In the INTEREST OF: V.C.N.C. & T.D.C.C., Minor Children
Deborah M. Bird, P.O. Box 39484, St. Louis, MO 63139-8484, for Appellant Van Courtney.
Chris Koster, Gary L. Gardner, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for Respondent Children‘s Division.
Ashley Ratcliffe Beumer, 920 North Vandeventer, St. Louis, Missouri 63108, for Respondent Guardian Ad Litem.
ROY L. RICHTER, Judge
Van Courtney (“Father“) and Tammy Harris (“Mother“) (collectively, “Appellants“) appeal from the trial court‘s judgment terminating parental rights (“TPR“) pursuant to Sectiоns
I. Background
V.C.N.C. and T.D.C.C. are twin girls born to Appellants in May 2010. Both children were taken into Children‘s Division protective custody оn September 9, 2010, due to medical or nutritional neglect, and on October 13, 2010, an adjudication and dispositional hearing was held and found that Appellants could not provide the medical care the girls needed without the assistance of the Children‘s Division. Both girls have been in custody of the Children‘s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services (“Children‘s Division“) since September of 2010.
At the dispositionаl hearing in October of 2010, both parents were ordered to: have visitation with the girls at least semimonthly; obtain and maintain financial stability or regular employment; obtain and maintain appropriate housing; submit to blood, breath, and urine testing upon request; enroll in and successfully complete family counseling; provide information on any relatives who may be fit, willing, and able to be caretaker оf the girls; attend all medical appointments for the girls; and submit to a psychological evaluation with a parenting assessment, and comply with any recommended treatment. The record on appeal does not include any transcript of the October 13, 2010 hearing, nor does it include any petition or motion indicating why Appellants were ordered to comply with these conditions when thе girls were taken into Children‘s Division custody due to the need for medical services that Appellants could not provide.
The Children‘s Division filed its TPR petition on October 17, 2013, alleging that Appellants had abandoned the children pursuant to Section
The trial court heard testimony from Erica Furrer, the twins’ occupatiоnal therapist, and from Misty Jones, the twins’ assigned case manager from Missouri Baptist Children‘s Home. Both Furrer and Jones testified that Mother and Father were involved and active in the twins’ lives at first, but that both parents had become uninvolved, especially after a March 2012 family support team meeting. At that meeting, Mother and Father were asked to suggest relatives who could permanently adopt the twins. They suggested Father‘s aunt, and even signed consent forms for the children to be adopted by her, but that ultimately did not happen. After that meeting, Mother and Father “withdrew” and “stopped really communicating” with the Children‘s Division. Their visitation became nearly nonexistent, once going six months without seeing the twins, and Jones testified that after October 25, 2013, the parents had seen the children only three times.
Jones further testifiеd that the parents had not attended a medical appointment for the twins since March of 2012. She said that Mother had submitted to only 30 of her 50 required drug screenings, testing positive for alcohol 14 times, and that Father had not submitted to any of his 24 required screenings.
Mother and Father both appeared in the courtroom after the lunch break, and their respective attorneys renewed their respеctive motions for a continuance, with the trial court denying both motions. Then, after four separate closing arguments, the trial court began to make his ruling, although he talked at length about how he reached his decision. During this extemporaneous discussion, the trial court discussed why Father had been absent from various visitations or appointments and said the following:
I mean I hear about, well, he didn‘t makе it to this and that, and then I‘m seeing all these driving without the license charges. I can tell you why he didn‘t make it. His license was suspended, that‘s why. Public record, [Father‘s counsel], accessible to you or anyone in case you want it. I don‘t know why you didn‘t know, quite frankly. A couple clicks of a button and you would know. But, you know, that‘s on you. You know, me, personally, I‘d check out my client before I walk into court. But that‘s you, not me. As a Judge you better believe I check people out before I start moving kids around, and I‘d tell anybody that I do that. It‘s a simple public record that‘s sitting right there. And that causes me some concern. Now you know 2010 was the last one but I‘m looking for is there evidence of being responsible enough, because these kids have serious problems.
The trial court orally granted the TPR petition, and then published its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree Terminating Parental Rights on June 24, 2014. These consolidated appeals follow.
II. Discussion
For our review, we will consolidate Mother‘s and Father‘s points on appeal. Mother‘s points I, II, and III all claim that the trial court erred in terminating Mother‘s parental rights because its findings were not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Fаther makes the same claim in his points I and II, so these
A. Standard of Review—Findings not supported by the evidence
Before proceeding to analysis of Appellants’ arguments, we direct Appellants’ attention to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 84.04, regarding requirements for the contents of briefs on appeal. Specifically,
Five of Appellants’ points relied on argue that the trial court erred in terminating Appellants’ parental rights because, under the relevant statute, there was no clеar, cogent, and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination existed. Not coincidentally, an appellate court‘s standard of review for a termination of parental rights is “whether clear, cogent, and convincing evidence was presented to support a statutory ground” for the termination “under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976).” In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. banc 2011). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court‘s judgment unless there is no substantial evidenсe to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law; we will only reverse if we are left with a firm belief that the order is wrong. Id. We find it particularly frustrating that Appellants were able to include language taken from the standard of review in their points relied on, but were still unable to then include a concise statement of the applicable standard in the body of the argument under each point. Due to this omission, we would be within our discretion to dismiss this appeal without even reaching the merits. In re Marriage of Fritz, 243 S.W.3d 484 (Mo.App.E.D.2007); Citizens for Ground Water Protection v. Porter, 275 S.W.3d 329 (Mo.App.S.D.2008); Waller v. Shippey, 251 S.W.3d 403 (Mo.App.W.D.2008). However, to expedite proper resolution of this appeal, we will proceed to the merits of Appellants’ points relied on.
Analysis—Findings not supported by the evidence
Mother argues in her first three points, and Father in his first two points, that the trial court erred in terminating thеir parental rights pursuant to Sections
1. Abandonment
Section
Here, during the six months prior to the Children‘s Division filing its TPR petition, Mother visited the children one time, and Father did not visit them at all. Following the filing of the TPR petition in October of 2013, Appellants both visited the children four total times before trial in June of 2014. After March of 2012, neither parent attended a medical appointment with the children. Appellants argue that these contacts show that it was not their intent to abandon the children, while the trial court referred to these as “token visits.” We agree with the trial court. “Parents are not allowed to maintain only a superficial or tenuous relationship with their children to avoid a determination of abandonment,” and courts “may regard such efforts as token and terminate parental rights despite their existence.” In re P.G.M., 149 S.W.3d 507, 514-15 (Mo.App.S.D.2004). Further, at the March 2012 family support meeting, both parents signed consent forms for Father‘s aunt to adopt the children. “A willingness to voluntarily relinquish parental rights if a relative would receive custody demonstrates a desire contrary to the maintenance of a parental relationship.” Id.
Ultimately, we find there was substantial evidencе to support the trial court‘s finding that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence existed for termination of parental rights due to abandonment under Section
2. Abuse or Neglect
Section
The trial court concluded that both Mother and Father had no mental conditions, and neither had ever committed a severe or recurring act of abuse. It found that Father had no chemical dependency, but that Mother had a chemical dependency on alcohol, and that both parents had failed to provide the necessary care for their children.
Mother was requested to complete 50 drug screenings, submitted to only 30, and tested positive for alcohol 14 of those 30 times. She was referred to BASIC drug treatment, although she attended only sporadically and was discharged multiple timеs, with her positive tests occurring more frequently after her last discharge in January of 2012. We find substantial evidence was presented to support the trial court‘s finding that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence existed to support the trial court‘s determination that Mother had a chemical dependency on alcohol.
As to neglect, the same facts that support the finding that Appellants abandoned the children apply equally. Appellants both consistently failed to provide the children with adequate care, failing to visit the children regularly or even attend their medical appointments. Substantial evidence exists that clear, cogent and convincing evidence supports the trial court‘s termination of parental rights under Section
3. Failure to Rectify
Section
One problem we have in reviewing this case is the lack of any motion, petition, or transcript from the October 2010 dispositional hearing. We do not know what the circumstances were that led to the twins being taken into Children‘s Division custody, other than that they needed medical care that Appellants could not provide without Children‘s Division‘s assistance. However, since no record of that hearing or the petitions that рreceded it exists in the record, we cannot consider it. An appellate court “should not look beyond the record in examining sufficiency of evidence at trial.” In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 814.
“The ultimate issue when applying Section
B. Standard of Review—Denials of Motions for Continuance
In Mother‘s point IV, her final point, and рart of Father‘s point III, Appellants argue that the trial court improperly denied their motions for a continuance. We will review the denial of a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. at 464. We will find an abuse of discretion only “in extreme cases where it clearly appears that the moving party is free from any dereliction,” and the trial court‘s ruling was clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. Id.
1. Analysis—Denials of Motions for Continuance
C. Standard of Review—Judge Considering Evidence Beyond the Scope
In the second part of Father‘s point III, the final point for us to consider, he argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in its “extemporaneous remarks” after the close of all evidence. The trial judge made reference to Father‘s driving record and the fact that Father had a suspended license—facts that were apparently not presented by either party at trial. Again, Father does not put forth a clear standard of review as required by
Ultimately, Father is arguing that an extrajudicial source resulted in the trial judge having a disqualifying prejudice. This occurs when the “extrajudicial source . . . results in the judge forming an opinion on the merits based on something other than what the judge has learned from participation in the case.” In re C.H., 412 S.W.3d 375, 385 (Mo.App.E.D.2013) (citing State v. Cella, 32 S.W.3d 114, 119 (Mo. banc 2000)). In In re C.H., the trial judge made remarks about considering race in his custody decision, about personalizing the сase by comparing the child there to his own granddaughter, and about basing his decision upon his experience in other cases. 412 S.W.3d at 385. The court there decided that “[e]xpressions of annoy-
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court‘s judgment is affirmed pursuant to
Patricia L. Cohen, P.J., concurs
Robert M. Clayton III, J., concurs