Dennis Freligh pleaded guilty to federal narcotics offenses and on June 20, 1989, was sentenced to ten years in prison. The following month he was called before a federal grand jury to answer questions about the activities of his fellow narcotics conspirators. He refused, pleading the Fifth Amendment, and on August 15 the judge in charge of the grand jury (Chief Judge Baker) ordered him to testify under a grant of immunity the adequacy of which is not questioned. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003;
In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Special April 1987,
The United States Attorney filed a petition for contempt on September 11. Fre-ligh’s lawyer requested a hearing, but on September 25, without responding to this request or conducting any further hearing, Chief Judge Baker held Freligh in civil contempt for disobeying his original order to testify and ordered him incarcerated until he testifies or until the statutory limitation on civil contempt for disobeying an order to testify before a grand jury expires, which will be either upon the discharge of the grand jury or the end of eighteen months, whichever comes first. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). The judge found that “the fear of retaliation expressed by Dennis Freligh as grounds for non-compliance with the prior order of this court is speculative and unsupported except for the self-serving statements of Dennis Freligh.” The judge directed that the running of Fre-Iigh’s ten-year prison term be suspended while he is incarcerated for contempt.
The appeal challenges the denial of the request for a hearing before Chief Judge Baker. The only hearing that Freligh received was the one before Judge Mills on September 6, and it was perfunctory. Fre-ligh was given no opportunity to amplify or substantiate his fear of retaliation if he testified, or to address the question of the proper sanction for his contempt, if contempt it was.
A federal civil contempt proceeding is a civil proceeding governed by the rules of civil procedure.
Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County,
The government says there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case. We disagree.
1. If a witness can establish that he has not only a genuine but also a reasonable fear of retaliation against himself or his family, he places on the government the burden either of taking reasonable steps to protect him against such retaliation or, at the very least, of explaining why it should not be required to take such steps. No cases so hold, but
In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
2.
Piemonte v. United States,
In a case as barren of relevant facts as this one is, we need not decide whether reasonable fear can ever be a defense if the government makes a reasonable offer of protection; Freligh was denied an opportunity to substantiate his fears and the government an opportunity to show what steps it would be willing to take to allay them. We regard the question as an open one, rather than settled by
Piemonte,
although the dictum we quoted is repeated in many cases. E.g.,
United States v. Damiano,
Duress could well be regarded as a form of excessive burden on a witness ordered to testify, and therefore an apt parallel to the excessive burdensomeness of a subpoena; if so, duress might be a form of just cause. This suggestion derives color from the frequently repeated statement that "punishment may not be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding when it is clearly established that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms of the order." Hicks v. Feiock,
3. We may assume, also without having to decide, that the government is not permitted to force a witness to risk his own life or the lives of his family by testifying if the government can obtain the same evidence from a safer source or wants this witness's testimony not for its evidentiary value but to terrify or endanger him, perhaps because it thinks he has not been punished enough by his criminal sentence. But we do not want to encourage con-temnors to believe that it is easy to establish improper governmental purpose; it is not. Institutional purpose is an elusive concept, and contempt proceedings should not be side-tracked into investigations of prosecutorial motive.
4. "The power to punish for con-tempts is inherent in all courts," Ex parte Robinson,
It could be argued that the right to a hearing in a civil contempt case is even broader than we have suggested:
5. The purpose of holding a witness in civil contempt is to elicit testimony. If it is perfectly clear that the witness, for whatever reason, will not testify, there is — or so at least a number of eases have held — no ground for holding him.
In re Crededio,
Can this line of cases survive
Hicks v.
Feiock? The Supreme Court held there that “the critical feature that determines whether the remedy is civil or criminal in nature is ... whether the contemnor can avoid the sentence imposed on him, or purge himself of it, by complying with the terms of the original order.”
But even if certainty that a witness cannot be coerced will not convert civil contempt into criminal contempt, it does not necessarily follow that incarcerating such a witness is a sound exercise of equity powers. The judge who is convinced that the witness will not talk may well decide that it is inequitable to incarcerate him, and that decision would not be an abuse of discretion. We need not decide whether a contrary decision would be an abuse of discretion.
If, moreover, Freligh succeeds in proving duress, this would imply that he can’t really purge himself of his contempt, in which event, perhaps, he cannot be held in contempt in the first place. Freligh was denied an opportunity to prove duress.
United States v. Halper,
— U.S. -,
6. Many courts say that because incarceration is incarceration, due process entitles the witness charged with civil contempt to a full hearing. For a clear statement of this position, see In re Kitchen,
The main point of these cases is to remind district judges that, despite the tradition of summary justice in contempt, the civil contemnor is, with the possible exception of contempts committed in the presence of the court, cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a), entitled to the same rights as other civil litigants, plus the right to bail. Some cases go beyond Rule 42(b) to suggest that the civil contemnor is entitled to counsel and other perquisites of criminal defendants. In re Rosahn, supra,
7. The analogy between incarceration as a remedy for civil contempt and incarceration as the normal punishment for crime might be thought to entitle the civil contemnor, like his criminal counterpart, to a right to allocution, that is, a right to throw himself on the judge's mercy before "sentence" is pronounced. Cf. Groppi v. Leslie,
Whether there is a right of allocution in a civil contempt case is a fascinating question but has few if any consequences. (The question has arisen in only one reported case, and was answered in the negative. In re Rosahn, supra,
We do not suggest that equitable discretion is unlimited. A modern federal equity judge does not have the limitless discretion of a medieval Lord Chancellor to grant or withhold a remedy.
Whitcomb v. Chavis,
The question whether there is a right of allocution in civil contempt is fascinating but we shall defer attempting to answer it until persuaded that it needs to be answered. Freligh is entitled to a hearing to explore the gravity and sincerity of his fears and the measures available to mitigate them. The judgment of contempt is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
