Trustee John Lowe appeals the denial of his objection to a homestead exemption claimed by debtors Isidro and Martha Sandoval in a case converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7. Because we conclude that the bankruptcy court improperly determined the exemption at the date of conversiоn rather than the date of filing of the original petition, we reverse.
I.
In 1993, the Sandovals filed a chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy. Their original schedules listed property loсated at 9659 Silver Moon, San Antonio, Texas, as their homestead. The Sandovals owned a second home, located at 2839 Lombrano, San Antonio, Texas, which they designatеd as rental property.
The Sandovals later became unable to make payments on their house at 9659 Silver Moon. They decided to convert the case to a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, move to the Lombrano house, and claim the Lombra-no property as their homestead and therefore exempt. In 1995, the Sandovals filed a motion to convert and amended their schedules to designate a new homestead. The court granted the Sandovals’ conversion motion.
Lowe, the chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, filed an objection to the Sandovals’ designation of the Lombrano property as their homestead. After a hearing, the bankruptcy сourt concluded that exemptions in conversion cases should be measured as of the date of conversion rather than the date of filing of the original petition; it found that at the time of the conversion, the Lombrano property was the Sandovals’ homestead under Texas law and denied Lowe’s objection. Lowe moved for reconsideration of the court’s order, and the bankruptcy court held another hearing on the exemption issue; Lowe’s motion was subsequently denied. Lowe appealed the bankruptcy court’s order, and the district court affirmed. Lowe now appeals the district court’s judgment.
II.
We review a bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error аnd conclusions of
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law
de novo. In re Kemp,
A.
Under Bankruptcy Rule 1009(a), “[a] voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.” BankR.R. 1009(a). This court has interpreted Rule 1009(a) as prohibiting courts from denying the debtor’s request to amend in a voluntary bankruptcy case, unless a creditor demonstrates the debtor’s bad faith or prejudice to creditors.
In re Williamson,
B.
Exemptions claimed in a converted case are governed by § 522(b) and § 348(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 522(b)(2)(A) provides- that an individual debtor may exempt from his bankruptcy estate “any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Seсtion 348(a) states that when a case is converted from one chapter to another, the conversion does not advance the filing date of the petition to thе date of conversion:
Conversion of a ease from a case under one chapter of this title to a case under another chapter of this title constitutеs an order for relief under the chapter to which the ease is converted, but, except as provided in subsections (b) and (e) of this section, does not effect a сhange in the date of the filing of the petition, the commencement of the case, or the order for relief.
11 U.S.C. § 348(a)(emphasis added).
This court has not addressed whether § 522(b) and § 348(a) require the debtor’s exemptions to be determined on the date of filing rather than the date of conversion in a chapter 13 to chapter 7 conversion. However, we have considered and decided this question in the closely analogous casе where a debtor converts from a chapter 11 to a chapter 7.
In re Williamson,
Despite the statutory language and our holding in
Williamson,
the Sandovals ask this court to adopt the reasoning of
In re Lindberg,
We are persuaded that our reasoning in
Williamson
should also apply to a determination of exemption rights in a conversion of a chapter 13 to a chapter 7. Lindberg’s reasoning that policy reasons justify departing from the plain language of the statute is unpersuasive.
See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
Recent legislation suрports our conclusion and undercuts one prong of Lindberg’s rationale. In passing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress sought to resolve a circuit split on whether the property to be included in a converted bankruptcy estate should be measured as of the date of filing of the original petition or as of the date of conversion. An аmendment to the Bankruptcy Code provides that the estate in a converted case consists only of property of the estate as of the date of the original filing that remains in the possession-of the debtor on the date of conversion. 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A); 140 Cong. Rec. H10752-01 (Oct. 4,1994) (explaining that the amendment was intended to overrule
In re Lybrook,
The 1994 amendment does nоt directly apply to today’s case because the Act bars retroactive application of the statute to cases accruing before the Act’s effеctive date (October 22, 1994).
In re Young,
III.
For all the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the Sandovals’ homestead exemptiоn must be determined as of the date of filing rather than as of the date of conversion. This holding, however, does not resolve the Sandovals’ claimed exemption. On remand, the bankruptcy court must determine whether, as the facts existed at the date of filing, the Sandovals were entitled to a homestead exemption in the Lombrano property. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.