737 N.E.2d 1062 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2000
Lead Opinion
On March 3, 1998, Baby Boy Brooks was born to appellee, Karen Brooks. Three days later, Karen Brooks permanently surrendered the child to LDS, an Ohio licensed adoption agency, and executed an affidavit indicating that Phelps was the father of the child. Brooks and Phelps were never married. On that same day, Baby Boy Brooks was placed with his prospective adoptive family. On April 17, 1998, the administrator of the putative father registry certified that a search of the registry, conducted on April 16, 1998, revealed that no putative father was registered for Baby Boy Brooks.
On May 6, 1998, Phelps filed a complaint in juvenile court to establish a father-son relationship with Baby Boy Brooks. On July 1, 1998, Phelps registered with the Putative Father Registry. On July 22, 1998, a juvenile court magistrate held a hearing in Phelps' parentage action, and, on August 17, 1998, the magistrate issued a decision establishing the father-son relationship between Phelps and Baby Boy Brooks. This decision was adopted by a judge of the juvenile court on the same date, and pursuant to Civ.R. 53(E)(4)(c), the trial court entered judgment finding that immediate relief was justified. LDS timely objected, but these objections were overruled by the juvenile court judge in a decision filed December 8, 1998.
On September 29, 1998, Baby Boy Brooks' prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption in the probate court. On October 16, 1998, Phelps filed an objection to the adoption and sought a writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody of Baby Boy Brooks. Phelps contended that the adoption of Baby Boy Brooks was not lawful absent his consent. A hearing was held by a probate court magistrate on December 4, 1998, to determine if Phelps' consent was necessary for the adoption to proceed. In a decision, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, filed December 9, 1998, the probate court magistrate found that Phelps' consent to the adoption was required under R.C.
LDS timely objected to the magistrate's decision. In a decision and entry filed March 30, 1999, the probate court overruled LDS's objections, dismissed the adoption petition, and certified the writ of habeas corpus (and revocation of *827 permanent surrender) to the juvenile court. It is from this judgment entry that LDS appeals, raising the following four assignments of error:
The Franklin County Probate Court erred in dismissing the Appellant's Petition to adopt by determining:
A. That Theo Phelps was not considered a putative father subject to the requirements of
3107.061 et seq., despite his failure to register with the Putative Father Registry, because he had sought to establish a parent-child relationship in the Juvenile Division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas prior to the filing of a petition to adopt in the Franklin County Probate Court.B. That no conflict exists between R.C.
3107.06 (B)(3) and R.C.3107.07 (B)(1) concerning the status of putative fathers.C. That the adoption of Baby Boy Brooks could not proceed without the consent of Theo Phelps.
D. That the best interests of the child should not be considered at the same time it is decided whether consents to the adoption are required.
In its first, second, and third assignments of error, appellant challenges the trial court's interpretation of the relevant statutes governing who must consent to an adoption under Ohio law. In particular, appellant challenges the trial court's ruling that Phelps' consent was required by application of R.C.
R.C.
Unless consent is not required under section
3107.07 of the Revised Code, a petition to adopt a minor may be granted only if written consent to the adoption has been executed by all of the following:
(A) The mother of the minor;
(B) The father of the minor, if any of the following apply:
(1) The minor was conceived or born while the father was married to the mother;
(2) The minor is his child by adoption;
*828(3) Prior to the date the petition was filed, it was determined by a court proceeding pursuant to sections
3111.01 to3111.19 of the Revised Code, a court proceeding in another state, an administrative proceeding pursuant to sections3111.20 to3111.29 of the Revised Code, or an administrative proceeding in another state that he has a parent and child relationship with the minor;(4) He acknowledged paternity of the child and that acknowledgement has become final pursuant to section
2151.232 ,3111.211 , or5101.314 of the Revised Code.
(C) The putative father of the minor[.]
R.C.
Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following:
* * *
(B) The putative father of a minor if either of the following applies:
(1) The putative father fails to register as the minor's putative father with the putative father registry established under section
3107.062 of the Revised Code not later than thirty days after the minor's birth;(2) The court finds, after proper service of notice and hearing, that any of the following are the case:
(a) The putative father is not the father of the minor;
(b) The putative father has willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the minor;
(c) The putative father has willfully abandoned the mother of the minor during her pregnancy and up to the time of her surrender of the minor, or the minor's placement in the home of the petitioner, whichever occurs first.
Appellant argues that, under R.C.
As in any case of statutory construction, the paramount goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Brooks v. Ohio State Univ. (1996),
Ambiguity in a statute exists only if its language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See,e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde (1996),
Here, there is no ambiguity in the relevant statutes and no conflict between them. In fact, appellant has manufactured a conflict where none exists by incorrectly assuming: (1) that the provisions of R.C.
First, contrary to the analysis advanced by appellant, we do not look first to the provisions of R.C.
R.C.
* * * [A] man, including one under age eighteen, who may be a child's father and to whom all of the following apply:
(1) He is not married to the child's mother at the time of the child's conception or birth;
(2) He has not adopted the child;
(3) He has not been determined, prior to the date a petition to adopt the child is filed, to have a parent and child relationship with the child by a court proceeding pursuant to sections
3111.01 to3111.19 of the Revised Code, a court proceeding in another state, an administrative agency proceeding pursuant to sections3111.20 to3111.29 of the Revised Code, or an administrative agency proceeding in another state;(4) He has not acknowledged paternity of the child pursuant to section
5101.314 of the Revised Code. [Emphasis added.]
Under the clear language of R.C.
Under well-established rules of statutory construction, "[t]his court in the interpretation of related and co-existing statutes must harmonize and give full application to all such statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict."United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach (1994),
Even if the relevant statutes were ambiguous, nothing in the legislative history of the General Assembly's 1996 enactment of the putative father registry suggests that the thirty-day filing requirement (R.C.
Second, appellant attaches too much importance to the legislature's rejection of a ten-day grace period for those putative fathers who were unable to register for reasons beyond their control. Certainly, the legislature intended to preclude putative fathers from raising fact-specific, equitable excuses for their failure to register in a timely manner. Thus, consistent with the statute and its legislative history, the magistrate and trial court here properly found that Phelps' equitable arguments concerning the reasons for his untimely filing with the putative father registry were legally irrelevant. However, nothing in the legislature's rejection of a grace period to the putative father registry requirement reveals an intention by the legislature to eliminate the consent requirement from a father who has judicially established his parentage before the filing of the adoption petition, especially considering that statutory language to the contrary is contained in the very same bill.
Because we find that Phelps' consent to the adoption of his son is required under Ohio law, appellant's first, second, and third assignments of error are not well-taken, and are overruled.
In its fourth assignment of error, appellant contends that, even if Phelps' consent were required under the applicable statutes, the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for adoption without also considering the best interests of Baby Boy Brooks. Appellant apparently contends that an adoption may be *832 approved over the objection of one of the child's parents if the best interests of the child warrants it. We disagree.
An adoption in Ohio is a two-step process, involving first a determination whether parental consent is required and, second, whether the adoption is in the best interest of the child. R.C.
For the foregoing reasons, all four of appellant's assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Probate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
BRYANT, J., concurs.
KENNEDY, J., dissents.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority holds that appellee's, Theo Phelps', consent to the adoption is required because he established paternity before the adoption petition was filed. The majority contends that this result is required by the clear and unambiguous language of the adoption statutes. Because I find that the statutory language is ambiguous, that the majority's interpretation is contrary to the legislative history, and that the majority's interpretation undermines the effectiveness of the putative father registry, I respectfully dissent.
The Ohio General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 419 in 1996, which altered the existing adoption statutes and created a putative father registry. See R.C.
However, under R.C.
This court has held that, when a statute is subject to various interpretations, a court may invoke the rules of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. Rajan v. State Med.Bd. Of Ohio (1997),
The Supreme Court of Ohio discussed the purpose behind Ohio's adoption statutes in In re Adoption of Zschach (1996),
Ultimately, the goal of adoption statutes is to protect the best interests of children. In cases where adoption is necessary, this is best accomplished by providing the child with a permanent and stable home, see In re Adoption of Ridenour (1991),
61 Ohio St.3d 319 ,328 ,574 N.E.2d 1055 ,1063 , and ensuring that the adoption process is completed in an expeditious manner. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl Hudnall (1991),71 Ohio App.3d 376 ,380 ,594 N.E.2d 45 ,48 . If these goals are met, the new parent-child relationship will have the best opportunity to develop fully.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that adoption laws are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. In re Adoption of Zschach, at 655, citing Lemley v.Kaiser (1983),
The Ohio Legislative Service Commission prepared an analysis of Am.Sub. H.B. No. 419, which provides insight into the legislative intent behind the changes to the adoption statutes. 3 Baldwin's Ohio Legislative Service (1996), L-336. The Legislative Service Commission cautions that the final version of bills may be different from the legislative analysis because they are subject to floor amendments and conference committee changes. Id. According to the analysis, the changes to the adoption laws require a putative father to register with the putative father registry within thirty days of the child's birth or his consent will not be required. Id. at L-336, L-346. The original version of R.C.
Given that the legislature did not intend for there to be any exceptions to the registration requirement, that the purpose of the adoption laws is to provide children with a stable home in an expeditious manner, and that adoption laws are to be strictly construed, I conclude that the General Assembly intended in R.C.
The majority's conclusion, that the failure to register is irrelevant as long as paternity is established prior to the filing of the adoption petition, would create a race to the courthouse and undermine the effectiveness of the putative father registry. This argument also is inconsistent with the public policy of promoting stability and certainty in the adoption process and would discourage prospective adoptive parents from developing an emotional bond with a child whom they could lose any time prior to the filing of the final adoption petition.
Additionally, the majority's interpretation of the registration requirement is inconsistent with the law in other jurisdictions that have adopted similar putative father registration statutes. See, e.g., Aizpuru, Protecting the Unwed Father's Opportunity to Parent: A Survey of Paternity Registry Statutes (1999), 18 Rev.Litig. 703 (noting that the more common approach among states with paternity registries is for parental rights to terminate automatically after the expiration of the registration period). For example, under the New Mexico statute, a putative father's failure to register with the putative father registry within ten days of the child's birth eliminates the necessity of his consent to an adoption. N.M. Laws 32A-5-19(E); see, also, Ala. Code 26-10C-1(i) (any person claiming to be the father of a child who fails to file with the putative father registry within thirty days of the child's birth shall be deemed to have given irrevocable implied consent to adoption); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a putative father registration statute that eliminates a putative father's right to have notice of and participate in an adoption proceeding for failure to register within the statutory time period. Lehr v. Robertson (1983),
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie.
Id. at 262. The Supreme Court found that the New York putative father registry statute was constitutional in that it provided a putative father with an adequate opportunity to preserve his interest in his child, and noted that "[b]y mailing a postcard to the putative father registry, he could have guaranteed that he would receive notice of any proceedings to adopt Jessica. The possibility that he may have failed to do so because of his ignorance of the law cannot be a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself." Id. at 264.
Because I find that Phelps' consent to the adoption of Baby Boy Brooks was not required, I respectfully dissent. *837