82 Iowa 14 | Iowa | 1891
I. Appellees insist in argument that -appellant has not made all the evidence taken on the trial of record, namely, Exhibit A and Exhibit number 1, and that, therefore, the case cannot be tried de nono. We are not referred to any part of the six abstracts or ■of the transcript in support of this claim, but are left to .search these several hundred pages to see what they .show, if anything, as to these exhibits. In the absence of any specific reference, we conclude that we may rely upon the certificate of the judge that the transcript contains all the evidence, and, therefore, consider the case .denono.
II. The following statement of facts, with those hereafter mentioned, will be sufficient to a correct
III. Our next inquiry is whether the incorporated town of Spencer had power to grant the permission given
IY. Appellant contends that, although the council had power to grant the permission, “it was in effect a mere license, and, as such, was revocable at any time before an entry upon the premises, and possession taken thereunder, and expenses incurred.” Appellee contends that under the facts the plaintiff was estopped from revoking the permission at the time it was attempted to do so. We have seen that, before the attempted revocation, the defendants, relying upon the permission, had ordered a scale suited to the place, paid the freight thereon, and had it shipped to them at Spencer. It also appears that the location requires grading, some of which was done, and that defendants enlarged the plan of their building so as to make room for the scale-beam on the inside. These facts were known to the council at the time of the attempted revocation, and, under the familiar rules of the law, were estopped from then revoking the permission. Appellees cite cases wherein licenses were held irrevocable, but we do not understand them to claim, nor would we hold, that this license must continue perpetually; for, surely, such was not contemplated by either party. The license having been granted by authority, and the defendants having acted thereon, as stated, the plaintiff is estopped from revoking it until the interests of the public shall require that it be revoked. If from any cause, such as change in the travel or business, the construction of a scale by the town, or the condition or management of this scale, public interests require its removal, then the council may revoke the permission. In Emerson v. Babcock, supra, where the scales were placed without permission,
Y. The permission being to Andrew alone, appellant contends that it confers no privilege upon the firm
This discussion fully disposes of the case, and leads to the conclusion that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.