Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court,
In this case the trial court terminated the parental rights of M.N.’s mother and appointed the Department of Family and Protective Services as managing conservator. The mother’s statement of points for appeal required by section 263.405 of the Texas Family Code was filed late, but the trial court granted an extension of time and concluded that the statement of points was filed timely. The court of appeals held that section 263.405 did not allow extensions of time for filing statements of points, concluded the mother did not preserve error for review of her issues, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Following a bench trial, Mandi D.’s parental rights to her daughter, M.N., were terminated, and the Department was appointed as M.N.’s permanent managing conservator. The trial court signed the final order on August 4, 2006. On August 25, Mandi filed a combined statement of points for appeal and motion for new trial. The filing was more than fifteen days after the final order was signed and therefore outside the time limit set by section 263.405(b) of the Texas Family Code. On September 5, Mandi filed a written motion to extend the time for filing her statement of points. On that same day, the trial court heard Mandi’s motions, signed an order extending the time limit for Mandi to file her statement of points, found that her statement of points was timely filed, and denied her motion for new trial. See Tex. Fam.Code § 263.405(d).
Mandi appealed. The Department asserted, and the court of appeals held, that the trial court did not have authority to extend the time for Mandi to file her statement of points and that she had not timely filed them.
Family Code section 263.405 is entitled “Appeal of Final Order.” It provides for the expedited disposition of cases in which children are under the care of the Department. See In re D.R.L.M.,
(a) An appeal of a final order rendered under this subchapter is governed by the rules of the supreme court for accelerated appeals in civil cases and the procedures provided by this section. The appellate court shall render its final order or judgment with the least possible delay.
(b) Not later than the 15th day after the date a final order is signed by the trial judge, a party who intends to request a new trial or appeal the order must file with the trial court:
(1) a request for a new trial; or
(2) if an appeal is sought, a statement of the point or points on which the party intends to appeal.
In 2005, section 263.405® was added. See Act of May 12, 2005, 79th Leg., R. S., ch. 176, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 332. Subsection (i) provides:
(i) The appellate court may not consider any issue that was not specifically presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of the points on which the party intends to appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new trial. For purposes of this subsection, a claim that a judicial decision is contrary to the evidence or that the evidence is factually or legally insufficient is not sufficiently specific to preserve an issue for appeal.
The bill analysis indicates that section 263.405® was added because some
In construing statutory language our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. State v. Gonzalez,
This Court is obligated to promulgate rules of practice and procedure in civil cases. See Tex. Const, art. V, § 31(b) (“The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts.”); Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.003(d) (“The supreme court from time to time shall promulgate suitable rules, forms, and regulations .... ”); id. § 22.004(a) (“The supreme court has the full rulemaking power in the practice and procedure in civil actions, except that its rules may not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of a litigant.”); see generally Stillman v. Hirsch,
Although the goal of section 263.405 is to decrease post-judgment delays when children are under the care of the Department, section 263.405 does not indicate legislative intent to unfairly or unreasonably preclude parents from appealing final orders. In construing the procedural provisions of section 263.405, we keep in mind that the Legislature adopted it in light of the rules of civil and appellate procedure providing for extensions of deadlines under certain circumstances. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.004(b) (“The clerk of the supreme court shall file with the secretary of state the rules or amendments to rules promulgated by the supreme court ... [and][t]he secretary of state shall report the rules or amendments to rules to the next regular session of the legislature by mailing a copy of the rules or amendments to rules to each elected member of the legislature on or before December 1 immediately preceding the session.”). Section 263.405(h), for example, contains language implicitly acknowledging that procedural appellate deadlines can be extended under the rules of appellate procedure: it provides that an appellate court may not extend certain deadlines except for good cause. Tex. Fam.Code § 263.405(h).
As previously noted, section 263.405 does not address whether 263.405(b)’s deadline for a statement of points can be extended. Unquestionably, however, the Legislature intended sections 263.405(b) and (i) to yield just, fair, and reasonable results within the legislative goal of obtaining expedited disposition of appeals. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(3). Such intent is in harmony with the goals of the rules of civil and appellate procedure. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 1; Williams,
In Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp.,
*804 motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response should be granted when the nonmovant [for summary judgment] establishes good cause by showing that the failure to timely respond (1) was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of an accident or mistake, and (2) that allowing the late response will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the party seeking summary judgment.
Id. Cimarron, however, had offered no explanation for its failure to timely file a response, so we held that the trial court’s denial of Cimarron’s motion to file an untimely response was proper. Id.
Applying the standards of Rule 5 we enunciated in Carpenter to this case, we note that Mandi’s motion to extend time to file her statement of points set out that her counsel mis-calendared the time for post-trial filings. Further, at the hearing on the motion to extend time, Mandi’s counsel explained without objection that the late filing was due to counsel’s having mistakenly used the date she received the final order to calculate the last date for filing the statement of points, instead of using the date the order was signed. According to counsel’s explanation during the hearing, Mandi at all times desired to appeal the termination of her parental rights and counsel filed the statement of points timely according to the erroneously-calendared deadline. The Department did not contest either the allegations in Mandi’s motion for having filed the statement of points late or Mandi’s attorney’s explanation at the hearing.
The court of appeals held that the trial court did not have authority to grant Man-di’s motion, the trial court’s order was ineffective to extend the time to file, and the untimely filing failed to preserve error for review.
Mandi’s petition for review is granted. Without hearing oral argument, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. See Tex.R.App. P. 59.1.
Notes
. Mandi also challenges the constitutionality of sections 263.405(b) and (i). We decide the case on non-constitutional grounds, do not reach the constitutional issue, and express no opinion in regard to it. See VanDevender v. Woods,
Dissenting Opinion
For better or for worse, the Legislature in Family Code section 263.405(b) set a firm fifteen-day deadline for filing a statement of points for appeal. Reasonable people can dispute the efficacy of this hard-and-fast deadline, but few can dispute its clarity.
I fully understand the Court’s desire for leniency in enlarging the fifteen-day deadline beyond the statute’s terms. Appealing the termination of one’s parental rights is serious business, and having such rights vanish because of a counsel’s (or pro se litigant’s) mis-calendaring is nigh unfathomable. On the other hand, every day of childhood is irreplaceable, and society benefits when children are placed in safe, secure and loving homes as quickly as possible.
The Legislature wanted these cases to proceed with alacrity, reducing post-judgment delay by barring appellate consideration of tardy points. I would take lawmakers at their word: fifteen days means fifteen days. Squeezing out delay, however, does not permit squeezing out due process. It is one task to honor a fast-tracking statute’s unambiguous text and refuse to judicially rewrite it under the guise of construction. It is quite another to examine whether that text, however plain, unconstitutionally restricts due process or other guarantees. Terminating parental rights cannot warrant terminating constitutional rights.
I would (1) hold that court-made rules of procedure do not trump the Family Code’s fifteen-day deadline and then, assuming preservation, (2) confront head-on whether this statutory deadline violates Durham’s due-process rights or any other constitutional provision.
. The Court today has granted a petition for review that challenges the fifteen-day deadline on constitutional grounds. In re J.O.A.,