185 Iowa 203 | Iowa | 1919
Lead Opinion
The defendant was convicted, in the mayor’s court of the incorporated town of Decatur, of violating an ordinance of said town, limiting the speed of automobiles upon its streets to 10 miles per hour. Upon appeal to the district court, he was again convicted, and now appeals to this court from a judgment thereon, imposing a fine of $25 and costs. The principal contention of counsel for appellant is that the ordinance, the violation of which is charged, is invalid. The ground upon which the legality of the ordinance is challenged is that the town council did not comply with the provisions and requirements of Section 1571-m20 of the Supplement to the Code, 1913, the material portion of which is as follows:
“Except as herein otherwise provided, local authorities shall have no power to pass, enforce or maintain any ordi
A sign, bearing the inscription, “Decatur City, automobiles and motor vehicles slow down to 10 miles per hour,” of sufficient size and easily readable, was located at the proper place on all highways entering the town. The sign
It is the contention of counsel for appellant that the requirement of the statute that an arrow “pointing in the direction where the speed is to be reduced or changed” be placed upon the required signs is mandatory, and a condition which must be complied with before the power conferred by the legislature upon municipal corporations to place certain limitations upon the speed of motor vehicles within the corporate limits thereof can be exercised. It is, of course, fundamental that such corporations can exercise only such powers, and in the manner, as are delegated thereto by the legislature. Mr. Justice Dillon, in Merriam v. Moody’s Exrs., 25 Iowa 163, speaking for the court, said:
“In determining the question now made, it must be taken for settled law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation — not simply convenient, but indispensable; fourth, any fair doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation — against the existence of the power.”
See, also, Logan & Sons v. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524; Brooks v. Incorporated Town of Brooklyn, 146 Iowa 136; Farmers Tel. Co. v. Town of Washta, 157 Iowa 447; Town of Hedrick v. Lanz, 170 Iowa 437; Huston v. city of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 455.
The legislature of this state has, by proper statutory enactment, prescribed and limited the duties and privileges of drivers of motor vehicles upon the public highways thereof. In addition thereto, it has conferred certain limited
“Provided further, that the local authorities of cities and towns may limit by ordinance, rule or regulation the speed of motor vehicles on the public highways, such speed limitations not to be in any case less than one mile in six minutes, * * * and on further condition that each city or town shall have placed conspicuously on each main public highway where the city or town line crosses the same, and on every main highway where the rate of speed changes, signs * * * and also an arrow pointing in the direction where the speed is to be reduced or changed. * * * ”
The requirement of the legislature that local authorities place an arrow upon signs at highways entering cities and towns, and at points therein- where the speed changes, is not a mere captious one, but is intended to serve a perfectly reasonable and legitimate purpose. It is a matter of Common knowledge that the possibility of injury to persons upon public streets from motor vehicles driven át a rapid rate of speed is much greater in certain congested portions of towns and cities than upon public highways, or generally upon other streets less frequented by the public. Greater care should be required of drivers of motor vehicles when passing, or in the vicinity of, public school buildings, churches, market places, and congested business districts, than in many other parts of the city. The legislature has, there
It follows that, as the incorporated town of Decatur failed to comply with the terms and conditions imposed by the legislature as a condition precedent to the exercise of the authority delegated by Section 1571-m20, its ordinance is invalid, and cannot be enforced. The motion of defendant’s counsel for a directed verdict based upon this ground ■ should, therefore, have been sustained. The judgment of the court below must be, and is, therefore, — Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I cannot agree to the conclusion reached by the majority. Conceding that the statute is mandatory, I think a substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required. We so held in Pilgrim v. Brown, 168 Iowa 177, construing this same section, and as to the location of the signs where the city or town line crosses the highway. In that case, the sign was located 500 feet from the line, and within the city. The same claim was made there as here: that the ordinance was void. It is true that was a negligence case, but we said:
“It is not altogether clear from the statute whether the legislature intended to make the validity of the ordinance depend upon the city’s compliance with the requirement for signboards, or to relieve from the penalties of the ordinance such persons as might be misled or deceived by the absence of the prescribed warnings, or that the presumption of negligence attached to the driving of a motor car at a greater speed than the regulation allows should be applicable only in cases where the city has performed its duty in this respect. But if either of these several constructions be adopted, the I’esult of the case in hand must be the same. The evident purpose of the provision for the display of signs at the entrance to the cities is to give warning to car drivers, that they may not unwittingly violate municipal regulations., They also, to some extent, tend to protect the'general public in the use of the city streets, against the perils caused by the reckless or thoughtless operation of such‘vehicles. It cannot be supposed there was any legislative intent to make the validity of a municipal regulation of this character depend on the question whether a nice or accurate survey shall find all the several sign posts surrounding the city planted squarely upon the boundary line.”
It seems to me the majority opinion requires too strict compliance, and is technical. The evidence shows that defendant was within the town, at the time he was speeding
“The plaintiff has offered evidence to show that there were signs on the main highways, at or near the corporate line, with the words, ‘Decatur City. Automobiles and Motorcycles slow down to 10 miles per hour.’ If the plaintiff has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there were signs on the main highways, dt or near the corporation line, which could be readily read, containing the words, ‘Decatur City. Automobiles and Motorcycles slow down to 10 miles per hour,’ this would be a substantial compliance with the. law, and sufficiently so as to tMs requirement.”
There is some suggestion in the majority opinion in regard to the arrows and signs within the city or town, giving notice of public schools and congested districts, where a further change of speed may be required. Whether or not this rule would ■ apply where a person was approaching a schoolhouse or the like, within a city or town where such
I think that the statutory provision pertaining to the “arrow” indicating direction should be construed to apply only to signs erected within the city at points where the ordinances require a reduced speed. This is the only rational construction of the statute. No reason is conceivable why an arrow indicating direction should be posted at the outer limits of the city. I therefore join in the dissent.