162 Ky. 150 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1915
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
The death of the appellee, Allen B. Evans, occurring after this appeal was taken, it has been revived in the name of his mother, Flora B. Evans, administratrix. The suit was filed to set aside a certain writing executed by Allen B. Evans, whereby he expressed a willingness to cancel a $1,000 insurance policy, issued upon his life by the appellant, upon the payment to him of $200. It is charged that the writing was procured by certain false and fraudulent representations of appellant’s agent.
The insured paid the annual premium in November, 1909, and November, 1910, and, in fact, tendered the premium accruing in 1911. The company refused to accept this 1911 payment, claiming that the writing involved in this action, executed a few weeks before the tender, cancelled the policy.
During 1909, the young man had a spell of malaria, and from which he never recovered. In his weakened condition, he soon became a victim of tuberculosis. As usual in such cases, he grew weaker and weaker, and after 1910 was confined to his bed a large part of the time. Feeling that he was totally disabled, early in October, 1911, he notified the company of this fact in writing, and requested the company to pay the premiums and keep his policy alive according to its terms. The company instructed its physician, Dr. Lindenberger, to examine him. Dr. Lindenberger visited and examined the insured on October 23rd, 1911. He found the conditions above mentioned, and testifies that the insured was totally disabled by reason of that disease, and so notified the company. The insured heard nothing from the company until October 30th, when he was visited by its agent, Mr. Keane. The young man was sitting up at the time, and Keane’s visit, which lasted from one hour and a half to three hours, as estimated by the witnesses, resulted in the writing which is sought to be set aside. According to Evans and his mother, Keane began to ingratiate himself into their confidence by recounting his old friendship with the elder Evans, and the fact that his religious faith was the same as the Evans’. Then, at his request, Allen Evans went with him into another room for a private conversation. Keane told him he had come to see about the insurance, and first offered a return of the premiums with six per cent interest. This
“Louisville, Ky., October 30, 1911.
“Allen B. Evans will accept $200.00 in full settlement for his policy with the Independent Life Insurance Company for full settlement on No. 467 on my life.
“AlleN B. EvaNs. ’ ’
Allen Evans testifies that he told Keane he would not and did not intend to bind himself in this matter until he could consult with his father when he returned home that night, and Keane agreed- to this, and said he would come back next morning with the money and get ! the policy. Keane denied that the young man signed it with any such reservation. The $200' was never paid, nor was the policy ever surrendered or canceled in fact. The company relies upon the writing above quoted as its cancellation. Keane testifies that the next morning he returned to the house with the money and tendered it to Allen Evans, but he would not accept it, and said that he had been advised by his father and physician not to surrender the policy.
Mrs. Evans says that Keane never had any such conversation with her son, and made no tender of the money nor demand for the policy. She says that he did come there next morning and she met him on the front porch; that her son was upstairs in bed; and she would not let Keane enter or see the boy, and he did not see or talk with
The action is in equity and such conflict as there was in the evidence was passed upon by the trial judge. His finding is supported by the weight of the evidence, and we will not disturb the judgment, which sets aside the writing.
The written opinion of the lower court, filed with the record, is so pointed that we copy it:
“The plaintiff was a confined and hopeless invalid, and was dependent upon his family for nursing, medicines, etc. He had been in that condition for several months. In response to his letter seeking to avail himself of' the total disability clause in his policy, the defendant sent its physician to examine him and was advised by the physician that plaintiff was afflicted with advanced pulmonary tuberculosis. Thereupon a special agent of defendant was sent to him for the purpose of securing a cancellation of the policy. The plaintiff had not contemplated a cancellation or surrender of his policy up to that time. He was very weak physically and was in no condition to carry on negotiations of several hours, and at the end cope with a strong and vigorous person such as the agent of defendant. IJnder such circumstances, it would not be difficult, through religious sympathies, for the agent to ingratiate himself with plaintiff and to win his confidence. He was sent there to secure a cancellation of this contract and he accomplished his mission. From the physician’s report upon the risk, it was a profitable transaction on the part of the defendant company to pay $200.00 in cash to get from under the certain and near liability for $1,000.00, and the suggestion that the cash value of the policy was $11.90 only is of no importance. The weight of the testimony shows that the plaintiff was overreached in the matter of the agreement to surrender and cancel the policy for $200.00, and there can be no doubt that plaintiff is totally incapacitated from pursuing a gainful calling.”
In view of the young man’s physical condition, and the fact that the company would soon have to pay the policy in full, and the further fact that the purpose of Keane’s visit was to secure a cancellation of it in behalf
More than this, the writing signed by the boy is nothing more than a proposal. Keane says that he accepted the proposition next morning, and tendered the amount called for, but this is denied by Mrs. Evans. Certain it is, the money was never paid, nor did the company get possession of the policy nor an actual cancellation. The writing itself does not amount to a contract, and the evidence is not convincing enough to put it in that category.
Wherefore the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.