiff, however, claims that, as this land in Sections 33 and 34 was, at the time that the petition was filed, a part of the Independent District of Swan, and the Independent District of Swan included lands not only in Warren, but also in Marion County, that it was necessary,
“If such action can defeat the formation of a consolidated independent district, designing adjoining school boards could prevent the formation of any consolidated independent district.”
At the time the petition was filed and acted upon by the county superintendent and the board, at the time the special meeting was called, and up to within three days of the election, the territory in question was a part of the Swan independent district; was no part of plaintiff district. It was taken from the Swan district. The Swan district is not complaining. We think the plaintiff has no just ground of complaint, and the record discloses that it is now left with all the territory it had at the time this consolidated independent district was proposed, the petitiqn circulated, filed and acted upon by the county superintendent and the school board. We think plaintiff is not in a position to complain on this point. As throwing some light upon these questions, see School District Twp. v. Independent District, 149 Iowa 480; Wallace v. Independent School District, 150 Iowa 711; Gallagher v. School District, supra.
Other questions are urged, but we do not deem them sufficiently supported in the record to justify a discussion of them here.
Upon the whole record, we think the district court was right, and its action is — Affirmed.