In the Matter of the Application of Andrew Wheeler for a Conditional Use Permit
Brandon J. Wheeler, Felhaber Larson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator Andrew Wheeler)
Paul Donald Reuvers, Michael Conlin-Brandenburg, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondents Cass County and Cass County Planning Commission)
Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Rasmusson, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Andrew Wheeler challenges respondent Cass County Planning Commission’s denial of his application for a conditional use permit. Wheeler argues that (1) the Planning Commission’s failure to follow statutory requirements made its decision prima facie arbitrary and (2) the Planning Commission’s denial of his application was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. We affirm.
Wheeler and his wife purchased a 4.01-acre lakeshore property in Cass County and built a home on it. The house is around 10,000 square feet, contains nine bedrooms and nine bathrooms, and offers various amenities. For approximately three years, the Wheelers rented out the property on a short-term basis for up to 25 people at a time.
Cass County’s Short-Term Rental Ordinance
In February 2025, Cass County adopted an ordinance governing short-term rentals (the STR ordinance). See Cass County, Minn., Short-Term Rental Ordinance §§ 1-6 (2025). The STR ordinance permits short-term rentals with a license but requires that “[s]hort-term rental units that advertise as thirteen (13) or more occupants or advertise as six (6) bedrooms or more, must first obtain a Conditional Use Permit prior to receiving a license.” Id., § 3(A)-(B).
Cass County’s Process for Requesting a Conditional Use Permit
The process of requesting a conditional use permit (CUP) is governed by Cass County’s ordinance regulating land use (land-use ordinance). See Cass County, Minn., Land Use Ordinance (CCLUO) §§ 500, 705 (2025). The Planning Commission decides whether to approve or deny a CUP application. See id., § 705.1(B), (D). When reviewing a CUP application, the Planning Commission “shall consider” certain “evaluation criteria.” Id., § 705.2. The land-use ordinance requires the Planning Commission to consider CUP applications at a meeting, and, “[i]f the permit is denied, the [Planning Commission] shall advise the applicant of the reasons therefore in writing.” Id., § 705.1(C)-(D); accord
Wheeler’s CUP Application
In August 2025, Wheeler applied for a CUP to advertise the property for short-term rental with eight bedrooms and capacity of up to 25 people. Consistent with the process required by the land-use ordinance, the county sent out notices inviting public comment. See CCLUO § 705.1(B). In response, the county received four comments, all opposing Wheeler’s CUP application.
Also consistent with the land-use ordinance, the county’s environmental services department (ESD) conducted a field inspection of the property. See CCLUO §§ 501(F), 501.4. Based on this inspection, ESD prepared proposed findings and conditions for the Planning Commission to use in considering Wheeler’s application. The proposed findings noted that the application may not meet criteria for granting a CUP, including that “[t]he size of the proposed rental and its impacts on the neighborhood may have an undue impact on public health, safety, and welfare.”
On September 8, 2025, the Planning Commission held a public meeting during which it discussed Wheeler’s CUP application. The Wheelers were present at the meeting and participated in the discussion. The Planning Commission raised various concerns with Wheeler’s proposed use of the property as a short-term rental, including concerns about the size of the house and the number of people using the relatively small amount of lakeshore. After discussing these concerns, the Planning Commission voted to deny Wheeler’s CUP application.
At its next meeting on October 14, 2025, the Planning Commission adopted findings addressing the required criteria and detailing the reasons for denying Wheeler’s CUP application. These findings were sent to Wheeler, although he contends that he did not receive them for several weeks.
Wheeler filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking reversal of the Planning Commission’s denial of his CUP application and an order to issue the requested permit.
DECISION
I. The Planning Commission’s actions do not establish a prima facie case of arbitrariness.
Wheeler argues that the Planning Commission violated
Appellate courts review application of the law de novo. Harlow v. State, Dep‘t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016). Appellate courts “will reverse a governing body’s decision regarding a conditional use permit application if the governing body acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously.” RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015).
A zoning decision is presumed to be arbitrary “[i]f a [governing body] fails to record the basis for a zoning determination at the time it acts.” R.A. Putnam & Assocs. v. City of Mendota Heights, 510 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1994). The governing body “need not necessarily prepare formal findings of fact, but it must, at a minimum, have the reasons for its decision recorded or reduced to writing and in more than just a conclusory fashion.” Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn. 1981). “[A]s long as the necessary record is prepared within a reasonable time of a zoning decision, a [governing body] should not be presumed to have acted in an arbitrary manner.” R.A. Putnam, 510 N.W.2d at 267.
A. The Record
Wheeler first contends that the Planning Commission did not state its reasons for denial on the record. When “a multimember governing body denies a request, it must state the reasons for denial on the record and provide the applicant in writing a statement of the reasons for the denial.”
Although the Planning Commission did not specifically list in summary form the reasons for denial, the record contains the commissioners’ concerns and reasons for the denial. We therefore conclude that the Planning Commission stated its reasons for denial on the record as required in
B. Timeliness
Wheeler next contends that the Planning Commission failed to adopt and provide written findings within 60 days, thereby establishing a “prima facie case of arbitrariness.” The applicable deadline governing the CUP application is found in
The Minnesota Supreme Court has distinguished between mandatory and directory provisions in this statute. A mandatory provision is one that “express[es] specific consequences for noncompliance.” Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Minn. 2007); see also Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. 2010) (reaffirming this definition). A directory provision is one that “contain[s] a requirement but provide[s] no consequence for noncompliance.” Johnson, 786 N.W.2d at 295 (quotation omitted). A zoning authority’s noncompliance with a mandatory provision in subdivision 2 “would trigger [automatic approval], but noncompliance with a directory provision in the statute would not.” Id.
We next consider whether the Planning Commission’s delay was reasonable. “[A]s long as the necessary record is prepared within a reasonable time of a zoning decision, a [decision-making body] should not be presumed to have acted in an arbitrary manner.” R.A. Putnam, 510 N.W.2d at 267. Wheeler was aware of the denial and the reasons for it on September 8, 2025. He received written confirmation of the denial several days later. The Planning Commission reviewed and approved written findings at the first meeting following the initial determination, which was just one day past the deadline.
We conclude that, although the Planning Commission missed the 60-day deadline to adopt a written statement that states the reasons for the denial, the delay was brief, reasonable, and did not establish prima facie arbitrariness.
C. Reasons for Denial
Lastly, Wheeler contends that the formal reasons for denial provided by the Planning Commission were inconsistent with the reasons stated on the record. The formal written statement must be “consistent with the reasons stated in the record at the time of the denial” and “provided to the applicant upon adoption.”
[T]he visibility of cars and general operations as viewed from public waters is potentially an issue as parking is sparse and the lot is only 100’ in width at the water.
. . . .
Approval of the application is not consistent with the policies and provisions of the Comprehensive Plan and various Watershed Management Plans and the intent, purposes, and requirements of the Cass County Land Use Ordinance and the various other Ordinances as this size of activity is blurring the lines between a residential area and commercial use.
Approval of the application is not consistent with the present land uses in the area. Neighboring properties are single family homes and close by. While the property is 4 acres, the majority of that is in the backlot and the lakeside area where individuals gather is not very large.
. . . .
The size of the proposed rental and its impact on the neighborhood will have an undue impact on public health, safety, and welfare given the size of the short-term rental and the size of the lakefront portion of the property.
The Planning Commission members made several statements consistent with these findings on the record. In addition to robust discussions about the impact of trash and parking issues affecting the neighborhood, one member stated that “25 people impacting that narrow of riparian lot on the lake to me is an issue.” Another stated: “[N]o matter what, when you have property that’s on the lake, the people will always be on the lake side. That’s just where people hang out . . . .” Another member pointed out that resorts require commercial classification, including registration with the state and other rules, and that the
Although the language used by the Planning Commission members is not identical to the language used in the formal findings, the reasoning is broadly the same. The Planning Commission denied Wheeler’s CUP application due to limited lakefront, a large home with high occupancy, and potential commercial use in a residential neighborhood with single-family homes located nearby.
We conclude that the Planning Commission’s written findings are consistent with the reasons for denial placed on the record, sufficient to meet the requirements of
D. Prima Facie Arbitrariness
Wheeler contends that these alleged statutory violations amount to a prima facie case of arbitrariness, thereby shifting the burden to the Planning Commission to prove that its denial of the Wheeler CUP application was not arbitrary and capricious. We disagree.
A relator generally bears the burden of persuading the court that the zoning authority acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously. RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75 n.4. However, “[i]f the decision-making body does not state reasons contemporaneously with its action, its decision will be prima facia arbitrary, and it will bear the burden of persuading the reviewing court that the facts and circumstances before it gave rise to legally sufficient reasons for denial.” Corwine v. Crow Wing County, 244 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 1976)
II. The Planning Commission’s denial of Wheeler’s CUP application was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Wheeler challenges the Planning Commission’s decision to deny his CUP application, contending that the stated reasons were legally insufficient and unsupported by the record.
Appellate courts “will reverse a governing body’s decision regarding a conditional use permit application if the governing body acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously.” RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75. In considering whether a denial of a CUP application was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, appellate courts apply a two-step reasonableness inquiry. Id. “First, [the appellate court] must determine if the reasons given by [the governing body] were legally sufficient. Second, if the reasons given are legally sufficient, we must determine if the reasons had a factual basis in the record.” Id. at 75-76 (citation omitted).
Although Wheeler argues that each of the Planning Commission’s four reasons for denying his CUP application was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, we limit our
A. Legal Sufficiency
Under Minnesota law, a county “may by ordinance designate certain types of developments . . . as conditional uses under zoning regulations.”
To make a legally sufficient decision, the Planning Commission needed to apply “the standards set forth in the applicable ordinance,” here the land-use ordinance. In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008); see also Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417 (stating that in reviewing the grant or denial of a special use permit, “reasonableness is measured by the standard set out in the particular local ordinance,” and the appellate court’s “inquiry focuses on whether the proposed use is contrary to the general welfare as already established in the zoning ordinance”). The land-use ordinance at issue provides that the
The Planning Commission’s written findings address each factor and subfactor individually. The Planning Commission’s determination that granting Wheeler’s CUP application would have “an undue impact on public health, safety, and welfare given the size of the short-term rental and the size of the lakefront portion of the property” is consistent with its obligation to evaluate “factors specific to the application that impact public health, safety, and welfare.” CCLUO § 705.2(F). Accordingly, we conclude that the Planning Commission’s reason for denial is legally sufficient.
B. Factual Basis in the Record
We next address whether the Planning Commission’s reason for denial—that the requested use was against public health, safety, and welfare—had a reasonable factual basis. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 76 (requiring a reasonable factual basis even when the decision-making body had a legally sufficient reason for denying an application). We conclude that it did.
Upon review of a governing body’s decision, an appellate court’s function is “not to weigh the evidence, but to review the record to determine whether there was legal evidence to support the zoning authority’s decision.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Maps and surveys within the administrative record establish that the Wheeler property is 4.01-acres. See Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 416 (identifying materials that ordinarily constitute a factual basis as “maps, plans, surveys, studies and reports prepared by both the city staff and by the landowners”). The property is dissected by a road. The undeveloped
We conclude that the record contains sufficient facts supporting the Planning Commission’s legally sufficient reason for denying Wheeler’s CUP application.2 Because the Planning Commission’s denial is legally sufficient and has a reasonable factual basis, we conclude that it was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Affirmed.