*1 to the off-limits the matter places That sale that very aspects of the consider the FERC. agency specifi- by an assessed have been . authority Congress with cally vested for re- petition grant PGT’s We therefore subject. over the the Commis- challenges as view insofar of what in terms 1(c) NGA, is couched Although ANR authority under sion’s consider, a required to is 717(c). the Commission dis- also Accordingly, .§ we U.S.C. Congress when logical implication by the CPUC petition filed moot miss as a matter jurisdiction over explicitly reserves (without agency has resolving whether no here, has states, the Commission deny peti- complain) and we standing to n a “induc[e] how to considering Expansion business by Altamont and tion filed respect to that policy” with state] change [of Shippers. event, offers the Commission In matter. So ordered. authority. contrary no that it has Instead, insists Commission rates jurisdictional
merely PGT’s lowered authority intruding upon the
without The, rings hollow indeed. claim This CPUC. equity return PGT’s lowered
Commission change to “indue[e] to a
specifically jurisdictional purview,” beyond [its] policy regulate PG&E i.e., the CPUC to pressure PETROLEUM INDEPENDENT could desired but as the Commission AMERICA, OF ASSOCIATION circumstances, the require. Under itself al., Appellants, et attempting to do indeed was Commission directly, that not do indirectly could what .it Congress
is, that the a matter intercede in al., Appellees. BABBITT, et Bruce Cen State. See Northwest reserved 95-5210, 95-5245. Nos. Comm’n, Corp. Pipeline v. State tral . 493, 512, 109 S.Ct. U.S Appeals, Court States United (“The (1989) designed NGA was L.Ed.2d 509 Circuit. District Columbia produce power and supplement state regulation of comprehensive April harmonious 1996. Argued reg nor industry. Neither state federal Aug. Decided juris upon the ulatory body to encroach other”). diction III. Conclusion a Hin conceding that PG&E expressly de pipeline, the Commission
shaw company’s pipeline
clined-to look behind and to treat PG&E
corporate structure uphold that company. single We
PGT as hold therefore
step as reasonable must exempt rates
that PG&E’s California Al jurisdiction of the Commission. ordinarily has the
though. the Commission beyond its
authority consider a matter jurisdictional matter affects
jurisdiction if the abe there would otherwise least
sales' —at if gap there is no such
regulatory gap-—here congression
but, contrary, express body. jurisdiction to another
al reservation of *2 Lazarus, Depart- B. United States
William Justice, appel- argued the cause ment of Acting lees, Coppelman, Peter D. with whom General, L. Attorney and Robert Assistant DC, were on Washington, Klarquist, *3 brief. DC, McBride, Washington,
Lawrence G. curiae Interstate for amicus was on the brief al., et Association America Natural Gas appellants. support of LA, Whitrock, Rouge, Baton Frederick C. curiae State was on the brief amicus support appellees. Louisiana Attorney Unna, Gen- Special Assistant Jan eral, curiae State on the brief for amicus was Mexico. of New DC, Grant, an Washington, entered E. Jill curiae Jicarilla appearance amicus Apache Tribe. BUCKLEY, and SENTELLE
Before: ROGERS, Judges. Circuit court filed Circuit Opinion for the Judge SENTELLE. dissenting opinion filed Circuit
Separate Judge ROGERS.
SENTELLE, Judge: Circuit gas producer and and Appellants, oil association, industry chal- petroleum trade arbitrary capricious and incon- lenge as Department of applicable law a sistent with (“DOI”) royal- decision to collect the Interior gas pro- charges from the ties interest appellant on ducer of a well on made to a lessee natural exchange com- allotted Indian lands prospective accrued and take-or- promise of outstanding contract. under an pay liabilities appellant claims gas producer also royalties to collect if the DOI decision even valid, by a government is barred collecting from of limitations statute specific take-or-pay set- on the and interest this case. The issue in tlement summary judgment granted District Court government on both issues. Because for the impermissibly depart- that DOI for we argued the conclude Leggette, L. Poe causes Bruce, attempt- whom, practices its established ed from E. appellants, with Edward DC, ing collect Washington, was on the briefs. (1991) (“AGA II)). Previously, District Court and we reverse the natural
payment,
merchants,
gas pipelines
appellant
pur
cannot
acted
gas producer
hold that the
wellhead,
it,
chasing gas at
transporting
any royalties on the set-
required
be
reselling it
compa
to local distribution
accordingly find it
payment. We
tlement
(“LDCs”)
large
nies
end users.
In the
unnecessary
the statute of limita-
to consider
1980s,
concluding
system
after
that this
re
tions issue.
sulted
various market distortions and inef
ficiencies,
Energy
Regulatory
Federal
Background:
Indus-
I.
The Natural Gas
(“FERC”) began
Commission
lengthy
Royalties
“Take-or-Pay”
try and
process
transforming
pipelines
from
Payments and Settlements
gas. Along
merchants to common carriers of
DOI,
Management
through its Minerals
way, Congress completed
deregula
*4
(“MMS”),
and administers
issues
Service
gas prices through
tion of wellhead
the Natu
gas production
leases for offshore oil and
(“De
ral Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
Lands Act
under the
Continental Shelf
Outer
Act”),
101-60,
control
Pub.L. No.
103 Stat.
(“OCSLA”),
§
seq.,
43
1331 et
for
U.S.C.
regulated
pricing,
157. Under
wellhead
production on federal
lands under
onshore
pipelines,
policy,
consistent with FERC
had
(“MLA”),
Leasing Act
30 U.S.C.
the Mineral
long-term,
price
entered into
fixed
wellhead
Leasing
seq.,
§
and the Mineral
Act
181 et
purchase
price
contracts. After wellhead
de
Lands,
seq.,
§
Acquired
30
351 et
for
U.S.C.
regulation
price
gas dipped
the market
production on Indian tribal and allot-
and for
long-term
prices
well below the
contract
396, 396a-396g.
§§
ted lands under 25 U.S.C.
I,
pipelines
pay.
were committed to
AGD
royalty provisions
leases include
Certain DOI
824 F.2d
995-96.
percentage
calculate
as a
which
Unfortunately
pipelines,
for the
the well
saved,
production
“amount or value of the
usually
take-or-pay
head contracts
contained
See,
removed,
e.g.,
or sold”
the lessee.
provisions,
required
pipeline
which
(C)
(G);
OCSLA,
1337(a)(1)(A),
§
43 U.S.C.
&
seventy-five percent
for as much as
226(b)
k(l)(2);
MLA,
§
see also
30 U.S.C.
&
if it
eontraeted-for
even
did not take the
(1995) (tribal leases);
§
25
25
211.13
C.F.R.
(Often,
gas.
pipeline
Id. at 996.
could
(1995) (Indian
§ 212.16
allotted land
C.F.R.
payments
“make-up gas,”
credit these
toward
leases).
dispute
over
This case involves
gas taken at a later date. See Diamond
lump-sum payments
by gas
made
whether
Hodel,
Exploration
Shamrock
Co. v.
853
large “take-or-
pipelines to lessees to settle
(5th Cir.1988) (“Diamond
1159,
F.2d
1164
long-term gas
pay” liabilities accrued under
Shamrock”)).
pipelines
Because the
could
purchase
properly
contracts are
long-term
rely
corresponding
sales
royalties.
(FERC
customers
had
contracts
their
controversy
from a fundamen
This
arises
abrogate
allowed those customers to
such
industry
change
natural
over
tal
pipelines,
contracts with
see Wisconsin Gas
generally
past
years.
several
See
United
(D.C.Cir.1985),
FERC,
1144,
v.
770 F.2d
Co.
FERC,
Distribution Cos. v.
ment “in resolution and
original purchaser,
in-
instead of the
obligations and liabilities
ment of
and all
buyout
does not
volved in the
situation
*7
may
or
have under the
that Southern has
change
The result from the
the result.
Agreement and Re-
Contract.” Settlement
perspective, and the benefit to the
lessee’s
1987).
(December 1,
the same
at 2
On
lease
production,
is the same
lessee
gas for-
day,
contracted to sell the
Samedan
identity
party
regardless of the
tak-
merly
to Hadson Gas
allocated to Southern
delivery.
bought
If
out
ing
volumes
(“Hadson”)
price.
at
the market
Systems,
produced
to the substitute
and delivered
Subsequently,
sold some of the
Samedan also
agreement,
purchaser under a successor
1989,
By
had sold
gas to Transok.
Samedan
paid by
original purchaser
the amount
would have been sold to
all the
which
obligation to take the
to be relieved of its
contract,
the 1981
but South-
Southern under
part
which the lessee
gas is
of the benefit
of it.
purchased
ern
none
production.
pay-
derives from that
attributable to those vol-
ment therefore is
years
and after an audit of
Several
later
part of the total amount
umes and becomes
royalty obligations,
ordered
MMS
Samedan’s
production.
for that
paid to the lessee
$20,000
royalties,
which
Samedan
$100,000
twenty
Id. at 16-17. Assistant
Deer
represented
percent
that
payment
found irrelevant
the fact
from Southern. MMS
206.152(b)(l)(ii) (1993),
regula-
Be-
one
Order re Contract Settlement
Service
governing
oversight of
Corporation and South-
tions
MMS’
tween Samedan Oil
payments, refers to “the total consideration
Company
Natural
Dated December
ern
Gas
1993).
(December
actually
directly or indi-
applied
transferred either
MMS
Babbitt,
dent
Ass’n America v.
buyer to the seller for the
Petroleum
rectly from the
added).
(D.D.C.
1995)
is no rea-
(emphasis
“[T]here
regulation cannot mean IPAA, the District Court considered to which the of the sales contracts both (1) May three issues: whether the 1993 letter subject involved under the circumstances was rulemaking subject awas to APA notice-and- Corp., Oil MMS-94-0003- here.” Samedan (2) appro- comment what the requirements, IND at 18. priate reviewing standard is for the Assistant rejected Secretary also Assistant 16, 1994, September decision of May argument that the 1993 let- Samedan’s (3) whether that decision should survive prior with numerous ter was inconsistent IPAA, appropriate level of review. positions. Id. at 18-23. agency decisions and WL 431305 at *3. The court held that the rejected the claim that under the She also letter did not constitute a rule for APA no- (“APA”) Act Administrative Procedure purposes. “Nothing tice-and-comment validly issued without letter could not be procedures authority in DOI’s vests the As- rulemaking, concluding notice-and-comment MMS, or Di- sociate Director of even the within ... the letter “falls well rector, proclamations binding to issue exception to the APA’s notice-and-comment agency.... May The court finds that the rules, requirements ‘interpretive general statement,’- ‘agency letter is not an it has no policy, agency orga- statements of or rules effect,’ binding ‘prescribe ‘future and cannot nization, practice.’” Id. at procedure, and ” policy.’ law or Id. at *4. The court also 553(b)(3)(A)). (quoting 23-24 5 U.S.C. She if determined even the letter were a $10,294 payment concluded that the further rule, exempt'from it was notice-and-comment take-or-pay to settle accrued liabilities was rulemaking clearly interpre- because “it was reasoning royalties, that such also *6; tative not substantive.” Id. see also payment possible future a makes 553(b)(A) (“[T]his APA, 5 U.S.C. subsec- delivery prices. compro- at lower “The apply interpretative tion does not ... payment properly regarded mise therefore rules, general policy, statements of or rules anticipation price as a lower agency organization, procedure, prac- if and to the to be received the lessee tice.”). produces extent the lessee later take-or-pay payment volumes to which The District Court next concluded applied.”
would have
Id. at 27. Same-
been
protestations,
despite
plaintiffs’
agree-
dan also claimed that the settlement
apply
would
to Assistant
Deer’s
comparable
legal judgment,
to a
U.S.A., Inc.
production,
which
not a
decision the deferential Chevron
Council, Inc.,
imposition
royalties was inconsis- v. Natural Resources
that the
Defense
2778, 2781-82,
843, 104
previous
and with
tent with
MMS decision
467 U.S.
S.Ct.
(1984),
prior FERC statements about the nature of
and Enron
L.Ed.2d 694
Oil
Gas
Cir.1992),
(5th
payments. The As-
*8
Lujan,
v.
978 F.2d
215
Co.
Secretary rejected
arguments
denied,
813, 114
sistant
these
510
rt.
U.S.
S.Ct.
ce
(1993),
at
as well. Id.
30-36.
We held
Appellants argue that normal admin
rule,”
legislative
a rule
prior
it is
amends a
istrative,
apply
law standards do not
in this
subject
“legal
to notice-and-eom-
effect”
claim,
They
they
case.
as
did in the District
requirements. Appellants contend that
Court,
that Assistant
Deer’s deci
past practice of ex-
the letter altered DOI’s
actually interpret
sion does not
statutes
cluding take-or-pay settlement
rules,
agency
interprets
but instead
the Fifth
However,
ap-
if
proceeds.
even
gross
from
Circuit’s decision in Diamond
claim that
pellants are correct
their
which,
contend,
they
already
has
addressed
system in
royalty computation
the letter de-
controversy
They
at issue
this case.
substantially
prior legislative
from a
parted
argue
“reinterpretation”
that DOI’s
of Dia
rule,
not itself constitute a
the letter would
problematic
mond
is
Shamrock
because DOI
re-
to notice-and-comment
“rule”
already
regulations
has
amended its
to com
agency
an
quirements.
Id. The letter is not
ply
supra
with Diamond Shamrock. See
all,
interpretative, be-
legislative
rule at
(citing
Revision Gross Proceeds Defi
to,
capable
it
purport
it
nor is
cause
does
Regulations,
nition in Oil and Gas Valuation
However,
of, binding
agency.
appellants’
(Nov.
45,082,
45,083
45,084,
Fed.Reg.
past practice with
arguments about DOI’s
1988)). Thus,
claim,
they
agency
is
rele-
regard to
settlements are
acquies
its own hand —it is
own
bound
its
the Assistant
vant to our evaluation of
Secre-
cence
Diamond Shamrock that bars it
case, and
tary’s decision in the Samedah
we
“reinterpreting”
from
that decision. Because
appel-
as we now turn to
will consider them
court,
agency,
and not
administrative
challenges to that decision.
lants’
proper place
construing past judi
is the
decisions, appellants
cial
contend that we
Secretary’s Decision
B. The Assistant
interpretations.
should not defer to DOI’s
Review
1. Standard of
By implication, we would also not afford the
actions of administrative
We review
Assistant
decision
benefit
arbitrary
capricious
agencies under the
standard,
arbitrary
capricious
the APA’s
706(2)(A).
APA,
standard of the
U.S.C.
already
Diamond
has
deter
as
Shamrock
earlier, in
we
noted
our review
defer
As we
analysis.
APA
mined the outcome of the
agency’s
interpretation of a
to an
reasonable
Appellants
support
cite in
of their claim
long
so
statute it is entrusted
administer
interpreta
that we
not defer to DOI’s
should
unambigu
it
not inconsistent with the
the United
tion of Diamond Shamrock
ously expressed congressional intent. Chev
Supreme Court’s statement
States
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De
ron
we have determined a statute’s clear
“[o]nee
Council, Inc.,
837, 842-13, 104
467 U.S.
fense
meaning, we adhere to that determination
(1984).
2778, 2781-82,
L.Ed.2d 694
S.Ct.
decisis,
“[djeference
the doctrine of stare
and we
under
noted,
As the
Court
District
agency’s
interpretation
later
judge an
clearly
agency
in order when an
even more
against
prior
our
determination of the
statute
interprets
regula
its own administrative
Industries,
meaning.” Maislin
IPAA,
statute’s
(citing
1258
interpretation
that
respect
a
of a sister
termination
DOFs
deserving of
as
decision
authority
circuit,
binding
gross proceeds
on us.
rule is unreasonable under
but it is not
is,
case,
in
if
in-
language from Maislin is therefore
That
this
DOI’s
The cited
Chevron.
proceeds
point.
terpretation
gross
rule is
not on
unreasonable, it is unreasonable because the
say
agency’s
This is not to
that the
application
interpretation
of that
in the case
Fifth
decision is
acquiescence in the
Circuit’s
take-or-pay
payments
of
consti-
Chevron,
unimportant. Under
irrelevant or
unexplained departure
tutes an
from the
gross proceeds
interpretation of
DOI’s
agency’s adoption of Diamond Shamrock.
only to a standard of reasonable
rule is held
Broadcasters,
See National Association of
ness,
interpretation must be reason
but the
F.2d at 1201.
740
adoption Diamond
ligkt
able in
DOI’s
Apache
ar
706(2)(A) review,
Amicus the Jicarilla
Tribe also
§APA
Shamrock. Under
gues
a
different from
standard
review
Secretary’s decision must satis
the Assistant
law standards we normal
the administrative
arbitrary
fy
capricious
and
standard inso
Tribe,
ly apply. According
we are
payments
far
it treats contract settlement
Secretary’s
not
review the Assistant
decision
differently
way
take-or-pay
it
treats
standard,
arbitrary
capricious
An
under the
and
payments under Diamond Shamrock.
rigorous
in
but under the
standard of a fiducia
agency must treat similar cases
a similar
legitimate
ry duty
it
Indian
who
provide
manner unless
can
owed
DOI to
tribes
failing
leasing
Among
to do so. See National
are
Indian lands.
other
reason
FCC,
v.
things,
Association Broadcasters
the Tribe relies on a Tenth Circuit
(D.C.Cir.1984)
1190,
(stating
fiduciary duty
1201
that
opinion which states that this
agency
depart
from its conclusion
requires
could
to Indian oil and
lessors
that
explana
prior
in a
decision without reasoned
merely
DOI’s “actions must not
meet
tion).
law,
requirements
minimal
of administrative
pass scrutiny
but must also
under the more
past,
in
As we have noted
“Chev
stringent
of a
standards demanded
fiducia
arbitrary
capricious
and
and
re
ron review
ry.”
Apache
Supron
v.
Jicarilla
Tribe
Ener
overlap
margins.”
view
Arent v.
(10th Cir.1984)
1555,
gy Corp., 728 F.2d
1563
Shalala,
(D.C.Cir.1995);
615
F.3d
J.,
(Seymour,
concurring
part
in
and dissent
Regulatory
National Ass’n
Util. Comm’rs
ing
part),
majority
adopted as
en banc
(D.C.Cir.1994).
ICC,
F.3d
(10th
Cir.),
opinion, 782 F.2d
cert.
overlap.
The instant case falls within that
denied,
U.S.
S.Ct.
A
that
has acted incon
determination
DOI
(1986).
unnecessary
L.Ed.2d 416
find it
We
sistently
adoption
of Diamond
its
fiduciary duty argu
to consider the Tribe’s
phrased
Shamrock could be
as a conclusion
ment. Even if the Assistant
de
agency’s interpretation
that
is unrea
standard,
cision should be
this
light
adoption
of its
of the Fifth
sonable
pass
arbitrary
must also
the APA’s
and ca
agency
decision or that
had
Circuit’s
pricious test. Because we conclude below
arbitrarily
treating
take-or-pay
acted
set
arbitrary
that the decision fails to meet the
payments differently
tlement
from take-or-
test,
capricious
and
we need not reach the
pay payments,
governed by
which are
fiduciary duty issue.
agency’s adoption of Diamond Shamrock.
proceed
We now
to examine the Assistant
analytic
two
frameworks
this case
Secretary’s decision under the APA’s arbi-
produce
ques
the same result. Because the
trary
capricious
standard of review.
analysis
tion at the root of the
is whether
types
payments
DOI has treated the two
Analysis
differently,
arbitrary
capricious
ana
However,
must decide whether it was arbi
lytic
apt.
framework is the most
?
trary
capricious
DOI to conclude
we stress
within the boundaries of this
case,
take-or-pay
payments
royalty
determination
the Assistant Sec
(follow
bearing
light
retary’s
arbitrary
capricious
of its determination
decision is
Shamrock)
light
adoption
ing
of DOI’s
of Diamond
Diamond
functionally equivalent
bearing
Shamrock is
de-
themselves are not
*11
only
take-or-pay payments
on
and are
due on
specifically allocat-
payments are
until those
[i.e.,
gas actually produced
from the
and taken
physically severed
so-
gas
that is
ed
“make-up” gas].’”
that DOI has failed
conclude
called
Revision of Gross
ground. We
nonarbitrary
for
reason
a sufficient
Definition in
give
Proceeds
Oil
Gas Valuation
payments
(No-
different-
types
45,082, 45,082
treating
Fed.Reg.
the two
Regulations, 53
1988).
ly-
vember
DOI thus demonstrated
that it understood Diamond Shamrock to be
analysis
an examination
begin our
We
saying
royalties
only
that
would
be due on
holding in Diamond
basis for the
take-or-pay type payments
pay-
when those
placed heavy
Fifth Circuit
Shamrock.
recouped.
ments were
Two sentences later
roy-
necessary link between
emphasis on
order,
quoted
in its revision
DOI
from the
gas, finding it
production of
and actual
alties
court’s conclusion with the bracketed inser-
statutes, regula-
from the relevant
“obvious”
royalty
take-or-pay pay-
is due on
tion: “No
royalties
provisions that
“are
and lease
tions
gas [namely, make-up
and until
ments unless
even ‘market value’
on ‘value’ or
due
gas]
actually produced and taken.” Id. at
is
abstract,
produc-
value of
but
on the
45,083.
emphasizes that
This insertion
DOI
saved,
from the leased
removed or sold
tion
in 1988 as
read Diamond Shamrock
we read
Shamrock, 853 F.2d at
property.” Diamond
because,
today.
important
it
This fact is
as
Similarly,
determined that
the court
subsection,
previous
we noted
is the
“only
applies
gross
gross proceeds rule
agency’s adoption
application
of Dia-
the lessee from the
proceeds that accrue to
that is the
mond Shamrock
relevant consid-
substances,
produced
disposition or sale of
another Fifth
eration. DOI cites
Circuit
is,
actually
and delivered to
removed
Co.,
case, Frey
Production
v. Amoco
pipeline.” Id.
(5th Cir.1991),
vacated
review
F.2d 578
for
required
argues that the
connection
DOI
Court,
Supreme
F.2d
Part
Louisiana
royalties
physical severance
between
(5th
reinstated,
Cir.1992),
IIA
follow between the ROGERS, Judge, dissenting: Circuit obligations. the cancellation of contractual Secretary court that the way no in which the occurrence of The concludes We see adopted impermissible changes functional na- the Interior inter- negotiations these regulations royalty purposes. pretation of his when he deter- ture of the cases, buy-out payments question in both under mined that contract The relevant Shamrock, of accrued liabilities is whether or not the settlements Diamond actually “gross proceeds” making up among received funds gas production. any gas ground. When a lessee for The court relies severed reasoning dispute poses arbitrarily capriciously reject it for 3. We do not this dis- others. power proposition agencies have the sent's single nonacquiescence in decisions of a cir- colleague’s rejection 4. We do not understand our p. cuit. Dissent at 1261 & n. 3 & n. 4. That proposition that Diamond Shamrock de- proposition simply inapplicable here. The is pends recoupability. portion on of the Dia- acquiesce Secretary did not refuse to Diamond opinion quoted by colleague our mond Shamrock applicable amended the but instead p. expressly reflects that "no is due explanations regulations accompanying with take-or-pay payments unless and until adopting interpreting Diamond Shamrock. [namely, make-up gas] actually produced and acquiescence, While free to refuse p. taken.” Dissent at 1264. It is not clear to us free, text, taking make-up gas for the reasons set forth in the how the pur- recoupability. adopt for some could ever occur absent the Diamond Shamrock rule interpretations Exploration accord the rationale Shamrock largely on Diamond (5th Cir.1988), Hodel, change of Diamond This subtle Shamrock. v.Co. Secretary’s acquiescence approach the Dia- misconceives the nature of the and the holding, Revision Gross acquiescence Shamrock in Diamond Sham- mond and Gas Valua- in Oil Proceeds rock. Definition (1988) 45,082 Fed.Reg. Regulations, tion accept was not bound to Revision). (Gross contrary, To the Proceeds *13 holding at in of Diamond least responding in to Secretary made clear the cases reviewable in courts outside the Fifth regulations that the Diamond Shamrock disagreed has Circuit. Even after one circuit requiring the of changed to extent were position, agency with its is entitled to of from the earth that actual severance independent maintain its assessment of the any on are due must occur before regulations dictates the statutes and is challenged interpreta- the revenue. Because charged administering, hope in the that royal- assess in consolidated cases tions these circuits, Court, Supreme other or Con occurs, there is only after such severance ties gress ultimately uphold agency’s pos will inconsistency Secretary’s po- between the no Mendoza, ition.3 See United States v. 464 acquiescence in Diamond and his sition 154, 160, 568, 572, U.S. 104 78 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. Accordingly, respectfully I dis- Shamrock. (1984); 379 see also American Tel. & Tel. Co. sent. FCC, (D.C.Cir.1992) 727, v. 978 F.2d 737 I. (referring agency’s “right to to refuse to courts), critical, acquiesce” in in these decisions of circuit cert. preliminary, A issue denied, 913, 3020, of review. Or 509 U.S. 113 S.Ct. 125 proper is the standard cases (1993). courts, in to consider L.Ed.2d 709 While some dinarily, the is entitled one, cluding agencies this criticized interpreting in both the stat have deference able 1 here, apply v. refuse to the settled law of the circuit Chevron U.S.A. Inc. utes at issue Council, Inc., agency’s that will review the action in a Natural Resources Defense 837, 842-43, 2778, ease, particular nonacquiescence intercircuit 104 S.Ct. 2781- 467 U.S. (1984), 82, regulat permissible, especially when the law is 694 and the 81 L.Ed.2d statutes, can doubt that implement unsettled.4 Nor there be adopted ions2 to Tallman, 1, 16, in 85 the law involved Diamond Shamrock is v. 380 U.S. S.Ct. Udall (1965). unsettled; 792, 801, theory, and commentators are L.Ed.2d 616 courts 13 questions sharply over a host of in recognizes that the such deference divided the court volving Op. application leases take- appropriate the instant cases. settlements, however, or-pay payments court effec and even practice, 1258. In general regarding how to from whether the the most issues tively changes the issue interpret to divide interpretations of statutes clauses continue Secretary’s generally permissible the authorities.5 See John S. regulations are to whether J., MacKinnon, Act, J.); (Wright, Leasing con- 25 U.S.C. id. at 384-85 1. Indian Mineral Act, J., 396, (1994); (Bork, concurring). Leasing curring); §§ Mineral 30 id. at 385 396d (1994); § 226 Outer Continental Shelf U.S.C. Act, 1337(a) (1994). Lands 43 U.S.C. Corp. Hughey, 5.Compare v. 630 Tara Petroleum 1269, (Okla.1981) with Texas Oil & P.2d 1272-74 (1995). §§ 2. 206.150-.159 866, Vela, (Tex. Corp. 871 Gas v. 429 S.W.2d 1968). on whether Commentators are divided pointed various ben- 3. Commentators have out should be due nonacquiescence. See Samu- efits of intercircuit Brown, Note, payments. Compare Patricia A. Revesz, Nonacquies- and Richard L. el Estreicher Royalties Equitable Right v. Klein Jones: Agencies, by Federal Administrative 98 Yale cence 749, Settlements, Take-or-Pay 784- 47 Ark. L.Rev. 679, (1989). 736-37 LJ. Comment, (1994) Bily, Royalty on 86 and Kirk J. Take-or-Pay Payments and Related Consideration Retirement Johnson v. United States R.R. Cf. 105, Producers, Bd., (D.C.Cir.1992), Accruing 133— 27 Hous. L.Rev. rt. 1090-93 ce Barrett, Note, (1990) denied, Beverly (yes) with M. 113 S.Ct. 507 U.S. J., (1993); Roye Realty Royalties all (Buckley, Are Owedon id. at Watson: L.Ed.2d 467 1097-98 Oklahoma?, NLRB, Take-or-Pay part); dissenting Taxi Co. v. Settlements Yellow Okla. (1993) (D.C.Cir. 1983) Angela Jeanne (opinion 762-64 & F.2d n. 39 L.Rev. Secretary’s treat- Lowe, Obligation, Op. at 1260. The Defining Royalty 49 ments. inconsistent, however, (1996). Thus, because he Secretary ment is not SMU L.Rev. types royalties on obligation to adhere to the assesses both under no produces gas to which holding, let alone its the lessee when Diamond Shamrock dicta, court should not and the is attributable. rationale compliance with the actions for review his types At issue here are two opinion. language of payments as were described court concludes that 3,1993, Payor” May from “Dear letter of light interpretation “must be reasonable (MMS) Management the Minerals Service Op. adoption of Diamond Shamrock.” DOI’s Applying principle “les- its lessees. understood, Correctly the Secre- at 1258. required payors and other are sees tary’s interpretation must be reasonable payments to royalties on contract settlement adopted regulations he after light min- attributable to the extent *14 Faced Diamond Shamrock was decided. lease,” produced from the the MMS erals circuit, from one the with an adverse decision types four common of settlement examined Secretary to how to re- had discretion as payments. pricing disputes” “Past relate to spond. regulations Because the were produced for minerals or the amount owed response to Diamond amended settlement, sold before the contract and such authority persuasive will be as to ease royalty amounts are when the regulations’ meaning. But what binds the buydown” A payment is made.7 “contract Secretary regulations is the amended payment price involves a made to reduce the themselves, pre- not the court decision (after gas of to be taken the future cipitated the amendment. settlement) by original purchaser is—“it Secretary great The is entitled to the def- payment of some amount now in return for usually agency’s in- erence we accord to an pay- paying price a lower later” —and such terpretation regulations,6 of its own S.G. royalty-bearing produc- are as future ments Reich, Sons, & Inc. v. 70 F.3d Loewendick types of two of tion occurs. Neither these (D.C.Cir.1995), interpreta- for his 1294 is involved the instant case. Fifth tion is not constrained what the Rather, agreement the Samedan-Southern say. Secretary had to must also Circuit ($89,- buyout” payment contains a “contract for when have a coherent rationale 706) and a made settlement of assessed, to ensure that his decision is are unpaid take-or-pay accrued but liabilities arbitrary capricious. nor 5 U.S.C. neither ($10,294). “buyout” payment extinguish- 706(2)(A). § purchaser’s obligation any gas es the to take future, royalty-bearing and is because II. “compensates prices it the lessee for lower pur- production foregone by The court faults the for his the future for the portedly royalty original purchaser.” an attribution inconsistent treatment Under formula, take-or-pay payments “functionally buyout payment indis- amount pay- up unit tinguishable” attributable to each freed Crowder, Comment, Taker-or-PayPayments tary prescribe regulations governing mineral Share?, (allotted lands, Settlements—Does the Landowner 49 La. § 25 U.S.C. Indian leases. 396 (1989) (no). 935- 37 Samedan); (trib- applicable §id. see also 396d L.Rev. lands); 1334(a) (offshore § al leases); 43 U.S.C. Indian Appellants 6. contend that no deference should (onshore leases); § 30 U.S.C. see agency's interpretation be due to an of its own Udall, Co. v. California regulation when it will affect contracts to which (D.C.Cir.1961) (deferring Secretary's reason- agency party, relying is a dictum in a § construction of 30 U.S.C. able because previous opinion. See Transohio Sav. Bank v. statute). duty administering the Director, has Supervision, F.2d Office of Thrift (D.C.Cir.1992) (leaving open whether to interpretation accord deference to Chevron paid Appellants have conceded that amounts agreements a statute that affected to which the disputes past price produc- to resolve over the party). agency was a This contention is incor- royalty bearing. tion are Congress authorized the Secre- rect because has gas.9 in connection with Before original take-or- remaining term of the regulations specified that the “value” must be proceeds re- to the is added pay contract “gross proceeds accruing at least the to the purchaser, and substitute ceived gas, but did not royalty-bearing as lessee from the sale of” proceeds are gross these “gross proceeds.” 30 Finally, payments in set- further define C.F.R. production occurs. (1987). 206.103, §§ The 1988 over- take-or-pay liabilities are 206.150 tlement of accrued regulations haul of continued the same production, as royalty-bearing, at the time of up approach, prescribing basic that “under no unit of attributed to each make-up production circumstances shall the value of would have been volume of what gross make-up purposes be less than the remaining term of the gas, for the proceeds accruing to the for lease original contract. lessee period under the 206.152(h) (1988) production,” § regulatory scheme An examination 205.153(h) (unprocessed gas); (unpro- § id. Secretary’s extraction-plus- why the reveals gas),10 explicitly the new cessed rules principle permissible. Con- attribution “gross proceeds” defined to mean “the total authority delegated to the Secre- gress broad accruing monies and other consideration paid on the tary to ensure disposition an oil and lessee for or sold removed full “value of unprocessed gas, gas, gas plant residue 226(b)(1)(A); 30 U.S.C. from the lease.” products.” 206.151. As MMS ex- Id. (for 1337(a)(1)(A) Outer see also U.S.C. gross plained, “purposefully drafted the leases, pro- “value of the Shelf Continental proceeds expansive definition to be and thus *15 sold”).8 saved, removed, The Sec- or duction types flowing all of consideration include turn, a market-based retary, adopted has buyer Royalty to the seller.” Gas of determining the value each approach Revision, Fed.Reg. expan- at 1241. This 53 market gas produced. unit of necessary sive definition was because other- individuals “and its reliance on self-motivated Secretary’s acceptance general wise the of which are to their engage transactions arm’s-length val- contracts as evidence of the therefore, interest, is a cornerstone own best gas might total of ue of overlook the value Royal- regulations.” Revision Gas of the of gas to the lessee: Topics, Regulation and Related ty Valuation [Tjhere gener- (1988) (Gas exceptions must be 1230, Royalty Fed.Reg. 53 1233 arm’s-length al rule that the lessee’s Revision). production is The value of price accepted with- contract should be by indi- generally prices set “determined question out as the value opposing economic interests trans- viduals of where purposes. Once such situation is acting Id. business between themselves.” contract does not reflect all time, Secretary recog- At has the same directly or flowing either consideration produc- benefits conferred on nized that the buyer indirectly from the to the seller. may natural-gas market not all be ers of At when the economies regu- Id. at 1247. a time in the same fashion. The denominated changing and gas production rapidly were imposed royalties on a have therefore lations beginning ap- innovations were by lessees contractual range of received broad calculation statutory authority charge royalties tax reimbursements in the severance 8. 813, broader, denied, ”), ‘gross proceeds’ as are not U.S. Indian lands is even required cert. 510 of "production.” 59, (1993); 25 U.S.C. Oper to be tied to L.Ed.2d 29 Mesa 114 S.Ct. 126 (tribal lands). (allotted lands), §§ However, 396d 396 Partnership Department ating rior, Inte Ltd. U.S. of Secretary adopted has the formula 318, (5th 1991) (upholding F.2d 324 Cir. 931 produced and saved from the land "value ... Secretary's on reim assessment of on Indian lands. 25 C.F.R. leased” for leases §§ lands). denied, costs), 502 treatment cert. bursed lands), (allotted 211.13(a) (tribal 212.16 934, 106 S.Ct. 117 L.Ed.2d U.S. 112 Indian lease is on allotted Samedan's (1992). lands, regulation § is the so 25 C.F.R. 212.16 applicable to Samedan’s lease. gas, produces unprocessed so 30 10.Samedan (1995) 206.152(h) reg- applicable See, § Lujan, C.F.R. e.g., Co. v. 978 Enron Oil & Gas (5th Cir.1992) (upholding Sec- ulation. F.2d 215-17 including "long-standing state retary’s method of 1264 Revision, 45,- Fed.Reg. therefore, Secretary 53 made it clear Gross Proceeds
pear,
Shamrock,
dealings
pro-
(quoting
Diamond
that he would examine
082-083
1168).
carefully
purchasers
Although
to ensure
the court is not
F.2d at
ducers
by producers
value received
Secretary’s
that all of the
reviewing the merits of the
read
(cid:127)
royalties.
subjected
Shamrock,
In the definition
was
ing of Diamond
his view
many exam-
“gross proceeds,”
he included
reasonable;
has twice
the Fifth Circuit itself
subject to
ples
payments that would -be
distinguished
charac
Diamond Shamrock
royalties; among
examples were take-
those
terizing
depending
decidendi as
its ratio
payments to
or-pay payments and advance
Frey
“production.”
the definition of
v. Amo
development costs. 30
exploration
cover
or
Co.,
578, 581-82,
n.
co Prod.
943 F.2d
584 & 5
(1988).
C.F.R.
206.151
(5th Cir.1991)
I),
(Frey
part,
vacated in
(5th
adjunct
Cir.1992), reinstated,
necessary
to his reliance on
As a
F.2d
arm’s-length
(5th
contracts as indicators of
Cir.1992);
Operating
F.2d 242
Mesa
value,
Secretary required producers to be
Partnership
Department
Inte
Ltd.
v. U.S.
reasonably diligent
enforcing
con
their
(5th Cir.1991)
rior,
(Brown,
against purchasers.
rights
tractual
On
J.),
denied,
1058,112
cert.
S.Ct.
U.S.
generated
considerable comment
issue
(1992).
important
Contrary
court’s
after
to this
pertain
which
claims
has
extract-
those
been
Shamrock nor
Gross
neither Diamond
ground.
ed from the
adopted
requirement
Proceeds Revision
royalty
recouped
payments be
before
Rather, it
Op. at 1259.
be assessed.
could
III.
only change in the
that the
was clear
regulations
minimum necessitated”—
—“the
The court reads the
references
previously
that all revenues that had
was
make-up gas
royal-
his discussion of the
longer be sub-
royalty-bearing would no
been
ty
recoupable take-or-pay pay-
treatment of
royalty
until actual
jected to a
assessment
Revision,
ments
Gross Proceeds
53 Fed.
It follows
extraction of
occurred.
45,082-83,
Reg.
indicating
that the Sec-
Secretary’s decision
the instant cases
retary
believed that
could be as-
post-Dia-
the text of the
is consistent with
take-or-pay payments only
sessed on
because
amendment,
all
because
mond Shamrock
recouped by
later
were
triggered by actual
royalty
were
assessments
original purchaser. Op. at 1259-60. With
extraction.
however,
respect
take-or-pay payment,
ato
things happen
make-up gas
two
when
is tak-
Secretary’s challenged actions are also
extracted;
en:
is
and the
the rationale of the amended
consistent with
Thus,
noting
recouped.
regulations as a whole. The definition
take-or-pay payments
roy-
would not be
such
to which a
“gross proceeds” includes revenue
taken,
alty-bearing
make-up gas
until
contractually
but does not
entitled
lessee
could have identified as a sine
through reasonable efforts.
seek to collect
qua
recoupment.
non either extraction or
(1995).
regulations,
§ 206.151
that the Gross Proceeds Revision does
Given
and after Diamond
both before
all,
recoupability at
and that the
not mention
that the most
possibility
for the
also account
make-up gas
references to
occur
the con-
way to collect contractual entitle-
reasonable
explaining
defi-
text of
Diamond Shamrock’s
through
‘Walue
may be
settlement.
ments
“extraction,”
“production” mean
nition of
highest price prudent
be based on the
shall
reading
the most natural
is that it was ex-
through legally enforce-
can receive
lessee
traction,
recoupment, that the
and not
Secre-
its contract.” 30 C.F.R.
able claims under
tary
triggering
viewed as
obli-
(1995).
206.152(j)
Given the unforeseen
gation.
the contract so un-
circumstances that made
*17
Southern,
for
Samedan’s decision
economical
recoupa-
without
The court contends
prudent
a
course
at a discount was
settle
bility,
no
link between the
there is
“direct
MMS, acting in accordance with
of action.
imposed and
upon
funds
which
206.152®,
by
logic
recognized
this
the
of
gas.” Op. at 1259.
physical severance of
the
royalty
prudent
charging
however,
a
on the
by the Secre-
provided,
That link is
value,
full face value of
rather than on the
case of a
tary’s
principle.
attribution
the
By waiting
Secretary
until extraction
buyout payment,
the contract.
the
determines
occurred,
settling
the
gas
MMS also adhered to
Secre-
of
for which the
the amount
take-or-pay obligation and
tary’s acceptance
purchaser
of Diamond Shamrock’s
had a
buyout pay-
challenged
proceeds from the
“production.” The
the
definition of
attributes
would not
straightforward
gas
than a
ment to the
the lessee
actions are no more
the settle-
regulations: assessing a have been able to sell without
application of the
“freed-up gas.”11 For the settle-
legally
royalty
of
ment —the
payment on the settlement
By limiting
deliverability
year.
the attri-
technological
each
only
and some-
of
Not
are there
take-or-pay
lia-
legal
for accrued
on increas-
bution
times contractual or
constraints
make-up period,
original
the Secre-
production,
take-or-pay
the
but
bilities to
es in the volume of
problem demanding
tary
percentage
avoids the
typically
a certain
contracts
set aside
original purchaser would have been
deliverability.
when the
In Southern’s take-
of the lessee's
Samedan,
make-up rights. For
example,
take its entire
or-pay
unable to
contract with
for
example,
were able to
percent
Hadson and TransOk
promised
to take or
Southern
by pipelines that
take-or-pay lia-
that would have been made
payments for accrued
contracts,
bilities,
Secretary
fully performed
determines the amount
under the
for the
the
(at
settling purchaser’s accrued
gas
simply replacements
under the
a
settlements are
make-up rights
proceeds
discount)
and attributes the
forgone take-or-pay payments
portion
from that
of the settlement
high
prices.
contract
Just as the lessor
gas that
sells
additional
the lessee
production
would have received at the time of
take-or-pay obligation
orig-
beyond the
the
price
royalty
a
on the full contract
of make-
make-up
inal contract —the “would-have-been
paid
by an
up gas, which would have been
case,
gas.” In each
the
waits
take-or-pay payment, it should receive
earlier
royalties until the time of extrac-
assess the
royalty
price
a
full contract
of would-
the
pro-
link
between the
tion
establishes
make-up gas, less a reasonable
have-been
and the
ceeds from
discount,
part by
paid
which is
for in
gas produced.
Secretary’s ap-
contract
settlement.
proach
only permissible
eminently
not
royalty system
recog-
Any sensible
must
sensible.
does,
nize,
Secretary’s system
gas
as the
production
go
take-or-pay
will
on after the
By recognizing
the estimates of value
crisis,
has been resolved. Before the
crisis
agreement
the settlement
between Southern
routinely
contracts were
when
Samedan,
adhered to his
reasonably
it
negotiated, was
assumed
general approach
allowing
the market to
pipelines
eventually
all of
would
take
production.
determine the value of
When
they
make-up volumes to which
were enti-
arm’s-length take-or-pay
contract was
Thus,
ongoing take-or-pay
tled.
con-
into,
represented
first entered
it
the mar-
tract,
Diamond Shamrock rule affects
contemplated
ket’s estimation of the value of
royalty
timing
payment,
not
production.
price
future
Even after the
royalty
Although
the amount of
due.
declined,
spot
on the
market
charge
royalty
lessor could
when the
higher
to the contract had a
value for
take-or-pay payment,
received the
lessee
Samedan because of the existence of the
eventually
lessor
received
take-or-pay contract with
Southern.
de-
proceeds
full
received
the lessee when the
market, however,
cline of the
did reduce the
make-up gas was taken. When an extreme
market value of
contract
under the
drop
spot
prices
coupled
market
the time of settlement below the face
sales,
deregulation
of wellhead
the elimi-
contract,
value of the
because
introduced
pipelines’ minimum
nation of
bills and the
uncertainty
ability
as to Southern’s
to contin-
implementation
open-access transporta-
performing.
ue
Southern and Samedan
however,
tion,
pipelines were threatened with
freely negotiated
pay-
therefore
a settlement
bankruptcy
they
if
continued to meet their
ment that reflected their estimation of how
take-or-pay obligations. See United Distri-
far the value of Samedan’s future
FERC,
Companies
bution
unpersuasive. royalty payments for two would be there IV. the gas misapprehends Secre each sale determining the rule for tary’s attribution appel- that Previous administrative actions Second, the for each sale. “gross proceeds” Secretary’s conflict the ac- lants claim with the mini purpose that the claim court’s present in fact no tions in the instant case protect the requirements was to mum-take Secretary’s position. Op. See obstacle lessor) (and against the risks not lessee Co., Energy Fe MMS-85- at 1253. Santa that anoth the fact development overlooks (Ass’t Sec’y Land Minerals & 0046-OCS (which paramount has become purpose er 14, 1988), roy- Mgmt. decided Oct. settlement) protect both was to the time of take-or-pay payments reeoupable alties against risk that lessee and lessor take-or-pay accrued lia- and settlements of Third, drop. the court’s would price market make-up gas until were not due bilities might barred from be claim that lessees decision, shortly Diamond after taken. The overpayments, see seeking refunds holding of that simply put the under because is mistaken 43 U.S.C. effect, entirely and is consistent case into Secretary’s extraction-and-attribution position. current Santa only at the royalties are assessed principle question, which was speak to the Fe did not Finally, court’s claim production. time of proceeding, whether a presented in that not part payments are that settlement third-party purchase could substitute Roy production, Gas value of fair market cf. on Hunt make-up gas. reliance Samedan’s Revision, ignores Fed.Reg. at alty Co., (Dep. Ass’t Oil MMS-87-0324-OCS settlement, sale of like the fact that the Mgmt. Sec’y Minerals Jan. Land & an arm’s- subsequent purchase, is gas to the 1989), pro- persuasive. In that is no more pro “value of length market measure charge ceeding, permitted was not MMS lessee, why only unclear duction.” It is pay- of advance royalties on the time value lessor, from that should benefit and not production development and ments for the value. (that is, imputed interest payments were made until advance time the Accordingly, I conclude Secre- though royal- production), even time of principle is tary’s extraction-and-attribution perverse that would other- incentives royalty-free payment. This is avoids for a wise obtain. duty toward the with the lessee’s inconsistent price. highest possible to obtain the lessor apply if the effect would A similar distortive Co., 206.152(j); Frey v. Amoco Prod. C.F.R. cf. take-or-pay liabilities were of accrued 1992) II); (La. (Frey So.2d 173-75 recog- royalty-free. As the Assistant Oil Gas Eugene Kuntz, the Law of Treatise nized, original purchaser retains whether the (“[T]he 60.3, (1991) is re- lessee at 137-38 make-up rights settlement is on its diligence degree quired ... the to exercise willing how much it is function of prudent op- ordinarily by an would be exercised analysis urged under the settlement. Even *19 having regard for the interests of both erator court, recoupa- accepted by appellants a and lessee.”). Eighth Circuit As the and the lessor observed, royalty-bear- take-or-pay be settlement would ble relinquished a action has “The lessee's Treating gas non- ing make-up was taken. when right to receive differently and the lessor is entitled would distort recoupable valuable settlements Jones, decision-making F.2d it something lead producer’s return.” Klein in Cir.1992). (8th uneconomically large on a Secretary's posi- discount accept an nonrecoupable royalty-bearing settlement. buy-out payments are tion that due, production, at take-or-pay provi- ties were the time ued to take under the Deputy Secretary sions. The Assistant ruled principal payments. value of the advance Hunt, royalty-bearing was not Whatever the merits the Secre- against it not fu- because could be credited tary’s actions are consistent with that deci- purchases. ture The result in Wolverine sion because he does not assess Secretary’s does not conflict with the assess- (that the time value of contract settlements payments ment of on Southern’s in is, imputed interest from the time the settlement of accrued liabilities were made until the because, Secretary as the Assistant in Same- production). time of noted, dan the record does not show that the appellants The two other decisions that purchaser took Wolverine additional cite, Co., Blackwood obligation. By & Nichols MMS-88- above its minimum-take con- (Dir. trast, 20, 1989), Apr. Samedan concedes that its 0008-0&G MMS sales Co., Hadson exceeded the minimum-take amount Exploration Wolverine MMS-88-0052- Southern, original in its contract with so that (Dep. Sec’y (Opera- IND Ass’t Indian Affairs Secretary’s policy roy- under the attribution tions) 2,May 1990), by were both issued alties were assessed on that “would-have- authority officials who did not have the make-up gas” only. been department-wide policy, make or even to agency subject judicial take final action 243.3, (1995); §§
review. See C.F.R. 290.7 Y. 4.21(c) (1995). Although both subject decisions were to further administra- The court argu- does not reach Samedan’s appeal, they Secretary’s tive appealed. were not counterclaim to When partially enforce his order is time-barred be- Samedan reached the Assistant cause it finds the order cannot be en- disagree she was therefore free to with any Op. forced case. at 1260. I Because prior decisions of lower-level officials. In disagree holding with the court’s on the va- event, though, neither decision conflicts lidity Secretary’s order, of the I address the Secretary’s with the actions the instant statute limitations issue and conclude Nichols, case. quite Blackwood & while as with the by appel- other issues raised cryptic, held that nonrecoupable a certain lants,13 position Samedan’s is not meritorious. buyout payment was not royalty-bearing, but is no there indication in the record that the Samedan contends that the at- buyout payment volumes to which the tempt partly to assess by barred by attributable par- were ever taken a third six-year period by limitations created Thus, ty. the decision does not address the 2415(a).14 U.S.C. A brief review of the issue of the of “would-have-been” chronology is in order. settling After make-up volumes. Wolverine involved a Southern in began December Samedan nonrecoupable settlement of accrued take-or- producing to which the buyout liabilities. There was no later payment. attributed the settlement contract, original purchaser and the contin- began February Production roy- join 2415(a) (1994) opinion 13. I provides: Part II.A of the Section 1256-57, Op. holding at that the "Dear court. Subject provisions of section 2416 of this 3, 1993, Payor" May letter of does not constitute title, except provided by as otherwise Con- rulemaking requiring APAnotice-and-comment gress, every money damages brought action for addition, procedures. because for reasons agency the United States or officer or my noted above in Part II of dissent the letter did upon any thereof which is founded contract "effectively prior legislative amend[] rule" fact, express implied in law or shall be assessments, governing royalty Mining American complaint barred unless the is filed within six Admin., Congress Safety v. Mine & Health years right after the of action accrues or within (D.C.Cir.1993), (if F.2d the letter year one after final decisions have been ren- all) “interpretative- were a rule would be an applicable proceedings dered in administrative proce- law, rule” not required by notice-and-comment contract or whichever is 553(b)(A). dures. 5 U.S.C. later.... *20 any pro engaged in administrative having portion of the buyout the due on alties were actually proceedings that he ceedings, so the until occurred production “required by ... law” and not provided were 1989, total sales when in November sometime filing period the suit. thus did not extend Royalties $89,706buyout value. the reached required was undisputed that Samedan It is the settlement portion of were due appeal to the pursue its administrative to liabilities as accrued Secretary before it could file level Assistant until May 1988 sometime from occurred 243.3; 43 C.F.R. judicial suit. would- 1988, during which period July the proceed the administrative 4.21. Because taken, until make-up gas was have-been could “required” before ings were Samedan $10,294 the reached sales those additional sue, one-year period Secretary also had a the the settlement. portion of for that value he could following their conclusion which if the settlement dispute that is no There Operating in court. See Mesa file his claim all, royalties became due royalty-bearing at Department Inte Partnership v. U.S. Ltd. following pro- day month of the on the last (10th Cir.1994); rior, 1288, 1291-92 royalties on the duction, which means Corp., 709 v. Care United States California accrue began to Cir.1983).15 (9th 1241, 1247 F.2d 2, 1993—almost December March 1988. On await the Permitting government to the royalties began to accrue—(cid:127) years after six proceedings re of administrative conclusion pay a 20% to ordered Samedan MMS adversary purposes the quired of its serves in- The order the entire on settlement. of limitations while simulta of the statute right to an adminis- of its Samedan formed proper be neously preserving the balance exercised appeal. Samedan trative judicial pro tween administrative and the Secretary affirmed right, and the Assistant otherwise, the cesses. Were 16, On September 1994. order on the MMS to “protective” suit have had to file would enjoin 3, 1994, sued Samedan October order even as the MMS order enforce the Secretary’s or- of the Assistant enforcement review. Such administrative was under der, Secretary filed a counterclaim the formality” hav would be a “sheer suit either 1, 1994, the order. to enforce November of the during pendency the ing no substance counterclaim, than more On the date review, in a result or would administrative ac- passed since had years had six process. administrative “short-circuit” through Septem- produced on volumes crued Inc., Elec., v. General States United therefore contends ber 1988. Samedan (D.N.J.1983) (quoting F.Supp. time-barred Secretary’s counterclaim is States, 386 v. Front Co. United Crown Coat volumes. respect those 1177, 1184, 18 L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. U.S. (1967)); International United States however, timely, be- The counterclaim F.Supp. Firefighters, 716 Ass’n of 2415(a) government permits cause (D.D.C.1989). in the absence of At least years accru- complaint within six file a delay by the Sec unreasonable allegation of year “or within one right of action al of proceedings, retary the administrative been final have rendered after decisions those Secretary into before forcing court re- proceedings applicable administrative completed would not have been proceedings law, by whichever is by quired contract limita purposes statute serve the filed less than was The counterclaim later.” Transferring dispute tions. initial order year MMS one after both court process into district administrative ap- accuracy order of fact-find improve and the Assistant would not repose parties Samedan’s ing, provide that the contends peal. Samedan sleep- government for position, penalize judicial complaint without could have filed a "required Berkau, Inc., not relief was cess for administrative v. Cocoa United States because, things, private among other (Fed.Cir.1993), law" Same- cited 615-16 F.2d dan, There, required and exhaust party to invoke contrary. Federal is not informal, bringing process suit. discretionary pro- before held that Circuit *21 ing rights, equalize positions Aceordingly, on its I dissent and would affirm adversaries, government private judgment its of the district court. S.Rep. goals § which are the 2415. No. 2, 12, Cong., reprinted 89th 2d Sess. 2502, 2503, 2513; 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. see Gen- Elec., F.Supp.
eral at 805.16 contract; rejected ages The district court the statute of on a and the counterclaim was limitations defense for a 2415(f), number of other reasons timely provides § under which "money as well: damages” counterclaim was not for 2415(a) prevent government shall not from meaning within the of 2415 because asserting a counterclaim "that arises sought performance agreement of the lease same transaction or occurrence that sub- breach; monetary compensation than rather for a ject opposing party's matter of the claim." Be- proceedings the administrative themselves did year cause the counterclaim was filed within one not constitute "action” within pro- of the final decision the administrative concluded, proceedings gov- once those were ceedings, unnecessary it is to reach these alterna- judicial had a ernment claim to enforce the ad- grounds. tive order, money ministrative rather than for dam-
