Dеfendant-appellant MBank Waco, N.A. (MBank) appeals from a district court judgment reversing an earlier bankruptcy court ruling and awarding plaintiff-appellee Britt R. Kennard (Kennard) approximately 190 acres of ranch land under the homestead provisions of the Texas Constitution and Property Code. Beсause we agree with the district court’s interpretation of Texas homestead law as it applies to the facts of this case, we affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
The following facts are undisputed. Kennard owned approximately 900 acres of rural land near Mt. Calm in Limestone County, Texas, consisting of several contiguous tracts. He built аn 1,800-square-foot house on a 9.95 acre tract within the 900 acres in 1978 and has lived in that house *1457 continuously since that time. 1 The rest of the 900 acres were, and continue to be, used uniformly as farm and grazing land. In 1983, Kennard granted a lien on approximately 470 acres of his property to First City Bank by deed of trust. This 470-acre parcel did not include any of the 9.95-acre tract.
Barth of Texas, Inc., a closely-held Texas corporation owned solely by Kennard, owed approximately $200,000 to MBank, which debt Kennard had personally guaranteed. On December 15, 1986, Kennard secured his guarantee by executing and recording a deed of trust on the remaining 430 acres of his 900-aсre ranch that were not already encumbered by First City Bank. This 430-acre tract included all of the 9.95-acre tract on which Kennard’s house was situated. The deed of trust, which was prepared by MBank’s attorneys and executed and acknowledged by Kennard and his wife, contained a homestead designation of 200 acrеs comprised mainly of land already subject to the First City lien. 2 When the deed of trust to MBank was executed, the only residence on the 900 acres, apart from Kennard’s son’s house on a 5.51-acre tract previously deeded to him (see note 2), was Kennard’s house on the 9.95-acre tract.
Kennard filed a voluntary pеtition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 5, 1987. On January 24, 1990, Kennard filed a complaint against MBank to determine the validity of its lien on what he claimed as his 200-acre rural homestead. The 200-acre tract Kennard claimed as homestead in his complaint against MBank was an entirely different portion of his 900-acre ranch from that specified in the homestead designation included in the MBank deed of trust. In his complaint, Kennard claimed as homestead 200 contiguous acres of land within the 430 acres he had pledged to MBank (the remaining 230 acres out of that 430 acres likewise formed one contiguous parcel). This 200 acres of claimed homestead included the 9.95-acre tract on which Ken-nard’s house was located and land adjacent thereto. The 9.95-acre tract on which Ken-nard’s home stands is not separated by fence, road, or other physical separation from the remaining 190 acres Kennard claimed in his action against MBank.
Kennard filed his complaint in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas, Waco Division. The bankruptcy court held a trial on August 14, 1990, and ruled that Kennard had a valid homestead claim to the 9.95-acre tract on which his house was located, but not to the other 190 acres adjacent to his residence that he claimed as homestead, but which had been pledged to MBank (the 190-acre Tract).
Kennard then appealed the bankruptcy court’s judgment as to the 190-acre Tract to the district court. 3 In an order filed January 15, 1991, the district court reversed the judgment of the bankruptcy court, finding that Kennard had homestead rights in the 190-acre Tract. MBank brings this appeal.
Discussion
We review the decision of the district court by applying the same standards of review to the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as applied by the district court.
In re Killebrew,
Homestead rights are recognized in the Texas Constitution, which states, in relevant part:
“The homestead, not in a town or city, shall consist of not more than 200 acres of land, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements thereon ... provided, that the same shall be used for the purposes of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the homestead claimant, whether a single adult person, or the head of a fami-ly_” Texas Const., Article XVI, § 51.
Texas Property Code, § 41.002(b), provides that:
“If used for the purposes of a rural home, the homestead shall consist of ... for a family, not more than 200 acres, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements thereon.... ”
Under Texas law, a claimant may establish homestead rights in his land by showing both (i) overt acts of homestead usage and (ii) the intention on the part of thе owner to claim the land as a homestead.
Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt,
The bankruptcy court also found, however, that Kennard lacked the necessary intent to claim the 190-acre Tract as his homestead. Though Kennard testified that he had always intended to claim the 190-аcre Tract as part of his homestead because of its proximity to his home and barns, the bankruptcy court balanced this testimonial evidence against that of the homestead designation contained in the MBank deed of trust and found Kennard’s proof of intent to be lacking.
The bankruptcy court's finding that Ken-nard lacked the intent to make the 190-acre Tract his homestead is clearly erroneous for two reasons. First, the bankruptcy court relied on the factually inaccurate homestead designation and disclaimer as a basis for its factual finding. In
Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock,
“Our courts have uniformly held that where a person is actually in possession of a piece of property, occupying and using same as a homestead, at the time a mortgage or lien is attempted to be placed thereon, an affidavit or a statement made by the parties contrary thereto is of no binding force or effect....” Id.13 S.W. at 13 . 6
Given Kennard’s open possessiоn and occupation of his home at the time the lien in favor of MBank was executed, we find the homestead designation filed with the deed of trust to be worthy of little evidentiary weight. The designation signed by Ken-nard did not include the land on which the house in which Kennard lived was located, and did contain land that was already enсumbered to another bank and a 5.51-acre tract that, as the public records reflected, *1459 Kennard did not even own and that was occupied by another and not by Kennard. Other than the house on that 5.51-acre tract, there was no residence on the 200 acres that the MBank deed of trust designated as Kennard’s hоmestead.
The second reason that we conclude the bankruptcy court’s finding of a lack of intent is clearly erroneous is that under settled Texas homestead law an “investigation of intention need not be made when the land is actually put to homestead uses. Such actual use of the land is the most satisfactory and convincing evidence of intention.”
Lifemark, supra,
Were we not persuaded by the above analysis that Kennard had established his homestead rights in the 190-acre Tract, the same conclusion would be mandated by this Court’s recent decision in
Matter of Bradley,
MBank also argues that Kennard should in any event be estopped from claiming the 190-acre Tract as part of his homestead because of his contrary homestead designation and disclaimer executed with the MBank deed of trust. This contention, however, was rejected by both the bankruptcy court and the district court, and we agree.
The bankruptcy court found, as a matter of law, that Kennard was not es-topped from asserting homestead rights in the 200 acres that he had pledged to MBank. Though a valid designation of homestead may be binding upon a debtor,
see
Texas Property Code § 41.005,
8
in
Rut-land Savings Bank v. Isbell,
“We think that Texas law is clear that a homestead claimant is not estopped to *1460 assert his homestead rights in property-on the basis of declarations made to the contrary if, at the time of the declarations, the claimant was in actual use and possession of the property.” Niland, supra,825 F.2d at 808 .
Further, only the
action
of homestead claimants will lay sufficient grounds for estoppel; their declarations made orally or in writing are alone insufficient.
In re Rubarts,
As the designation filed with the December 1986 MBank deed of trust did not contain any of the 9.95 acre tract on which Kennard had openly and continuously made his only home since 1978 (and indeed includеd no residence either owned or occupied by Kennard), the designation was an insufficient basis on which to estop Ken-nard from asserting a homestead claim to any other part of his ranch that did include his home and was used by him for homestead purposes.
MBank relies on the Texas Court of Civil Appeals deсision in
Prince v. North State Bank of Amarillo,
Not so here. As the
Rutland Savings Bank
court held, where a debtor disclaims homestead rights in more than one parcel of land, one of which contains his home, the disclaimer is invalid as to all of the parcels named therein. “The basis of estoppel in a case of this kind is a reliance upon a statement and not a reliance upon one portion of a statement when thе other portion thereof is known to be untrue.”
Rutland Savings Bank, supra,
On estoppel grounds, this case is controlled by Rutland Savings Bank. The homestead designation and disclaimer executed by Kennard failed to claim land on which he was openly living at the time the MBank deed of trust and designation were executed, and it included no residence that Kennard owned, or had record title to, or was occupying. This partial invalidity in the designation rendered the entire designation and disclaimer invalid and freed Kennard to later claim as homestead any 200-acre parcel of his ranch that included his home and was used and occupied by him as homestead. MBank could not reasonably and innocently have relied on such an obviously erroneous designation and therefore is not entitled to assert estoppel.
Conclusion
We agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court’s determination that Ken-nard did not have the necessary intent to claim the 190-acre Tract as his homestead was clearly erroneous. We agree with both the bankruptcy court and the district court that MBank is not entitled, based on an obviously inaccurate homestead designation, to an estoppel defense against Ken-nard’s claim. The judgment of the district court is therefore
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Kennard’s wife has lived in the house with him since their marriage in 1986.
. There was a house located on the 200 acres contained in the homestead designation attached to the MBank deed of trust, but it was not Kennard’s house. In June 1986, Kennard deeded 5.51 acres of his land with a house thereon to his adult son. This deed was recorded in August 1986. For reasons neither party can explain, the 200 acres in the homestead designаtion included this 5.51 acre tract, which no longer belonged to Kennard.
.Kennard’s appeal to the district court and MBank's appeal before this court involve only the 190-acre Tract. Neither party has claimed error in the bankruptcy court’s determination that Kennard has valid homestead rights in the 9.95-acre trаct on which Kennard’s house is located.
. Under article XVI, § 50 of the Texas Constitution, the homestead may not be protected from forced sale if the underlying debt was for purchase money of the property claimed as a homestead, to pay taxes thereon, or for improvements to the homestead. In this case, however, the debt to MBank was not for any of these purposes.
. Other than the son's 5.51 acres.
.We recognize that Blalock was discussing the effect of such a statement on a lender in the context of an estoppel argument. We see no reason, however, why that principle is not just as applicable to a judicial determination of intent аs it is to a determination of a lender's reasonable reliance for estoppel purposes. A court is no more justified in relying on a factually inaccurate designation than is a lender where the homestead claimant has openly and continuously resided on the land at issue.
. We note that the undisputed evidence establishes (and the bankruptcy court did not find to the contrary) that Kennard’s use and occupancy of the 190-acre Tract was not of any less of a homestead character than his use and occupancy Oi the portion of the 430-acre tract that he did not claim as homestead in his сomplaint in dt.o action; indeed, almost all the 190-acre T-act is closer to the 9.95-acre tract than any of the remainder of the 430 acres, and the 190-acre Tract lies between the 9.95-acre tract and the balance of the 430-acre tract.
. Section 41.005 was enacted by the Texas legislature in 1987. It is the successor to several previous civil statutes to the same effect.