6 N.W.2d 873 | Iowa | 1942
This is a suit brought by the Independent School District of Jewell, Iowa, against the Consolidated School District of Ellsworth, Iowa, various county officers of Hamilton county, and all the landowners in certain disputed territory. The appellant is an independent school district which originally consisted of sections 27, 28, 33, and 34 of Township 87 North, Range 24, West of the Fifth P.M., Hamilton county, Iowa. These four sections were in the form of a square. Sections 26 and 35 lie immediately east of these four sections and sections 14 and 23 run north in the same line as sections 26 and 35. It *994 is the west half of sections 14, 23, and 26 and the northwest quarter of section 35 which are in dispute. The amount of land in controversy would therefore be one and three-fourth sections. This disputed territory comprised nine per cent of the real estate value of the Jewell District. In 1913 the appellant, Independent School District of Jewell, annexed the west half of sections 26, 35, 14, and 23, which were originally a part of the District Township of Lyon, by joint action of the boards of the Independent School District of Jewell and the District Township of Lyon. The Consolidated School District of Ellsworth lies immediately east of the parts of sections 14, 23, 26, and 35 above mentioned. This consolidated school district was formed January 20, 1914, and within that district is the town of Ellsworth with a population of over 400. Within the Jewell District is the town of Jewell with a population of over 1,000, of which the school population is 221. The disputed land, therefore, is a tract running north and south three and one-half miles and east and west one-half mile, the south part of which is directly east of the original four sections of the Jewell District, and all of said three and one-half miles is directly west of the Ellsworth District. The school population of the disputed territory at the time of the annexation was seven and at no time ever comprised more than 18 students.
About the year 1923 the Independent School District of Jewell purchased the property of the Jewell Lutheran College, and for the purpose of payment, voted a bond issue of $60,000, on which there is now outstanding $36,000, with a sum in the schoolhouse fund for the purpose of additional payments of $9,929.54.
Under the provisions of section 4144.1 and other provisions of the Code of 1939, about April 14, 1941, proceedings were had for the annexation of this disputed territory, and it is conceded that the proceedings complied with the sections of the statute applying to additions and annexations and the validity of the election is not in dispute. About April 29, 1941, the board of directors of the Jewell District were informed of the special election held on April 26th and of the results, and were requested by the board of directors of the Ellsworth District to set *995 a date to meet with the Ellsworth District to consider the question of division of the assets and liabilities. This request was refused and the board of directors of the appellant, Jewell District, have continued to refuse so to meet and have ignored the request. The appellee, Ellsworth District, certified to the county officers the results of the special election and that the Ellsworth District claimed full jurisdiction over the disputed territory since the special election. Regular bus transportation is now maintained for the convenience of the student population of the disputed district by both the appellant and the appellee, and it was stipulated that both parties had acted in good faith in relation to the disputed territory.
There were petitions of intervention filed by O.I. Kleaveland and Nettie Kleaveland, as residents, citizens, and taxpayers of the Independent School District of Jewell outside of the disputed territory. The case in the district court was tried by consent on the stipulated record in substance as above set out.
[1] I. Appellant's first complaint is that there is no authority in the law for a consolidated school district to detach territory from an independent school district except by consent of both districts, and it cites in support of its proposition sections 4133, 4143 and 4144.1 of the Code of 1939, and Peterson v. Independent Sch. Dist.,
Section 4144.1 is as follows:
"Whenever it is proposed to extend the limits of, or add territory to, an existing independent city, town, or consolidated district, the voters residing within the proposed extension or addition and outside the existing independent district, shall vote separately upon the proposition. The proposition must be approved by a majority of the voters voting thereon in each of such territories."
Appellant argues that this provision does not authorize one of the three classes of districts specified to take from either of the other two types of districts, but that the only manner in which segregation could be accomplished would be by a concurrent action of the respective boards of the two districts, as provided by section 4133; in other words, that without the consent of both districts no such segregation could be legally made. The *996
Peterson case, supra, held that, notwithstanding the enactment of section 4144.1 of the Code of 1939, formerly section 4191 of the Codes of 1931 and 1935, section 4133 was not repealed, so that there are two methods by which school corporations may alter their boundaries or annex territory. See Chambers v. Housel,
[2] Appellant argues that no one of the districts mentioned may exercise rights superior to the rights of the other two types of districts. We find nothing in the statute, however, which denies the right of one district to take from another district of equal dignity the territory as authorized by section 4144.1. We are satisfied that there is no merit in appellant's first proposition.
II. Appellant further contends that the attempted segregation of territory from appellant's school district at the time when there was a large outstanding bonded indebtedness in said district should be set aside, not only because such attempted segregation is unauthorized by law, but also because the appellant's remedy for the injuries ensuing therefrom is inadequate at law.
As we have stated, there was a balance of bonded indebtedness *997 against the Jewell District of $36,000, with a sum in the schoolhouse fund for additional payments of $9,929.54, leaving a net balance of about $26,000 still payable. The Jewell District insists that with the detached territory of 1 3/4 sections gone it would be casting an undue burden upon the remaining 4 1/4 sections of the district and they would be left with buildings and equipment too large and expensive for the reduced needs of the district. However, it is agreed that the disputed territory comprised only nine per cent of the real-estate value of the Jewell District and that the number of pupils in such disputed district is only seven. So far as the needs of the Jewell District for school purposes are concerned, the school equipment is as necessary without the severed territory as it was prior to such severance, and the expense of maintaining the school is the same for the reduced territory. There may be some slight difference in expense per pupil and some reduction in the necessary bus service. We are satisfied that there is no extreme hardship to the taxpayers of the Jewell District in the proposed change requiring our interference.
Appellant's principal argument, however, is that forcing upon the remaining portion of the Jewell District the payment of the bonded indebtedness would be unauthorized, and appellant cites various cases, including Harbin Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Denman, Tex., 222 S.W. 538; Chastain v. Hoskins, Tex., 168 S.W. 421; Gilbert v. Scarbrough,
We may notice briefly some of the cases cited by appellant. Creery v. Town of Okoboji,
[3] III. We have not undertaken to follow all the arguments or review all the authorities cited by both parties since the case hinges on the two propositions, first, whether there is authority in law for action such as was undertaken in this case, and, second, whether the existence of the bonded indebtedness prevents such action. In addition to appellant's argument as to the extent of the school facilities in proportion to the school population, and the alleged additional expense, to which we have referred, there is also considerable argument as to the lien on the Jewell District property of the bonds and the rights of the bondholders. Since the bonded indebtedness has been reduced more than fifty per cent we fail to see how a reduction of *999 nine per cent of the taxable real estate is going to cause any serious injury to the appellant district. So far as the bondholders are concerned, they are still protected. The statute provides a means of settlement and adjustment, and if carried out according to the terms of the statute, an adjustment of the assets and liabilities of the two districts could equitably be made.
[4] IV. Another matter upon which both parties apparently agree, but which we deem not practicable, is suggested by appellant and approved by appellee — that this court should dispose of the case once and for all by making the adjustment of assets and liabilities itself. There are several reasons why we may not comply with this suggestion. In the first place, we have no record of all the assets and liabilities of the two districts nor of their financial situation. It is not a matter which we could undertake under the record; nor do we think we are authorized so to do. We have at various times said that distribution must be made by a special tribunal created by law, and not decided by the court. District Township of Franklin v. Wiggins,
In District Township of Viola v. District Township of Audubon, supra, the court held that there was no jurisdiction in the district court and that the jurisdiction of the tribunal created by law was exclusive. See, also, Independent School District of Lowell v. Independent School District of Duser,
V. Question is raised as to the right of the interveners to appear in this action. We see no particular reason for their appearance as such and we do not find it necessary to decide their rights in this matter. They have no further rights, or will incur no further liabilities, than all the other taxpayers in the district. Their rights in the litigation neither add to nor take away from any of the issues necessary to a determination of this cause.
We are satisfied that the action of the district court was right and that its ruling was correct and should be affirmed. — Affirmed.
WENNERSTRUM, C.J., and SAGER, MILLER, GARFIELD, OLIVER, BLISS, and STIGER, JJ., concur.