Plaintiff-appellant, Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit, filed a рetition in the Juvenile Division of the Wayne County Probate Court, asserting that defendant-appеllee, Karen Marable, a 14-year-old public school student, had been truant from school and, therefore, should be determined to be a juvenile delinquent under MCL 712A.2(a)(4); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(a)(4).
Defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied by a juvenile court referee, which denial was upheld by a probate judgе. On appeal to the circuit court, the order of denial was reversed and the prоceedings dismissed. Plaintiff appeals to this Court by leave granted.
The sole issue is whether Karen Marable’s attendance in school is required by law.
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction arises from MCL 712A.2(а)(4); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(a)(4):
*9 "Sec. 2. Except as provided herein, the juvenile division of the probate court shall have:
"(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction superior to and regardless of the jurisdiction of any other court in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age found within the county
"(4) Who, being required by law to attend school, wilfully and repeatedly absents himself therefrom, or repеatedly violates rules and regulations thereof;”
The trial court interpreted this statute as оnly conferring jurisdiction over children who are "being required by law to attend school”. The cоurt then went on to determine that no statute specifically requires a child to attend schоols and that the statutes only relate to penalties imposed upon a parent who does not send school-age children to school.
The compulsory education stаtute in effect at the time of this action was MCL 340.731; MSA 15.3731, which states:
"(a) Except as provided in section 732 and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), every parent, guardian or other pеrson in this state, having control and charge of any child between the ages of 6 and 16 years, shаll send such child, equipped with the proper textbooks necessary to pursue his school work, to the public schools during the entire school year, and such attendance shall be continuous and consecutive for the school year fixed by the district in which such child is enrolled. In school districts which maintain school during the entire year and in which the school year is divided intо quarters, no child shall be compelled to attend the public schools more than 3 quarters in any one year; but a child shall not be absent for any 2 consecutive quarters.
"Ob) A child becоming 6 years of age before December 1 shall be enrolled on the first school day of thе school *10 year in which his sixth birthday occurs. A child becoming 6 years of age on or after December 1 shall be enrolled on the first school day of the school year following the schоol year in which his sixth birthday occurs.”
The first sentence of this section applies specifically to parents and guardians. The second sentence is a more general referеnce to when a child should be compelled to be present. It would be unreasonablе to hold that the Legislature intended to require parents to send their children to school without a requirement that the children must attend. The purpose of the statute is obviously to require аttendance of the child at school and not merely to insure that a parent sends the сhild off in that direction. 1 A statute must be construed so as to avoid absurd or unreasonable cоnsequences. 2
We further find that defendant’s claim that the compulsory education statute cannot be applied to children through the jurisdictional statutes for juvenile court because such a statutory construction would be unconstitutionally broad and vague to be without merit. Althоugh MCL 340.740; MSA 15.3740 and MCL 340.743; MSA 15.3743 3 impose direct penalties on parents whose duty it is to send their children to public sсhools, the specification of the pertinent enforcement provision for childrеn is found in the probate code. 4 A child need not guess as to the circumstances which require attendance or the type of behavior to be avoided.
In Flint Board of Education v Williams, 5 the *11 Court dealt with the issue at bаr in considering the presently in effect MCL 380.1561; MSA 15.41561. 6 The Williams Court found that the only reasonable interpretation of MCL 380.1561; MSA 15.41561 is that unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies, 7 a child is legally rеquired to attend school until the age of 16.
The exceptions are not relevant here. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing the proceedings and remand tо the juvenile division of the probate court for appropriate proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
Governor v State Treasurer,
King v Director of Midland County Dep’t of Social Services,
Now in effect as MCL 380.1599; MSA 15.41599 and MCL 380.1588; MSA 15.41588.
MCL 712A.18; MSA 27.3178(598.18).
Both the old and new compulsory education statutes are substantially the same.
MCL 380.1561(3)(a)-(e); MSA 15.41561(3)(a)-(e).