In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Karen J. MYERS, Deceased. Rex A. Picken, Appellant.
No. 11-1378.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Nov. 2, 2012.
WATERMAN, Justice.
William D. Kurth of Kurth Law Office, Lake City, for appellees.
WATERMAN, Justice.
This appeal presents a question of first impression: whether a surviving spouse‘s elective share, as defined in
The assignees of Howard‘s elective share (assignees) argue the elective share should include POD assets under Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2006), which held the elective share includes assets in a revocable trust. The executor argues the general assembly, by amending
For the reasons explained below, we conclude the 2009 аmendment to
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Karen died on November 2, 2009, survived by her spouse, Howard. Rex Picken, Karen‘s brother and the executor of her estate, admitted Karen‘s will to probate on November 20. At the time of her death, Karen owned a number of assets, either jointly or individually, which were valued at $479,989.29. Howard bеcame the sole owner of real estate and other property he and Karen owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Karen left no other property to Howard in her will, aside from some household furnishings. Karen bequeathed the rest of her property to her daughters and stepson. The assets at issue in this appeal are a checking account and certificate of deposit at the First Federal Savings Bank vаlued at $91,085.71 and an annuity with River Resource Funds valued at $18,978.80. All three of these assets were accompanied by beneficiary designations that made them payable on death to Karen‘s daughters.
Howard filed for an elective share on June 30, 2010, and an application for support allowance on July 8. The probate court denied Howard‘s application for support allowance because it found Howаrd lacked need for such support. On February 9, 2011, Howard assigned his interest in Karen‘s estate, including his right to an elective share, to the heirs of DeLillian
On May 6, the assignees filed an application to set off the surviving spouse‘s share. The assignees requested that the probate court determine, as an initial matter, whether the checking account, certificate of deposit, and annuity should be included in Howard‘s elective share. The probate court relied on our 2006 decision in Sieh. There, we concluded that assets in a revocable trust werе to be included in the surviving spouse‘s elective share, even though they were not explicitly mentioned in
We retained the executor‘s timely appeal to resolve this question of first impression.
II. Standard of Review.
A surviving spouse‘s claim against the estate for an elective share under
Actions to set aside or contest wills, for the involuntary appointment of guardians and conservators, and for the establishment of contested сlaims shall be triable in probate as law actions, and all other matters triable in probate shall be tried by the probate court as a proceeding in equity.
III. Analysis.
Because the probate court relied on Sieh, we begin by discussing that decision. We then analyze the controlling statutory language.
A. Sieh v. Sieh.
In Sieh, Mary Jane Sieh, the surviving spouse of Edward Sieh, argued that she should receive, as part of her elective share, assets of a revocable inter vivos trust created by Edward several years before their marriage. Sieh, 713 N.W.2d at 195. The beneficiaries of this trust, Edward‘s children, argued that the revocable trust should not be included in Mary Jane‘s elective share, and the probate court agreed. Id. We reversed, emphasizing that,
because Edward had full control of the assets of the inter vivos trust at the time of his death, including the power to revoke the trust, the trust assets were property possessed by the decedent during the marriage and thus subject to the spouse‘s statutory share under
section 633.238 .
Id.
We reached this conclusion even though revocable trusts were not mentioned in
“Although property owned or owned in substance by the deсedent immediately before death that passed outside of probate at the decedent‘s death is not part of the decedent‘s probate estate, such property is owned in substance by the decedent through various powers or rights, such as the power to revoke, withdraw, invade, or sever, or to appoint the decedent or the decedent‘s estate as beneficiary. Consequently, for purposes of calculating the amount of the [spouse‘s] elective share the value of property owned or owned in substance by the decedent immediately before death that passed outside of probate at the decedent‘s death to donees other than the surviving spouse is counted as part of the decedent‘s ‘estate.’ The decedent‘s motive in creating, exercising or not exercising any of these рowers is irrelevant.”
Id. at 197 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 9.1 cmt. j (2003), at 212 (emphasis added)). Based on this Restatement provision, we concluded the fact Edward “had complete control over the trust assets at all times prior to his death ... would allow the assets in the revocable trust to be included in the statutory share of Edward‘s spouse electing against the will.” Id. at 198.
The assignees understandably argue Sieh should be read broadly to sweep into
H.F. 799, 81st G.A., 1st Sess., explanation (Iowa 2005). We did not mention this legislative history in Sieh.
B. Section 633.238.
We now consider whether the general assembly‘s subsequent amendment of
By this amendment, the legislature added “limited to” to
- The elective share of the surviving spouse shall be limited to all of the following:
- One-third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the decedent at any time during the marriage which have not been sold on execution or other judicial sale, and to which thе surviving spouse has made no express written relinquishment of right.
- All personal property that, at the time of death, was in the hands of the decedent as the head of a family, exempt from execution.
- One-third of all other personal property of the decedent that is not necessary for the payment of debts and charges.
- One-third in value of the property held in trust not necessary for the payment of debts and charges over which the decedent was a grantor and retained at the time of death the power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust, or over which the decedent waived or rescinded any such power within one year of the date of death, and to which the surviving
spouse has not made any express written relinquishment.
- The elective share described in this section shall be in lieu of any property the spouse would otherwise receive under the last will and testament of the decеdent, through intestacy, or under the terms of a revocable trust.
When interpreting a statute that has been amended, “we may consider the previous state of the law, circumstances surrounding the statute‘s enactment, and the text both before and after the amendment.” Davis v. State, 682 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2004). We presume that the law has been changed if the legislature added or deleted words from the statute, “unless the remaining language amounts to the same thing.” Id. “When interprеting amendments, we will assume that the amendment sought to accomplish some purpose and was not a futile exercise.” Id.
The postamendment version of
The assignees did not assert in probate court or in their appellate brief that the POD assets fall into any of the four categories in
POD accounts, such as the checking and сertificate of deposit accounts here, and annuities are nonprobate assets. 1 Sheldon F. Kurtz, Kurtz on Iowa Estates: Intestacy, Wills, and Estate Administration § 11.1, at 451 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Kurtz on Iowa Estates]. Nonprobate assets are interests in property that pass outside of the decedent‘s probate estate to a designated beneficiary upon the decedent‘s death. Id. Although these assets are the personal property of
The assignees make a strong public рolicy argument that elective share rights may be defeated by the use of POD assets if we interpret
Based on the plain meaning of thе operative statutory language as amended in 2009, we hold that only the assets specifically enumerated in
IV. Conclusion.
For these reasons, the probate court erred by including Karen‘s POD assets in Howard‘s elective share. The probate court order is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
Because the executor failed to raise this argument in probate court, we decline to reach it. See Bowman v. City of Des Moines Mun. Hous. Agency, 805 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Iowa 2011) (“We decline to consider an argument that is raised for the first time on appeal.“). In any event, this argument lacks merit. This provision states that it is “[t]he right ... to take an electivе share” that is not transferable.The right of the surviving spouse to take an elective share, and the right of the surviving spouse to receive a life estate in the homestead, are personal. They are not transferable and cannot be exercised for the spouse subsequent to the spouse‘s death. If the surviving spouse dies prior to filing an election, it shall be conclusively presumed that the surviving spouse does not take such elective share.
If the surviving spouse elects to take against the will, the share of such surviving spouse will be:
- One-third in value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property possessed by the decedent at any time during the marriage, which have not been sold on execution or other judicial sale, and to which the surviving spouse has made no relinquishment of right.
- All personal property that, at the time of death, was in the hands of the decedent as the head of a family, exempt from execution.
- One-third of all other personal property of the decedent that is not necessary for the payment of debts and charges.
The bill amends sections of the probate code relating to the right of a surviving spouse to take an elective share of the deceased spouse‘s estate including the right to receive a share of the deceased spouse‘s revocable trust assets and the right to elect a life estatе in the homestead. Current law provides that a surviving spouse may elect against the will of a deceased spouse and claim a statutory share that does not include property held in trust by the deceased spouse or the right to elect a life estate in the homestead.
