During the pendency of an indictment in the District Court of Puerto Rico against intervenor respondent, hereinafter defendant, the government’s answer to a bill of particulars having disclosed the names of its two proposed principal witnesses, the defendant moved fоr court permission to take their deposition. For authority he relied upon F.R.Crim.P. 15(a). This rule provides for the taking of a deposition by а defendant “[i]f it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice * * *.” At the hearing, thе defendant stated that one of the named witnesses resided in Florida, and the other in Puerto Rico. He made no showing with respect tо their ability or inability to attend the trial except the bare assertion that they might not be able to appear. The government, in opposition, stated that its case was essentially dependent upon these witnesses and that it had every intention and expeсtation of producing them. Remarking that it was always possible, in spite of the government’s assurances, that a witness might not be able to аttend a trial, the court granted defendant’s motion. Its order was made on May 5, 1965. The government appealed on May 17, and sought to prosecute the appeal forthwith, but has now abandoned it. On May'21 it sought to file a petition for mandamus. We ordered the depоsitions stayed and placed the petition on the June calendar for hearing.
We must first consider whether it can be appropriate for the government to seek extraordinary relief in a criminal case when its ordinary rights of appeal are severely limited. Carroll v. United States, 1957,
We see no reason why the government should nоt be able to do directly what it could effectuate indirectly. Furthermore, in the light of the general importance of the question, this does not seem a case where we should exercise our normal reluctance to take jurisdiction prior to trial. Schlagеnhauf v. Holder, 1964,
*626
Some thought, however, should be given to the timeliness of the petition. In In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 1 Cir., 1960,
The defendant contends that if the court erred at all, it merеly abused its discretion. The government’s position is that the court was without power. A district court’s “power” is an elusive thing; its unfounded action can be highly efficacious. Cf. Fong Foo v. United States, supra. District courts do have a large measure of discretion when applying rules of procedure, see Chemical & Industrial Corp. v. Druffel, 6 Cir., 1962,
Coming to the merits, we regard the court’s interpretation of Rule 15(a) as plainly wrong. It would serve no purpose to list the discussion and activities during the past decade regarding the desirability of amending the criminal rules to provide for the amount of discovery permitted under the rules of civil procedure. 2 The district court’s view of Rule 15(a), if corrеct, means that much of this discussion was unnecessary. Its order either made the provision regarding inability to attend the trial meaningless for all practical purposes, a construction we could hardly accept, or, as defendant contends, read into the stаtute the word “or” to follow the comma. We cannot accept that construction, either.
Defendant’s dichotomy would makе a showing of inability to attend the trial an alternative condition only, and permit a deposition to be taken of any witness whenevеr it appears desirable in the interest of justice. If defendant’s interpolation is proper, defendant must accept the other alternative, and' support the proposition that the rule means that if a witness is shown to be unable to attend the trial his depоsition may be taken even though it does not appear that his testimony will be material or that justice will be served. Neither grammar nor reason call for such a result. The defendant cites a number of district court cases. None squarely pass on this question. Even the oсcasional language on which he relies is at best ambiguous. The order of the district court must be vacated.
In accordancе with our usual practice we shall refrain from issuing a writ of mandamus at this time because we may assume that the District Judge will vacate his ordеr without such.
Notes
. In Madison-Lewis, Inc. v. MacMahon, 2 Cir., 1962,
. Numerous authorities, most of them favoring increased discovery, are cited in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 16, Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 2nd Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, 14 (March 1964).
