OPINION OF THE COURT
Wе here review the district court’s dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) of a multiple-count complaint brought against the City of Pittsburgh (the “City”) and the Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Authority (the “Authority”) by Independent Enterprises Inc. (“Independent”), a construction company, and Thomas Lozecki, a City taxpayer and Authority ratepayer. 1 The claims asserted in-the complaint include a civil contempt of court claim, an equal protection claim and procedural and substantive due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and pendent state law claims. All of these claims arose in the context of the Authority’s failure to award Independent three Authority contracts on which Independent had submitted the lowest bids.
I. The Facts
Because the district court dismissed Independent’s claims pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Fed R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we accept as true all factual allegations in Independent’s complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom.
2
Nami v. Fauver,
In 1986, Independent sued the City and Authority in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania after the City declared that Independent was “noncompetent” to bid on any projects in which it had an interest and the Authority consequently rejected a low bid by Independent. In settlement of that suit, the parties agreed to a consent decree that was ultimately entered by the court. . The consent decree provided that Independent could not be “debarred” from bidding on City contracts based on any past performance, and that if the City or Authority wanted to “disqualify” Independent from City or Authority work because of problems with future performances, it would first have to conduct a hearing under the Pennsylvania Local Agency Law. Between the issuance of the consent decree and the solicitation of bids for the 1995 contracts at issue here, Independent satisfactorily per *1169 formed “numerous” contracts for both the City and Authority.
In May 1995, the Authority solicited bids for two projects, the “Annual Watеr Line Contract” and the “Grandview Avenue Project.” Independent submitted bids for both projects. In accordance with the Authority’s “MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements,” each of Independent’s bids included a list of minority- and women-owned business enterprises (“MBE/WBEs”) that Independent intended to use as subcontractors if awarded the contract. One of the MBEs Independent listed was Whaley & Sons, a firm that Independent claims was certified by the Authority as an approved MBE/WBE vendor. Independent’s bids were the lowest for both projects, and an independent consultant recommended that the Authority award both contracts to Independent.
Before the Authority made a decision about awarding the contracts, the City’s Deputy Mayor of Government Operations, Salvatore Sirabella, issued a memorandum (the “Sirabella memorandum”) to the Authority’s Executive Director. In the memorandum Sirabella expressed concern about the cost over-run on a recent Authority project that had been completed by Independent, and directed the Authority to “temporarily halt awarding any contracts to Independent----” App. at 87. Shortly after receiving the Sirabella memorandum, the governing body of the Authority (the “Board”) decided that Whaley & Sons was an unacceptable MBE subcontractor and resolved to reject Independent’s bids for both the Water Line Contract and the Grandview Avenue Project “for failure to meet the MBE/WBE requirements of the specifications.” Auth.Res. 67 & 68, App. at 197-98. The Board then awarded the two contracts to the next lowest bidders. About a month later, the contracts with those bidders were rescinded, all bids were rejected, and the Authority resolved to readvertise both the Water Line and Grandview Avenue projects.
In June, 1995, Independent submitted a bid to the Authority for the “Annual Sewer Improvement Contract.” Again, Independent’s was the lowest responsible bid. And again, despite its low bid, Independent was nоt awarded the contract. There was apparently some communication between the attorney for the Authority and Independent regarding the absence of a Power of Attorney form in Independent’s bid package, but ultimately the Authority did not reject Independent’s bid on that basis. Instead, the Authority’s Board simply rejected all of the Sewer Improvement Contract bids without explanation and readvertised the project.
In response to the Authority’s failure to award it the Water Line Contract, the Grandview Avenue Project, and the Sewer Improvement Contract, Independent filed this suit. Its complaint alleged that: (1) the Authority and City violated the terms of the consent decree by “disqualifying”' Independent from Authority and City contracts; (2) the Authority’s MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements discriminate against Independent and other construction companies on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, and/or sex, thereby denying them the equal protection of thе laws; and (3) the Authority’s and the City’s disqualification of Independent, and the Authority’s resulting refusal to award it the Water Line Contract, the Grandview Avenue Project, and the Sewer Improvement Contract, deprived Independent of property without procedural and substantive due process.
The district court dismissed all of Independent’s federal claims. First, the court dismissed the § 1983 claims against the Authority on the ground that the Authority is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. The district court then dismissed the civil contempt claim on the ground that Independent had not been “debarred” from bidding on City or Authority contracts.
Turning to Independent’s procedural due process claim, the district court held that “Pennsylvania provides a judicial procedure for unsuccessful bidders to challenge whether a local contracting authority has violated a bidder’s rights under the Municipal Authority Act.” Op. at 7. In the court’s view, an adequate post-deprivation procedure thus existed to satisfy thе demands of the Due Process Clause. The court dismissed Independent’s substantive due process claims because it found that Independent had not *1170 alleged facts showing- that the City had deprived it of a protected property interest.
With respect to the equal protection claim, the court held that Independent lacked standing because the complaint failed to allege a causal connection between the MBE/ WBE requirements and the injury Independent had suffered from the rejection of its bids. 3
We will affirm the dismissal of Independent’s due process claims. We will reverse the judgment of the district court, however, and remand for further proceedings on Independent’s civil contempt and equal protection claims.
II. The Civil Contempt Claim
In Count I of its complaint, Independent alleges that the Authority and City are in civil contempt of court because their disqualification of Independent pursuant to the Sirabella memorandum and the Authority’s rеsulting rejection of Independent’s three low bids violated the terms of the 1986 consent decree. The district court dismissed the contempt claim because it found that the facts alleged did not show a violation of the terms of the consent decree. We disagree.
The 1986 consent decree provided in part:
2. Independent shall not be debarred from bidding on any City of Pittsburgh Contract based on past conduct or performanee.
3. Independent, City and Authority shall act in a cooperative manner on all contracts. Independent shall:
(a)' cooperate with inspectors at job site; and
(b) cooperate with consultants and officials of the City and Authority in regard to problems that occur at the job site and administrative matters; and
(c) move quickly to resolve any disputes with adjoining property owners as a result of their work.
4. If, because of problems with future performances, the City or Authority desire to disqualify Independent from City or Authority work, a hearing shall be held prior to disqualification under the Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, and Indеpendent shall have all rights afforded thereunder.
App. at 138-39.
At the time the consent decree was entered, the Pittsburgh Code contained a provision entitled “Debarment from Bidding On and Participating in City Contracts.” § 161.22. This provision states that any person or enterprise that had committed an “offense,” as defined therein, will not be allowed to bid and will not be “a responsible bidder on any city contract.” “Offense” is defined in a non-exclusive list to include sixteen different, categories of conduct ranging from fraud in connection with the obtaining or performance of a contract to the following:
(10) Willful or material failure to perform the terms of a contract or agreement in accordance with specifications or within contractual time limits;
(11) A record of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory performance in accordance with the terms of one or more contracts, provided that the failure or unsatisfactory pеrformance was within a reasonable period of time preceding the determination to debar and was caused by acts within the control of the person or enterprise debarred;
Hi * * * * Hi
(16) Other cause affecting responsibility as a city contractor or vendor as may be determined by the city.
Pittsburgh Code § 161.22(b). Debarments under this provision are to last for “a reasonable, definitely stated period ... commensurate with the seriousness of the cause therefore,” but “as a general rule [are not to] exceed three years.” Id. § 161.22(d)(3). Debarment proceedings are initiated at the discretion of the Mayor and the City’s Director of the Department of General Services. The stipulated process includes a notice to the contractor and a right to a hearing before the Director at which the cause for the debar *1171 ment has to be established by a preponderanee of the evidence.
The Pennsylvania Lоcal Agency Law referenced in paragraph 4 of the consent decree is found in Title 2 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated at §§ 551-555 and 751-754. 4 These subchapters relate solely to process; they stipulate the procedural rights that interested parties will have in any “adjudication” by a local agency, e.g., the rights to a hearing, representation by counsel, cross-examination, a written decision, judicial review, etc. Nothing in these subchapters describes the circumstances under which a would-be contractor may be foreclosed from contracting with a local agency.
In the context of these statutory provisions and the litigation that produced the consent decree, the intent of paragraph 4 seems clear and unambiguous. Independent was concerned about being foreclosed from doing City and Authority work based on complaints about its conduct and contract performance. In the interest of settling the pending lawsuit, the City was willing to assure that there would be no foreclosure based on past conduct or performance. While it and the Authority were not willing to give the same assurance with respect to future contract performance, they were willing to commit to hearing Independent’s side of the story regarding any alleged deficiency in its performance before foreclosing it from City and Authority work. Independent would be able to give its side in a hearing to be held in accordance with the Pennsylvania Local Agency Law. This reading of paragraph 4 gives the word “disqualified” its commonly understood meaning. “Disqualify,” according to Webster, means “to deprive of a power, right or privilege” or make “ineligible ... for further competition because of violations of the rules,” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 366 (1990); Black defines “disqualify” as “to render ineligible.” Black’s Law Dictionary 472 (6th ed. 1990).
Given this intent, we further think it clear that if Independent can prove its allegations, it will have established a violation of paragraph 4 of the consent decree. If the Sirabella directive, as alleged, resulted in Independent’s not being considered for City or Authority work for a period of time because of a cost overrun on a contract entered after the consent decree, the failure to give Independent a hearing on the overruns was a violation of paragraph 4.
In reaching its contrary conclusion, the district court reasoned that (1) “debarred” in paragraph 2 was intended to include only disqualifications for City work pursuant to the “formal procedure” spelled out in § 161.22 of the City Code; (2) “disqualify” in paragraph 4 is synonymous with the concept of “debar” in paragraph 2; (3) there was no “formal procedure” under § 161.22 conducted in connection with the Sirabella directive; and (4) therefore, there was no disqualification of Independent and no need for a hearing. We believe this approach leaves paragraphs 2 and 4 virtually without effect.
Even assuming that “debarred” in paragraph 2 refers to a foreclosure from City work for a period of time for the reasons set forth in § 161.22, it seems highly unlikely to us that the parties intended to limit its scope to situations in which the City both foreclosed Independent and invoked the formal process of § 161.22. After all, paragraph 2 simply says that the City won’t debar Independent, ie., declare it a non-responsible bidder, for past performance. But even further assuming that paragraph 2 is so limited, “disqualified” could not have been intended, to limit the scope of paragraph 4 to situations where the “formal process”- of § 161.22 is invoked. That process is City-specific and, by its own terms, cannot be invoked by the Authority. 5
*1172 Giving the word “disqualify” and the phrase “because of problems with future performances” in paragraph 4 their commonly understood meaning, we find paragraph 4 broad enough to include a blanket foreclosure of Indepеndent from City or Authority work because of an overrun on a post-consent decree contract. Moreover, it seems to us that the stated causes for debarment under § 161.22 are broad enough to include such a foreclosure. Accordingly, our conclusion would not be different even if we regarded the term “disqualify” in paragraph 4 as limited by the use of “debarred” in paragraph 2.
III. The § 1983 Claims
A., The “Person” Requirement
Independent brought its equal protection and due process claims against the City and Authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to be deprived- of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In support of its conclusion thаt the Authority “is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of section 1983,” Op. at 4, the district court cited
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
The framework for addressing the question of whether the Authority is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 was established by
Will
and the earlier case of
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,
In
Will,
the Court gave effect to the limitation expressed in
Monell.
Relying on the ordinary meaning of the term “person,” the legislative history of § 1983, and federalism concerns, the Court held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
The limitations that define the boundaries of the holdings in
Monell
and
Will
establish that the most important inquiry in determining whether a governmental entity is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 is whether the entity is an “ ‘arm[ ] of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”
Id.; see also Monell,
(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would come from the state (this includes three ... factors — whether payment would come from the state’s treasury, whether the agency has the money to satisfy the judgment, and whether the sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the agency’s debts);
(2) The status of the agency under state law (this includes four factors — how state' law treats the agency generally, whether the entity is separately incorporated, whether the agency can sue or be sued in its own right, and whether it is immune from state taxation); and
(3) What degree of autonomy the agency has.
We have repeatedly held that the most important factor in determining whether an entity is an “arm of the State” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is “whether any judgment would be paid from the state treasury.”
Fitchik,
The second factor, the Authority’s status under state law, also appears to weigh against a finding that the Authority is an “arm of the State,” if less clearly. Like SEPTA, which we held in
Bolden
is a “person” under § 1983,
On the other hand, municipal authorities have the power of eminent domain, 53 P.S. § 306(B)(Z), and have been held to be “agencies of the Commonwealth” independent from their incorporating municipality and not governed by laws empowering local municipalities.
Whitemarsh Township Auth. v. Elwert,
Like the first two, the third factor, the Authority’s “degree of autonomy” from the state, seems to weigh against a finding that the Authority is an “arm of the State.” The provisions of the MAA afford the Authority a high degree of autonomy from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For example, the members of the Board — which exercises all of the Authority’s powers — are appointed not by the State but by the governing body of the City of Pittsburgh, the incorporating municipality. 53 P.S. § 309(A)(a). The Authority is granted “all powers necessary or convenient” for carrying out its purposes, including, inter alia, the power to sue and be sued, to purchase property, to make by-laws, to appoint officers and definе their duties, and to make contracts. Id. § 306(B).
We have thus far discussed only the most significant inquiry identified by
Will
and
Monell, i.e.,
whether an entity is an “arm of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Will
also relied on two additional factors in reaching the conclusion that a State is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 — (1) “the language of Section 1983 and the meaning of the word ‘person’” and (2) the fact that “states enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit at common law, and ... Section 1983 was not intended to override Veil established immunities or defenses under common law.’”
Bolden,
First, although the term “person” in common usage does not include the “sovereign,”
Will,
Second, the
Will
Court also recognized that “in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities under the common law.”
It would be premature to express an opinion on the result that the required weighing process should produce. A record must first be developed and the parties permitted to comment upon it. We hold only that the Authority may be a person within the meaning of § 1983 and that the district court erred in ruling to the contrary on the present record.
B. The Equal Protection Claim
Having concluded that it was error to dismiss the § 1983 claims against the Authority on the ground that it is not a “person,” we now turn to Independent’s equal protection claim. It alleges that the Authority’s .MBE/ WBE Utilization Requirements, which were the asserted basis for the Authority’s rejection of Independent’s bids for the Water Line Contract and Grandview Avenue Project, discriminate against Independent and its owners on the basis of race, sex, or national origin, thereby violating their right tо equal protection. The district court dismissed the claim for lack of standing because it found that Independent “fail[ed] to allege facts that establish a causal relationship between the injury — its rejected bids — and the challenged conduct — the minority utilization requirement.” Op. at 11. It reached this conclusion by focusing on those portions of the complaint alleging that Independent had submitted bids in compliance with the utilization requirements and that those bids were rejected because of the Sirabella memorandum.
Standing is “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III” of the Constitution.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
In construing the plaintiffs complaint, we are of course bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(e)(2) of those Rules provides that:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses____ A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has, regardless of consistency....
This Rule permits inconsistency in both legal and factual allegations,
see, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp.,
The district court here failed to afford Independent the privilege of asserting alternative and inconsistent claims. Independent’s complaint alleges, inter alia, two inconsistent claims: First, Independent claims that the Authority and the City disqualified it from Authority work, per the instruction in the Sirabella memorandum, in violation of the 1986 consent decree. In connection with this claim, Independent claims that the Authority’s asserted reason for rejecting it’s Water Line and Grandview Avenue bids, i.e., the alleged failure to comply with the *1176 MBE/WBE requirements, was a pretext intended to mask the Authority’s disqualification of Independent in a. manner which violated the consent decree. Alternatively, Independent asserts that if the Authority in fact rejected its bids because Independent failed to satisfy the MBE/WBE requirements, that rejection was a violation of Independent’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Thus, in accordance with Rule 8(e)(2), Independent’s equal protection claim must be examined independently of its contempt claim to determine whether Independent has standing to pursue the claim.
Independent’s equal protection claim does allege facts satisfying all of the requirements of standing. The complaint alleges an injury in fact (the rejection of Independent’s bids); causation (that the rejection resulted, according to the Authority, from Independent’s inability to meet satisfactorily the Authority’s MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements) 7 ; and redressability (that the injury can be remedied through the award of the contracts or damages and an injunction against future enforcement of the Utilization Requirements).
Turning from standing to the issue of whether Independent has stated a claim on which relief could be granted, we conclude that it has. Independent’s сomplaint alleges that the Authority has established MBE/ WBE Utilization Requirements which require that all bidders on certain contracts provide with their bids a “utilization plan” that identifies the portion of work under the contract that will be subcontracted to “certified” minority- or women-owned firms. According to the complaint, bids that do not meet the MBE/WBE utilization goals are rejected. Finally, the complaint alleges that the MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements were not established to remedy past discrimination or passive participation in discrimination by the City or Authority against minority- or women-owned construction companies. These allegations support an equal protection claim under
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
*1177 C. The Due Process Claims
Independent further alleges that the Authority deprived it of property without procedural or substantive due process when it disqualified Independent and rejected its bids on the Water Line Contract, the Grand-view Avenue Project and the Sewer Improvement Contract. The property interest of which it was allegedly deprived was an interest in these contracts created by Pennsylvania statutes requiring that public contracts be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. 73 P.S. § 1622; 53 P.S. § 312. The remedies that Independent seeks are an injunction barring the Authority from awarding the three contracts to anyone other than Independent, an injunction barring the City and the Authority from refusing to consider Independent a competent bidder on future City contracts, and an award of compensatory and punitive damages. We will affirm the district court’s dismissal of Independent’s substantive and procedural due process claims, albeit for а reason different from that given by the district court.
The district court dismissed Independent’s procedural due process claim on the ground that Pennsylvania law provided a post-deprivation remedy that afforded all the “due process” required by the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the district court, the post-deprivation remedy, of which Independent had attempted to avail itself, consisted of “a judicial procedure for unsuccessful bidders to challenge whether a local contracting authority has violated a bidder’s rights under the Municipal Authority Act.” Op. at 7-8. The district court apparently reached this conclusion based on a statement in the Authority’s Motion to Dismiss that there was a pending state action between the parties. On appeal, however, the parties agree that Pennsylvania law in fact provides no such procedure. Nonetheless, the Authority and the City argue that the district court’s dismissal of Independеnt’s procedural due process claim should be affirmed on the alternative ground that their actions did not deprive Independent of any - property interest protected by the due process clause.
The Supreme Court outlined the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process protection for property interests in
Board of Regents v. Roth,
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” *1180 We have held that “ownership is a property interest worthy of substantive due process protection,” [DeBlasio,53 F.3d at 600 ], but we have found that neither interest in prompt receipt of payment for professional services provided to the state, Reich,883 F.2d at 244-45 , nor state law entitlement to water and sewer services, Ransom v. Marrazzo,848 F.2d 398 ,411-12 (3d Cir.1988), are the “certain quality” of property interest worthy of substantive due process protection. We have also strongly suggested in dictum that a student’s right to continued enrollment' in a graduate program does not rise to such a level on the ground that such an interest bears “‘little resemblance to the fundamental interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution.’” Mauriello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.,781 F.2d 46 , 50 (3d Cir.1986) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing,474 U.S. 214 , 229-30,106 S.Ct. 507 , 516,88 L.Ed.2d 523 (Powell, J., concurring)).
*1177
Id.
at 577,
According to the teachings of Roth, therefore, Independent may not pursue its procedural due process claims against the City and Authority unless “an independent source such as state law” affords it a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to be awarded a *1178 municipal contract for which it was the lowest responsible bidder. Independent relies only on state competitive bidding law as the “independent source” providing its “legitimate claim of entitlement.” 10
Although Pennsylvania’s competitive bidding statutes require that public contracts be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, 53 P.S. § 312(A); 73 P.S. § 1622, Pennsylvania courts have long held that such laws are for the benefit of the public only and do not give a low bidder standing to challenge a municipality’s failure to award a contract in accordance with the statute.
See, e.g., R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School Dist. of York,
These Pennsylvania cases demonstrate that one who bids on a public contract has no legitimate expectation of receiving it until the contract is actually awarded.
See Highway Express Lines v. Winter,
*1179
As Independent stresses, the law of this circuit recognizes that “an entitlement may exist for a benefit sought but not yet obtained if state law limits the exercise of, discretion by the state official responsible for conferring the benefit.”
Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Phila.,
Finally, we turn to Independent’s substantive due process claim. Although the Third Circuit has recognized that a governmental deprivation that comports with procedural due process may still give rise to a substantive due process claim “upon allegations that the government deliberately and arbitrarily abused its power,”
Midnight Sessions,
*1180
Homar,
We will leave for another day definition of the precise contours of the “particular quality of property interest” entitled to substantive due process protection. We have no difficulty in concluding that the property interest alleged to have been infringed here, which we have concluded is not entitled to procedural due process protection, is not the sort of “fundamental” interest entitled to the protection of substantive due process. Accordingly, we conclude that Independent has failed to state either a procedural due process claim or a substantive due process claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. Conclusion
We will revеrse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Lozecki is a party only to the pendent state law claims.
. The Appellees filed a "Motion to Dismiss or For Judgment on the Pleadings." Independent argues on appeal that the district court converted the Appellees' motion to one for summary judgment by considering matters outside of the pleadings, and that such conversion was improper because Independent was not given notice of the conversion or an opportunity to submit relevant materials. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Independent thus asserts that "it was reversible error for the district court to grant the motion without having afforded Independent any opportunity to submit materials under Rule 56." Appellant's Brief at 34. Because Independent indeed was not given an opportunity to submit evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment, we will treat the district court’s decision as a 12(b)(6) dismissal and will disregard anything other than the allegations of the complaint when conducting our plenary review of that decision.
. The district court, having dismissed the federal claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Independent's state claims and dismissed them without prejudice. It may reconsider that decision on remand in light of our disposition of the federal claims.
. Title 2 is devoted to "Administrative Law and Procedure." Subchapter 5A provides procedure for "Commonwealth agencies” and subchapter 5B stipulates procedure for "local agencies”, which include any “government agency other than a Commonwealth agency." 2 Pa.C.S.A. § 101. Section 105 of Title 2 provides:
The provisions of S.ubchapter B of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of local agencies) and Subchapter B of Chapter 7 (relating to judicial review of local agency action) shall be known and'may be cited as the “Local Agency Law.”
. In its opinion, the district court commented that, evеn assuming there had been a violation of *1172 the consent decree, the appropriate remedy would have been to file an application in the earlier suit. In response to the district court's suggestion, Independent stresses that the judge who presided over the former civil action had retired before the present action was commenced. Therefore, Independent argues, nothing should preclude it from including the contempt of court claim with its other claims against Appellees, and indeed that "[t]he assertion of all claims in one action serves the interests of judicial economy of resources. Moreover, even if the civil action was required to be brought at the old docket number, the proper action would be to transfer the matter rather than dismissal [sic].” Appellant's Brief at 21 n. 6. We agree that Independent should not be precluded from pursuing its contempt claim merely because it, fоr apparently logical reasons, failed to file that claim under the docket number under which the consent decree was entered.
. At oral argument, counsel for the Authority informed us that the Authority had not argued before the district court that it was not a "person" under § 1983. Counsel further candidly . acknowledged that she could cite no case in which a public entity had been held not to be a "person" on the basis of a record similar to the one before us. Counsel stopped short of conceding, however, that the Authority
is
a "person" under § 1983. As a result, the district court, on remand, will have to determine whether the Authority is a "person.” This will require it to afford the parties the opportunity to develop a record and to then weigh, with the assistance of the parties, the factors identified by this court in
Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc.,
. The Authority argues that Independent's allegation that its bids were rejected “ostensibly" because of its failure to satisfy the MBE/WBE requirements does not constitute an "affirmative allegation” that Independent was precluded from getting the contracts because of the allegedly discriminatory requirements. However, reading the complaint as a whole and clarifying any ambiguities in Independent's favor, it is clear that Independent "affirmatively alleged” that the Authority rejected Independent's bids on the ground that Independent did not satisfy the MBE/ WBE requirements. In accordance with Rule 8(e)(2), if that ground was a pretense for the Authority’s impermissible disqualification of Independent from the bidding process, Independent should be allowed to pursue its civil contempt claim. On the other hand, if failure to satisfy the MBE/WBE requirements was the actual ground for the Authority's rejection of the bids, Independent should be allowed to pursue its claim that rejection on such grounds violates its right to equal protection.
. The gender-based preference embodied in the Authority’s MBE/WBE Utilization Requirements will be reviewed under "intermediate scrutiny" rather than under the "strict scrutiny” applied to review of race-based preferences. See Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (3d Cir.1993). Nonetheless, Independent should still be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate the absence of “probative evidence in support of” the gender-based aspect of the Authority’s MBE/WBE requirements, id. at 1010, because it has alleged that the Authority adopted the utilization requirements without having established any history of discrimination against either MBEs or WBEs.
. We decline to accept the Authority's invitation to affirm the district court's dismissal of the equal protection claim on the merits on the ground that the MBE/WBE policy is "facially valid.” The Authority claims that the MBE/WBE Statement that must be submitted with each bid "itself does not require the use of minority or women subcontractors but merely requests information regarding the percentage of such subcontractors that the bidder intends to use on the project," and thus “does not create a discriminatory set-aside or quota program” but "serves merely to identify and guard against discrimination.” Appellees' Brief at 16-17 (emphasis added). We agree with Independent that this assertion of the facial validity of the Authority's MBE/ *1177 WBE policy "is an argument on the merits inappropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 12. At this stage in the proceedings, particularly in light of the Authority Resolutions that expressly rejected Independent’s Water Line and Grandview Avenue bids "for failure to meet the MBE/WBE requirements," Auth.Res. 67 & 68, App. at 197-98 (emphasis added), “Independent's allegation that the [Authority] rejects bids which do not meet the MBE/WBE goals must be taken as true, and forecloses [the Authority’s] assertion that they are not requirements but merely informational.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 12 (citations omitted).
. At oral argument, Independent's counsel suggested for the first time that paragraph 4 of the consent decree may have created а property interest for Independent. This suggestion mistakes a right to a particular process for a substantive right in a contract. The right to a particular process does not alone create a property interest.
Olim v. Wakinekona,
. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has dealt only with challenges brought under the bidding statutes themselves, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recently directly addressed the issue of the applicability of the
R.S. Noonan
standing principle to a due process challenge to the rejection of a low bid.
J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol,
95 Pa. Cmwlth. 376,
. Although
Bello
and
Midnight Sessions
both contained language indicating that substantive due process is violated whenever a governmental entity deliberately or arbitrarily abuses government power by, for example, taking actions that are motivated by bias, bad faith, or partisan or personal motives unrelated to the merits of the matter before it,
Midnight Sessions,