156 Pa. 181 | Pa. | 1893
Opinion by
Thompson was the solicitor of the appellant company and authorized to act for it in matters coming to him in that capacity. Of this Mrs. Wilson was informed, for she not only saw him at the company’s office, but was referred to him by the application clerk. She had made two applications to the appellant for loans of money, the first to be secured by mortgage on her Thompson street property, and to be used chiefly to pay off the plaintiff’s mortgage, the second to be secured by mortgage on the Morris street house, and to be used as part of the purchase money for it. The appellant was not only to lend the money, but also to do the conveyancing of both operations, and its solicitor, Thompson, was the officer to whom Mrs. Wilson was referred for that purpose. To get possession of the Morris street house, for which she was urgent, Mrs. Wilson paid the appellant $950 which were to he used in the settlement with the vendor. This was paid by direction of the application clerk, to Thompson; who unquestionably received it as an officer and agent of the appellant. When however that transaction was closed with the vendor, the appellant did not apply the $950 to it, but settled with the money it was to loan on the other application, leaving the $950 of Mrs. Wilson’s money in Thompson’s hands. But the money to be advanced on the other application was specifically understood to be for the pay
This brings us to the second branch of the case, whether the act of Gourley, the plaintiff’s treasurer, in taking Thompson’s check, and by Thompson’s request holding it for three days, was an acceptance of Thompson’s individual obligation which discharged the appellant from liability. This question is not free from difficulty. In theory the payment of the money and the satisfaction of the mortgage are dependent parts of the same transaction and should be contemporaneous. But the court is entitled to take notice that in cases like the present of replacing an old mortgage by a new one to a different party, the acts in practical business seldom are contemporaneous. The plaintiff’s mortgage was the first incumbrance; until it was actually satisfied of record, the appellant could not get a clear search showing the priority of its own mortgage, to go among its title papers, and such requirement, if not the uniform custom of Philadelphia conveyancing, is at least frequent enough to relieve compliance with it from any prima facies of being out of the ordinary course of business. The act of Gourley therefore in satisfying plaintiff’s mortgage before the receipt of the money was not a substitution of Thompson’s personal liability for that of appellant. Nor was the acceptance of Thompson’s personal check. For the purposes of this transaction Thompson was the appellant, the officer who was authorized to represent it, and the only one with whom the plaintiff had anything to do. The transaction itself was a loan of fourteen hundred dollars
The question of jurisdiction may be briefly disposed of. The bill was for the cancellation of the entry of satisfaction on complainant’s mortgage, and its reinstatement as a prior lien to
We have not thought it necessary to notice in detail the numerous assignments of error, even as reduced and classified in appellant’s argument. We have considered the case on the’ facts found by the master, because careful perusal of the evidence has failed to satisfy us that those found are not correct, or that those omitted in the findings would change the result. The case is one of hardship in anjr aspect, for it involves loss through the fraud of a person trusted by all parties, but the general conclusion is unavoidable that Thompson was the agent of appellant, with actual authority as to a large part of the transactions, and with such apparent authority throughout, as to make it answerable for his action.
Decree affirmed.