175 A. 644 | Pa. | 1934
In April, 1925, Greene and Fayette Counties entered into a written contract with Independent Bridge Company (hereinafter called the bridge company), to build a bridge across the Monongahela River. On April 15, 1925, the bridge company sublet the work of building the approaches and substructure to H. B. Mish Company. On May 22, 1925, H. B. Mish Company and The Ætna Casualty Surety Company, appellant, delivered to the bridge company a bond conditioned that Mish perform and complete the subcontract, and containing, inter alia, the following: ". . . . . . it is hereby further stipulated and agreed that the said principal and said surety jointly and severally further covenant and agree with said Independent Bridge Company that any person or persons having a claim for any sum alleged to be due by said principal for any labor or materials furnished in or about the construction of said contract, which shall have remained unpaid for a period of sixty days after the completion and performance of the above mentioned contract and acceptance by the two counties of the work done thereunder, shall have the right to bring suit upon this obligation and to recover any sums as may be justly and legally due him or them. Such suits may be brought in the name of the Independent Bridge Company for the use of the person or persons having such claim. . . . . ." *268
James Ainsley, the appellee, sued in the name of the bridge company for his use, to recover for certain coal sold and delivered by him to Mish, which was consumed in firing the boilers, and otherwise in and about the work. The surety denied liability. The case was tried and a verdict rendered for the use-plaintiff in the sum of $1,891.20, with interest, or the total sum of $2,790.31. Binding instructions for defendant were refused. A rule for judgment n. o. v. was entered and later discharged, the court saying: "In the case at bar it will be noted by reference to the above recited quotations from the contract [i. e., the agreement of the sub-contractor to give the contractor a surety bond 'conditioned for the faithful performance of this contract in every particular and the payment for all material and labor'] and the bond [heretofore cited in this opinion] that it was the intention that the surety was to be liable to the extent of the penal sum in the bond for the execution or carrying out by the sub-contractor, H. B. Mish Company, of its said contract. That contract obligated it to pay for all the labor and material used by it without regard to the nature thereof and without regard to whether the material became a part of the completed structure. [The phrase of twenty-three words following the word "material" is not found in the contract.] What the use-plaintiff, Ainsley, furnished was just as essential to the performance of thecontract by H. B. Mish Company, as was material remaining upon the completion of the contract a component part of the completed bridge."
The test is not whether the materials furnished were "essential to the performance of the contract." Such a test would be impracticable. Applying it, even the electric light furnished the laborers to enable them to work after dark, or the food and water supplied them during their employment would be included under the term "materials furnished." The appellate courts of Pennsylvania have clearly expressed and consistently adhered to a practicable test to be applied in suits of this character. *269
In Philadelphia, to use, Aplnt., v. Malone,
An inspection of the specifications in the instant case, so far as they are before us, likewise discloses nothing which can be construed to include coal furnished for any purpose. We cannot accept the reasoning of the court below that because the surety was liable to the extent of the penal sum in the bond for the execution by the subcontractor of its contract with the bridge company, and that that contract obligated it (i. e., H. B. Mish Co.) to pay for all the labor and materials used by it, and that because what Ainsley furnished was "just as essential" to the performance of the contract by the Mish Company as was the material which became a component part of the completed bridge, the surety company is liable for the coal furnished by the use-plaintiff. There was never any question of the liability of the Mish Company to pay for the coal furnished it. The question here is the liability of the surety company to pay for that coal. No such liability can be read into the bond unless the phrase "materials furnished in or about the construction of said contract" is given a meaning not heretofore judicially accepted. In Com., to use, v. Union Indemnity Co.,
In all these cases, though the provisions of the bond were as definite and comprehensive as in the bond now being interpreted, it was held that such provisions gave a right of action only to those who furnished to the principal on the bond material actually incorporated in the completed job. In Philadelphia v. Jackson Co., Inc.,
The use-plaintiff's claim is not strengthened by the fact that the surety bond in this case uses the phrase, "labor or material furnished in or about the construction of saidcontract" (italics supplied), instead of the word "work" or "improvement." We cannot subscribe to the proposition that the term "contract" has any broader significance than the word "improvement." The word "contract" is often used as meaning the work or improvement for which a contract has been entered into, and the phrase "construction of said contract" is not to be taken literally, for if so this phrase would mean something akin to the interpretation of a written instrument. Blackstone defines a contract to be an agreement upon a sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing. It is obvious, therefore, that the phrase "construction of said contract," as used in the bond, does not refer to this kind of a contract. But the word "construction" has also *272
another meaning of equal sanction and that is, "to build, to form, or to make." "Contract" also has a popular meaning not sanctioned by lexicographers but recognized in the practical administration of the law. We said in Hempfield Twp. School Dist. v. Cavalier et al.,
The judgment is reversed and is here entered for the defendant.