Sonny FORTES v. STATE of Rhode Island
No. 12-191-A
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
April 18, 2013
Virginia M. McGinn, Department of Attorney General, for the State.
ORDER
This is applicant Sonny Fortes’ appeal from a Superior Court ruling denying his application for post-conviction relief. The case came before the Court in conference on the state‘s confession of error wherein the state concedes that the applicant‘s statutory right to counsel as spelled out by this Court in Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448 (R.I.2012) was not properly observed. Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that the confession of error should be accepted.
Accordingly, the applicant‘s appeal is sustained. The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court for hearing on the application for post-conviction relief at which applicant Fortes shall be represented by counsel in accordance with Campbell, supra.
In the Matter of Susan J. TURNER
No. 2013-117-M.P.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
April 29, 2013
Susan J. Turner, Pro Se.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a petition for reciprocal discipline filed by Disciplinary Counsel in accordance with
On December 31, 2012, the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered an order suspending the respondent from the practice of law in the Commonwealth for an indefinite period, commencing immediately upon the entry of that order.
“Except as the court by order may direct, a lawyer who has been suspended for an indefinite period may not petition for reinstatement until the expiration of at least three months prior to five years from the effective date of the order of suspension.”
Disciplinary Counsel filed his petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline on January 31, 2013. On February 14, 2013, we entered an order directing the respondent to inform this Court within thirty days of any claim she may have that the imposition of reciprocal discipline
The factual basis for the discipline imposed by the Commonwealth is as follows: In 2006 the respondent was hired on a contingent-fee basis to represent a client injured in a motor-vehicle accident. She pursued a claim on his behalf against (1) the tortfeasor and (2) the client‘s own insurance company for any claim he may have under his policy for uninsured/underinsured benefits.
In 2008 a settlement was reached with the tortfeasor for payment of his policy limits of $100,000. The respondent received the settlement funds and deposited them into her client account. After payment of the client‘s bills, fees, and costs, he was entitled to receive $53,178.01. However, the respondent falsely informed her client that he could not receive the funds until resolution of the claim for underinsurance benefits.
In 2008 and 2009 the respondent made partial disbursements to the client totaling $16,000. However, she also converted approximately $25,000 of his funds to her own use. In 2010 the underinsurance claim was resolved with a settlement in the amount of $54,447.31, which the respondent deposited into her client account. At that time the client was entitled to receive from the respondent $37,178.01, his portion of the two settlements after reductions for bills, fees and expenses. However, as a result of the respondent‘s prior conversion of funds, she was unable to provide the client all the funds he was entitled to receive. Therefore, she falsely advised the client that he needed to retain $10,000 to reimburse his employer for any disability insurance payments he had received.
The client made repeated requests to receive the $10,000 which the respondent had withheld, to no avail. In April 2010, the client was injured in another motor-vehicle accident. He contacted the respondent and advised her that he would hire her to represent him in pursuing a claim for damages arising from that incident, but only if she would pay him the remaining $10,000 he was due from the first claim. At that time the respondent paid the client $10,000 from personal funds.
In a second matter the respondent represented the wife in a divorce action. In 2009 the parties to the divorce agreed to refinance the mortgage on the marital home, receive a cash payout from the proceeds, and divide the funds. The refinancing resulted in a cash payout totaling $38,330.22. Those funds were received by the respondent and deposited into her client account. The parties reached an agreement on the disbursement of $28,330.22 of the funds, with the remaining $10,000 to be held by the respondent until resolution of a disputed issue. The respondent subsequently converted those funds to her own use.
In 2010 the parties reached a resolution regarding the disputed funds, agreeing that the husband would receive the $10,000. The respondent paid that amount to the husband from personal funds which had been deposited into her business account.
In a third matter, the respondent was retained to represent a client in a divorce action to be filed in Massachusetts. She received a $2,000 retainer. She provided incompetent representation by preparing
On November 27, 2012 the respondent executed a stipulation with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Board of Bar Overseers admitting the above-noted facts and agreeing to the imposition of an indefinite suspension from the practice of law in the Commonwealth. After review of the facts and the disposition, and hearing no response from the respondent to our order of February 14, 2013, we deem that an order of reciprocal discipline is appropriate.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the respondent, Susan J. Turner, is suspended from the practice of law in this state for fifty-seven months, effective immediately.