The biological mother of S. L. W. appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of S. L. W.’s putative father but no appeal has been taken from that portion of the court’s order.
The applicable standard of review is whether a rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent’s rights had been lost. In the Interest of T. M. R.,
Viewed in that light, the evidence was as follows: The State’s first involvement with appellant occurred when Putnam County Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) received a report that S. L. W., then approximately age one, had been bitten by a rat. S. L. W. was placed in foster care but later returned to appellant. When S. L. W. was about age two, Fulton County DFCS received a referral from Grady Hospital due to S. L. W.’s ingestion of psychotropic drugs but before DFCS could intercede, appellant and S. L. W. disappeared from the hospital. The next referral occurred when friends of appellant contacted DeKalb County DFCS
While the criminal charges were pending, appellant asserted that S. L. W. suffered from a dysautonomia, a rare disease also known as Riley-Day syndrome, where a person is unable to differentiate by touch between hot and cold temperatures. Even though a geneticist and two neurologists determined that S. L. W. did not and does not have this condition, appellant solicited help for S. L. W., leaving fundraising cans with various businesses. In August 1991, the juvenile court conducted an adjudicatory hearing and entered an order finding S. L. W. to be deprived and awarding temporary legal custody to DFCS. Appellant did not appeal.
As a precondition for reunification with the child, DFCS set several goals to be met by appellant. Judicial citizen review panels evaluated appellant’s progress every six months from January 1991 up to the termination hearing. At the termination hearing,
1. The juvenile court did not err in finding that S. L. W. did not need to testify at the termination hearing. OCGA § 15-11-83 (c) authorizes the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to determine whether it is in the child’s interest to be brought before the court. To determine the necessity of S. L. W.’s presence, the juvenile court conducted a separate hearing during which S. L. W.’s guardian ad litem strenuously objected to requiring her presence. S. L. W.’s behavioral therapist, who conducted over 200 counseling sessions with S. L. W. since February 1991, testified that following visits with her mother or attendance at court proceedings, S. L. W.’s behavioral problems, including incidents of self-mutilation, would intensify dramatically. The juvenile court determined that S. L. W.’s testimony was not material or necessary to the termination proceedings and that requiring her to testify was not in her best interest. Under these facts, we are not able to say that the juvenile court abused its discretion. See Harvey v. Fulton County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs.,
2. The case plans were sufficiently plain, clear, and definite to comport with the requirements of due process. See OCGA § 15-11-41 (c). The plans articulated highly specific requirements and goals and were not ambiguous, vague, or arbitrary.
3. Prior to termination, reasonable efforts to reunite mother and daughter were made in compliance with State law.
4. The juvenile court’s determination was supported by the evidence in the record. Termination of parental rights requires a two-step process whereby, first, the juvenile court determines whether there is “present clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability,” and second, the juvenile court then must consider “whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.” OCGA § 15-11-81 (a).
After the juvenile court took judicial notice of the prior deprivation order, which was unappealed, only the remaining three criteria of OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (ii)-(iv) needed to be proven to show parental misconduct or inability. In the Interest of B. P.,
The second criterion, lack of proper parental care or control by the parent in question causing the child’s status as deprived, is supported by evidence. Appellant physically abused S. L. W. and was criminally prosecuted for this abuse. Appellant failed to obtain ongoing professional counseling for her violent and destructive behavior. A psychologist who evaluated appellant, testified that appellant needed intensive, long-term psychotherapy and without such treatment, appellant’s extremely volatile behavior, psychological problems and continued denials that she ever abused S. L. W., placed S. L. W. at greater risk if she were ever returned to appellant. During the termination hearing,
In light of appellant’s physical abuse of S. L. W., extensive psychological impairment, failure to obtain proper treatment for her problems, and the detrimental effects her actions have had on S. L. W., appellant failed to exercise proper parental care or control which resulted in S. L. W.’s deprivation. OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (ii).
As to the third criterion, the past conduct of a parent is properly considered by a court in determining whether such conditions of deprivation are likely to continue. In the Interest of J. M. C.,
As to the fourth criterion, the evidence showed that appellant was incapable of properly parenting her child and that her ineptitude was not likely to end. Further, the evidence showed that after visits from appellant, S. L. W.’s behavior problems and anxiety intensified. Incidents such as S. L. W.’s carving herself with a shard of glass, burning herself on her stomach with an iron, and thrusting her foot through glass, occurred after encounters with appellant or the court system. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the fourth criterion that “[t]he continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child.” OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (iv).
We find that the evidence presented to the juvenile court was sufficient to enable a rational factfinder to have found by clear and convincing evidence, parental misconduct or inability as required by OCGA § 15-11-81 (b). See In re B. D. C.,
“[T]hose same factors which show the existence of parental misconduct or inability can also support a finding that the termination of parental rights of the defaulting parent would be in the child’s best interest.” In the Interest of G. K. J.,
For the foregoing reasons, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found clear and convincing evidence that the deprivation is likely to continue and that the continued deprivation will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to S. L. W. In re B. D. C.,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Because appellant failed to support her federal statutory law argument with citation of authority or argument, it is deemed abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 27 (c) (2).