In thе Matter of Richard C. SCARLATA, Debtor. GOLDBERG SECURITIES, INC., Appellant, v. Richard C. SCARLATA, Debtor-Appellee.
No. 91-2304.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Feb. 13, 1992. Decided Nov. 9, 1992.
Andrew B. David (argued), William G. Gigler, Sugar, Friedberg & Felsenthal, Chicago, Ill., for debtor, appellee Richard C. Scarlata.
Before COFFEY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Richard Scarlata, a market maker who formerly traded options at the Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE), seeks a discharge in bankruptcy from a $4 million debt owed to the firm who cleared his accounts at the CBOE, Goldberg Securities, Inc. (Goldberg). The bankruptcy court barred Scarlata from discharge under
Facts
Scarlata was once a professional market maker at the CBOE. For four years, he traded options on an account through Goldberg. According to the various arrangements between Scarlata, Goldberg, and the CBOE, Goldberg received fees on Scarlata‘s transactions, as well as interest on money loaned to him; in exchange, Scarlata received certain services. The most important of these was that Goldberg guaranteed Scarlata‘s losses in excess of the equity in his account. As a result, Goldberg was potentially liable for 100% of Scarlata‘s losses in excess of his equity, even though it was not entitled to receive a share of his profits. Despite its one-sided exposure, Goldberg, like other clearing houses, had no electronic means of controlling Scarlata‘s trades once he was in the pit; when Scarlata (or any other market maker) traded, Goldberg relied on him to adhere to a “haircut requirement” which obliges him to have funds in his account to cover potential losses from unliquidated outstanding securities positions. The haircut requirement thus limits traders’ ability
Cut to the morning of October 19, 1987—“Black Monday“—when the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost approximately 22% of its value. The Dow had dropped more than 100 points the previous Friday, leaving Scarlata, as well as numerous other traders, in precarious positions. Scarlata had only $22,000 of equity in his account, but held 84 naked short puts amounting to a $150,000 risk exposure.2 Despite this 7-1 ratio, Scarlata wanted to trade that day. He wrote Goldberg a check for $30,000, even though he did not have sufficient funds in his bank account to cover the $30,000. Scarlata also told Goldberg‘s risk managers, the employees who monitor the traders, that he would reduce his positions. Yet Scarlata exponentially increased his exposure during the first rotation on the market floor. Over the course of the rest of the day, Scarlata never managed to reduce his positions. Although he began trading with an exposure of just over $100,000, he ultimately lost approximately $5 million.3 Because it had guaranteed Scarlata‘s trades, Goldberg paid the bulk of these losses.
Now Scarlata is in bankruptcy, seeking a discharge from his debt to Goldberg. As discussed above, the district court granted the discharge, reversing the bankruptcy court‘s findings that Scarlata had misrepresented his trading intentions and created a false pretense. The district court erred by applying the clear and convincing standard of proof, and the bankruptcy court‘s finding that Scarlata misrepresented his trading intentions may not have been clearly erroneous. Nevertheless, Goldberg did not prove that it relied on Scarlata‘s representation that he intended to reduce his positions. Further, we agree with the district court that Scarlata did not make a false pretense when he tendered the check. Finally, Goldberg has not explained how or whether the bankruptcy court and district court erred in concluding that Scarlata‘s actions were not malicious. Thus, we affirm.
Analysis
In bankruptcy, “exceptions to discharge are to be constructed strictly against a creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor.” In re Zarzynski, 771 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir.1985). The burden is on the objecting creditor to prove exceptions to discharge. Minnick v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., 392 F.2d 973, 976 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 875 (1968). Although Goldberg may have proved that Scarlata misrepresented his trading intentions, we do not believe it carried its burden to prove reliance оr to prove the applicability of the “willful and malicious injury” exception.
Count I—§ 523(a)(2)(A)
The bankruptcy court held that Scarlata had made a “false pretense” by tendering a check for which he did not have
As for Scarlata‘s statement that he would reduce his positions, Goldberg needed to prove 1) that Scarlata made a statement either knowing it to be false or with reckless disregard for the truth; 2) that in making this misrepresentation Scarlata possessed “scienter, i.e., an intent to deceive” Goldberg; and 3) that Goldberg actually and reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation. In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.1985). Because Scarlata was making a statement of future intention, it is possible that Scarlata‘s statement was true when made; intervening events may have caused his future actions to deviate from his prior intentions.
We need not answer this question. Even if Scarlata did misrepresent his trading intentions to Goldberg, Goldberg did not prove that it relied on Scarlata‘s statement.5 The bankruptcy court held that Goldberg had proved reasonable and actual reliance, but it did not specify any facts in support of this conclusion. 112 B.R. at 284-85. To the extent that the bankruptcy court did explain its reasoning, the court stated that “[h]ad Goldberg known that Scarlata ... intended to in-
Furthermore, Goldberg did not present sufficient circumstantial evidence of reliance.6 As everyone involved recognizes, the morning of Black Monday was exceptionally hectic. Indeed, the risk manager considered it “the busiest morning [he had] experienced as a risk manager at Goldberg up to that point.” R. 2-2 at 84-85. In these harried circumstances, Scarlata was far from Goldberg‘s greatest concern. Although he was on the risk manager‘s list of problem accounts, so were 24 other traders, and most of them were in much more serious condition than Scarlata. Four had haircut deductions over $1,000,000; 5, over $500,000; 16 between $100,000 and $500,000. R. 2-2 at 32-33. At least five traders had equity deficits, including deficits of $390,000 and $639,000. “[T]here were a lot of traders that morning thаt needed definite review.” R. 2-2 at 69-72. Considering the risk manager‘s damaging admission that he would not have prevented Scarlata from trading even if Scarlata had not made the representation, we believe that Goldberg did not satisfy its affirmative burden of proving reliance. As a result, Scarlata is not barred from discharging his debt under
Count II—§ 523(a)(6)
Goldberg also argues that Scarlata‘s debt should be barred from discharge under
Rather than explain whether and why the district court erred in concluding that Scarlata‘s acts would not necessarily cause harm, Goldberg instead argues that the district court erroneously applied the specific malice standard rather than the implied malice standard. Goldberg urges us to adopt the implied malice standard which was adopted in Southgate and derived from Tinker. Appellant‘s Br. at 40. But even if we were to adopt the Southgate standard, the conclusion of the bankruptcy and district courts would not be undermined. Southgate defined a willful and malicious injury as “a deliberate or intentional act in which the debtor knows his act would harm the creditor[‘]s interest and proceeds in the fact [sic] of that knowledge” (emphasis added). 35 B.R. at 776. In addition, the Southgate court explicitly adopted its implied malice standard from Tinker, which required that a willful and malicious act “necessarily cause[] injury.” 193 U.S. at 486-89. Therefore, even the Southgate standard requires proof that the debtor took the sort of actions that would “automatically or necessarily” harm the creditor. See also In re Guy, 101 B.R. 961, 982 (B.C.N.D.Ind.1988) (“[M]alice may exist by implication or constructively because the debtor‘s actions indicate he knew that his actions would result in injury.“); In re Condict, 71 B.R. 485, 487 (N.D.Ill.1987). As noted above, that is the standard the bankruptcy and district courts applied, and Goldberg has failed to give us a reason to overturn this holding.
The dissent contends that the law in other circuits supports barring Scarlata‘s debts from discharge. We believe that the dissent reaches out to decide a difficult issue of first impression. Indeed, the dissent does an admirable job of attempting to discover what Goldberg perhaps ought to have argued.7 But Goldberg has not explained why the district court and the bankruptcy court erred in using the “necessarily causes harm” standard; Goldberg has affirmatively requested that we adopt a malice standard which uses the same language; and Goldberg has not developed any argument which would support analogizing this case to the typical cases that arise under
Conclusion
Because Goldberg failed to prove that it relied on Scarlata‘s misrepresentation, it may not bar the debt from discharge under
COFFEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I fail to understand how the majority can review the facts that clearly establish Scarlata‘s willful and malicious actions in defrauding Goldberg Securities, Inc. (“Goldberg“), and then, while supposedly giving deference to the bankruptcy judge‘s findings, hold that Scarlata‘s debt to Goldberg was neither barred from discharge under the fraud exception of
In order to get around his excessive haircut requirement ($150,000 haircut requirement with only $22,000 equity) and persuade Goldberg‘s risk manager to allow him to enter the trading floor on “Black Monday,” October 19, 1987, Scarlata presented the manager with a $30,000 check (while his checking account had a balance of only $3,200) stating that he would reduce his exposure. The combination of a $30,000 deposit and promising to lower his risk position would have marginally fulfilled Scarlata‘s haircut requirement had he kept his word to Goldberg‘s risk manager regarding his alleged lowering of his exposure. He did not. Instead, he “exponentially increased his exposure during the first rotation on the market floor.” Id. at 524. Scarlata thus carried out his scheme1 to deceive Goldberg‘s risk manager into allowing him to trade on “Black Monday” in an attempt to make his fortune in what he thought would be a fluctuating (rather than falling) market and caused Goldberg Securities to incur a loss of over $4 million in one day‘s trading. The enormity of Scarlata‘s gamble is evinced by the fact that he was only one of twenty-five traders with a serious deficit on the morning of October 19, 1987.2 The twenty-four other Goldberg traders who acted responsibly on that date suffered a combined loss of but $3 million while Scarlata individually incurred a $4 million liability.
A. § 523(a)(2)(A)
As a matter of policy, the Code and supporting case law should serve to prevent discharge in at best highly questionable circumstances of this nature, and from my reading of it, I am confident it does. Section
The bankruptcy court found that Scarlata contrived a scheme over the weekend before “Black Monday” to “take advantage of what he perceived to be a substantial opportunity in the active market. He saw an opportunity to make large personal profits, perhaps millions of dollars, in that market.” In re Scarlata, 112 B.R. 279, 284 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990). This finding is supported in Scarlata‘s deposition testimony concerning his conversation with another options trader during a golf game the day before “Black Monday” in which they discussed the “buying opportunity” in the market. It is also supported by Scarlata‘s actions on Monday morning of immediately increasing his risk more than ten times his opening position in the first hour and one half of trading even though, as the bankruptcy judge found: “Prior to the opening of trading on October 19, 1987 Scarlata knew, from reports that were coming in from other markets around the world, that the [market] would open significantly lower.” Id. at 285. Given this support for the bankruptcy judge‘s finding that Scarlаta formulated his plan over the weekend, the bankruptcy court‘s findings were not clearly erroneous. The district court ignored these facts when it
“conclude[d] that the bankruptcy court‘s finding that Scarlata[‘s] statement was knowingly false when made and thus that he misrepresented his intended trading strategy is not supported by the record and thus is clearly erroneous. There is no evidence in the record to support the court‘s conclusion that Scarlata had formulated a plan over the preceding weekend to increase substantially his short OEX position. Rather, the record contains Scarlata‘s uncontradicted testimony that he intended to reduce or neutralize his positions when he made the statement to Goldberg‘s risk manager.”
Mem.Op. at 12-13. Although Scarlata somehow claims that he believed the market would open higher at the time he gave Goldberg‘s risk manager the $30,000 check at 6:10 a.m. and fully intended to reduce his position, there was counter-testimony that by 6:00 a.m. it was evident that the market would be opening lower and that Scarlata did not deliver the check until after 7:00 a.m. The bankruptcy judge‘s finding that Scarlata knew the market would be opening lower reveals that he disbelieved Scarlata‘s testimony. Since the record supports a finding that Scarlata viеwed a falling market as a buying opportunity as well as a finding that Scarlata knew that the market would open lower early on “Black Monday,” there is ample support for the bankruptcy court‘s finding that Scarlata deliberately misrepresented his intentions to Goldberg Securities and Goldberg reasonably relied upon his representations. Scarlata‘s entire course of conduct on “Black Monday” demonstrates that he viewed the day as a golden opportunity and intended to do whatever was necessary to recover his losses and make a fortune that day gambling with Goldberg‘s credit. The bankruptcy court had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses and observe their conduct, the tone of their voices in making their responses, their eyes, and their facial expressions while evaluating their credibility. The judge obviously found Scarlata‘s testimony regarding his intentions to be incredible in light of the other evidence. A trial judge or jury makes findings of fact, and it is not our place as an appellate court to “weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Ramirez, 796 F.2d 212, 214 (7th Cir.1986). We should defer to the bankruptcy court‘s resolution of the conflicting evidence and affirm its holding that Scarlata‘s debt is non-dischargeable under
The majority states that we need not decide whether Scarlata formed a plan be-
“It is not necessary for a person to make oral misrepresentation[s] of fact in order to be guilty of fraudulent conduct—such representations may be made by the acts or conduct of the party.... There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts.”
Bay State Milling Co. v. Martin, 916 F.2d 1221, 1227 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). It is likewise unnecessary for the record to include direct evidence that Scarlata intended to deceive Goldberg, for “an intent to deceive may logically be inferred from a false representation which the debtor knows or should know will induce another to make a loan [or extend credit].” In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir.1985). If Scarlata was not guilty of misrepresentation in submitting his $30,000 check and stating that he would reduce his risk position as evidence of his ability to financially cover his trading losses, under what circumstances would any market maker ever be guilty of misrepresentation?
“Fraud includes anything calculated to deceive, whether it be a single act or combination of circumstances, whether the suppression of truth or the suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.”
In re Witt, 145 Ill.2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526, 531 (1991) (citation omitted). Goldberg did not merely rely upon Scarlata‘s writing of the $30,000 check or his statement that he would lower his risk position (the check and the statement were necessary to satisfy Goldberg‘s usual requirements); it relied on Scarlata‘s entire course of сonduct that ended in the $4 million loss to Goldberg. Scarlata had traded with Goldberg for a period of four years dating back long before “Black Monday” and, because Scarlata was well aware of Goldberg‘s practice and limitations on trading, he had never before ever engaged in wild and uncontrolled speculation. He had been careful to establish a reliable and conservative reputation with Goldberg from 1984 to 1987 (Tr. 2-2-90 at 107), and, as the majority notes, “Goldberg relied on him to adhere to a ‘haircut requirement’ which obliges him to have funds in his account to cover potential losses from unliquidated outstanding securities positions.”3 Maj.Op. at 523 (emphasis added). Scarlata‘s obligation to Goldberg on October 19, 1987, was no different than it had been for the past four years, i.e., that Scarlata was responsible personally to cover all of his losses. Scarlata‘s deposit of the $30,000 check in his account constituted a representation4 that he intended to fulfill this obligation to Goldberg and this gave Goldberg every reason to believe that he
The majority errs when it says the bankruptcy court‘s “holding [that Goldberg relied on Scarlata‘s misrepresentation] was expressly contradicted by the testimony of Goldberg‘s senior risk manager....” Maj.Op. at 525-26. The fact that the risk manager might have allowed Scarlata on the floor without a statement that he would reduce his risk position in no way contradicts or detracts from the statement of the fact finder, the bankruptcy judge, that “[h]ad Goldberg known that Scarlata ... intended to increase substantially rather than decrease or neutralize his existing position, it would have not have [sic] allowed him to trade freely that day.”5 The majority casts aside and disregards the risk manager‘s testimony that he would not have allowed Scarlata to trade if Scarlata had informed him that he intended to increase his risk position when the market opened. Goldberg was relying on Scarlata‘s representation through his $30,000 check that he would trade in accord with his past course of conduct within the “haircut requirement” rather than the reckless, abnormal, and speculative method he admittedly adopted on “Black Monday.”
The majority argues that the testimony of Goldberg‘s senior risk manager failed to establish sufficient evidence that it relied on Scarlata‘s representation, even though Goldberg‘s risk manager in response to a question, “[d]id you rely on the truthfulness of Mr. Scarlata‘s statement to you that he would be cutting down his position on the morning of October 19th, 1987,” emphatically stated under oath, “Yes, I did.” How much more of a direct, clear and unequivocal answer could there be to the question posed, I do not know. The panel attempts in a three-page discussion to play down and diminish the risk manager‘s response that he relied on Scarlata‘s statement that his (Scarlata‘s) risk position would be reduced. On the other hand, I am at a loss to understand what other words in the English language other than, “Yes, I did [rely],” more plainly express an affirmative answer that a risk manager is relying on a trader‘s representation regarding his risk position. Further, it is interesting to note that Scarlata‘s attorney on cross-examination did not question the risk manager‘s statement of reliance any further because the answer was so clear and self-evident.7 There is nothing in the record that contradicts the risk manager‘s reliance and the absence of cross-examination on the risk manager‘s reliance furthers the argument that Goldberg relied on Scarlata‘s statement.8
Moreover, due to Goldberg‘s four-year relationship with Scarlata wherein he demonstrated his trustworthiness through consistently meeting his “haircut requirement,” Goldberg had no reason to be concerned about allowing Scarlata on the trading floor on “Black Monday” as soon as he submitted his check for $30,000 to remedy the equity deficit in his account and above all after he promised to lower his risk position. In view of Scarlata‘s history of careful and responsible conduct with Goldberg, the deposit of $30,000 in his account (regardless of whether the check was good) constituted a fraudulent representation that Scarlata intended to continue trading within his credit limits and within his personal ability to pay all losses. Thus, even if Goldberg would have allowed Scarlata to trade without his false statement that he would reduce his risk position, Goldberg Security established by more than a preponderance of the evidence that it relied upon Scarlata‘s false representation that he would trade in his established manner.
B. § 523(a)(6)
While I am convinced that the fraud exception to discharge should beyond doubt prevent the discharge of Scarlata‘s $4 million debt to Goldberg,
The majority notes that “[b]oth the bankruptcy court and the district court held that Scarlata did not act maliciously because his acts would not ‘automatically or necessarily’ cause injury to Goldberg.” Maj.Op. at 526. Initially, we need point out that the panel evades the
“Rather than explain whether and why the district court erred in concluding that Scarlata‘s acts would not necessarily cause harm, Goldberg instead argues that the district court erroneously applied the specific malice standard rather than the implied malice standard. Goldberg urges us to adopt the implied malice standard which was adopted in [United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 B.R. 766 (N.D.Ill.1983),] and derived from Tinker [v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904)]. Appellant‘s Br. at 40.”
Id. The majority thеn accuses me of “reach[ing] out to decide a difficult issue of first impression. Indeed, the dissent does an admirable job of attempting to discover what Goldberg perhaps ought to have argued. [ ] But Goldberg has not explained why the district court and the bankruptcy court erred in using the ‘necessarily causes harm’ standard; Goldberg has affirmatively requested that we adopt a malice standard which uses the same language....” Maj.Op. at 527 (footnote omitted). I suspect Goldberg will be more than surprised to learn from the majority opinion that it is arguing that “the district court erroneously applied the specific malice standard” and that it requested the court to adopt the necessarily-causes-harm standard. On page 40 of his brief, Goldberg states:
“The issue presented by this appeal is whether, in order to establish malice under
§ 523(a)(6) , the party must show that the debtor‘s malicious act necessarily and predictably caused the creditor [the] harm complained of. It is Goldberg‘s position that it is sufficient to show that [the] debtor acted intentionally and in reckless disregard of whether an injury would be inflicted.”
(Emphasis added). Likewise, in the “Issues Presented” section of its brief, Goldberg frames the issue as follows:
“whether, in order to prove that a debtor acted maliciously within the meaning of
§ 523(a)(6) , a crеditor must prove that the debtor‘s conduct ‘necessarily and automatically’ results in harm, or whether it is sufficient that it is reasonably foreseeable that the conduct would cause harm. This latter issue presents a question of first impression in this Court.”
After initially stating that “the dissent does an admirable job of attempting to discover what Goldberg perhaps ought to have argued,” the majority eventually concedes Goldberg squarely presented the
The majority asserts that ”Southgate defined a willful and malicious injury as ‘a deliberate or intentional act in which the debtor knows his act would harm the creditor[‘]s interest and proceeds in the fact [sic] of that knowledge’ (emphasis added).” Maj.Op. at 527. The majority overlooks the fact that the Southgate court specifically limited the cited definition to “the context of a debtor who sells encumbered property prior to bankruptcy....” Southgate, 35 B.R. at 776. As Goldberg notes, the Southgate court cited with approval a pre-Bankruptcy Code definition of malice from the Fourth Circuit:
“if the act of conversion is done deliberately and intentionally in knowing disregard of the rights of another, it falls within the statutory exclusion even though there may be an absence of special malice.”
Id. at 775 (quoting Bennett v. W.G. Grant Co., 481 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir.1973) (emphasis in Southgate). The court went on to observe that “[t]he knowing disregard standard of Bennett satisfies the maliciousness requirement.” Id. at n. 2. Hence, it is doubtful that the Southgate court intended to limit the exception to discharge in all cases to “a deliberate or intentional act in which the debtor knows his act would harm the creditor[‘]s interest,” so the bankruptcy court and the district court apparently misconstrued the holding of Southgate.12
But the real issue is not whether the bankruptcy court and the district court (and the majority) have misconstrued Southgate, but whether the courts erred in holding that only acts that “automatically or necessarily” cause injury are malicious within the language of
Further, Goldberg has directly requested that we hold that an act is malicious if “the debtor acted intentionally and in reckless disregard of whether an injury would be inflicted” and cited case law to support its position. This court in the past has decided many other litigants’ cases who have properly presented an issue on appeal despite their failing to offer the most extensive analysis of appellate case law. Thus, contrary to the majority‘s opinion, Goldberg does, but lest the panel forgets, the same can be said for the majority‘s treatment of Scarlata‘s argument that Goldberg allegedly failed to prove reliance.
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1008 (4th Cir.1985), the Fourth Circuit stated that “if the act ... is done deliberately and intentionally in knowing disregard of the rights of another, it falls within the statutory exclusion [from discharge in bankruptcy].” (Quoting Bennett v. W.T. Grant Co., 481 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir.1973)). In Vaughn, the debtor, a painting contractor, received payment for a contract with the Navy from his surety because the Navy refusеd to pay him for work that it required him to perform. After negotiating a settlement
Notes
In a case analogous to ours, Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Perry Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 783 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.1986), the Fifth Circuit held that a debt incurred as a result of losing a creditor‘s money while gam-
that would reimburse his surety. See Vaughn, 779 F.2d at 1007-1010. Likewise, the debtor in Chrysler Credit who gambled the money he held in trust for Chrysler Credit to increase his car dealership‘s cash reserves is different from the typical debtor‘s breach of a security agreement or attempt to evade a creditor‘s previously-entered judgment per Kimzey. See Chrysler Credit, 783 F.2d at 486. In both cases, the court prevented the debtor‘s discharge in bankruptcy under the willful and malicious exception in
“‘Willful’ means intentional and ‘malicious’ means without just cause or excuse. Perry knew that the money he took to Las Vegas was the property of Chrysler Credit. Neither common sense nor statutory construction can stretch his professed purpose of winning enough money to save his dealership into a valid cause or excuse.”
Id. at 486 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Scarlata‘s actions differ from Perry‘s only in that Scаrlata gambled with Goldberg‘s credit rather than its cash. If Scarlata had cut his losses at the opening of trade on October 19, 1987, he still would have been insolvent, but his loss would have been only about $150,000; instead, he chose to depart from his conservative trading history, throw all caution to the wind and speculate with Goldberg‘s credit in a last-ditch effort to either recoup his losses and become an instant millionaire or incur a debt he knew he was hopelessly incapable of paying. He had no more “just cause or excuse” for his speculation than Perry, who took his creditor‘s cash to Las Vegas—both were taking risks that an ordinary business person standing in their shoes would consider imprudent.
The Sixth Circuit has stated that malicious “means in conscious disregard of one‘s duties or without just cause or excuse; it does not require ill-will or specific intent to do harm.” Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610 (6th Cir.1986). In Wheeler the court reversed the district court‘s entry of summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the libel at issue was willful. But in Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.1987), the court relied upon
The only circuit that has defined malicious in a manner that even approaches the holding of the bankruptcy court and the district court that the act must “automatically or necessarily” cause injury is the Eighth Circuit, which has held that “malicious” refers to “conduct [that] is certain or almost certain to cause ... harm.” In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 881 (8th Cir.1985). The certain-or-almost-certain-to-cause-harm standard continues as the Eighth Circuit‘s interpretation of malice, see In re Miera, 926 F.2d 741, 743-44 (8th Cir.1991), but no other circuit has accepted much less fol-
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have adopted a construction of “malicious” that requires “the debtor‘s actual knowledge or the reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the creditor.” In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting In re Posta, 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.1989)) (emphasis added). In Britton the office manager of a cosmetic surgery medical group fraudulently represented himself as a doctor to a patient when he persuaded her to have a surgical procedure done at the medical group‘s clinic. As a result of malpractice during the surgery, the patient eventually required follow-up corrective surgery. The Ninth Circuit refused discharge of the patient‘s judgment against the debtor on the basis of both
In In re Posta, 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.1989), the case upon which the Ninth Circuit relied, the Tenth Circuit articulated its interpretation of malicious: “the focus of the ‘malicious’ inquiry is on the debtor‘s actual knowledge or the reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the creditor....” (Emphasis added). The court noted that while malice can sometimes be demonstrated through direct evidence that the debtor intended to harm the creditor, in the usual case “malicious intent must be demonstrated by evidence that the debtor had knowledge of the creditor‘s rights and that, with that knowledge, proceeded to take action in violation of those rights. Such knowledge can be inferred from the debtor‘s experience in the business....” Id. The court granted the debtors’ discharge of the debt because of the district court‘s factual finding that the debtors did not knowingly violate the creditor‘s rights. Id. at 368. But in this case there can be no doubt that with Scarlata‘s experience he “had knowledge of [Goldberg‘s] rights [to require brokers to trade within their credit limits] and that, with that knowledge, proceeded to take action in violation of those rights.” Nor can there be any doubt that there was reasonable foreseeability that Scarlata‘s unprecedented manner of trading on “Black Monday” would cause injury to Goldberg.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, in a formulation similar to the Fifth Circuit‘s, has held that the term “malice” in
As my review of the above cases demonstrates, the majority‘s approval of the bankruptcy court‘s and the district court‘s holding14 that the
C. CONCLUSION
Since the appellant has squarely presented the issue of malicious injury in
