Natural mother, C.S., appeals the judgment of the Juvenile Court of St. Louis County terminating her parental rights to her seven-year old daughter, M.L.S. The court also terminated the natural father’s
M.L.S. was born September 8,1978. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over M.L.S. on January 8, 1980, and the Division of Family Services continually rendered services to aid C.S. from 1980 through 1985. The original petition to terminate parental rights was filed on September 24,1984, and amended twice.
C.S. visited the child nine times between February 1980 and April 1985. Throughout this period, C.S. was diagnosed as a “schizophrenic, residual type.” She suffered from this condition for at least ten years, and the likelihood the condition was reversible was “extremely remote and slim.” C.S.’s basic limitation is her inability to think or act purposely or intentionally. She is not able to plan and carry out any goal-directed actions or behavior and this greatly impairs her ability to care for a minor child. The opinion of the appellant’s doctor indicated that it would be at least five years before C.S. could provide adequate care for the child. The doctor’s findings were supported by a D.F.S. case worker assigned to C.S. and by a registered nurse who monitored C.S. at a boarding home facility for psychiatric patients.
Based on this evidence, the juvenile court found that C.S. had a mental condition which rendered her unable to form an intent or to act knowingly and there was no reasonable likelihood this condition could be reversed. § 211.447.2(2)(g) a. and b. RSMo Cum.Supp.1984. The juvenile court also found that M.L.S. had been under its jurisdiction continuously since January 8, 1980 and since then C.S. had failed to rectify the conditions which formed the basis of the court’s original jurisdiction (failure to care for M.L.S), despite reasonable, continuing and diligent efforts by the Missouri Division of Family Services to aid C.S. Specifically, the court found that there was reasonable cause to believe that even if given additional time, C.S. could not rectify these conditions. § 211.447.2(2)(i)b. RSMo Cum.Supp.1984.
C.S. contends that the judgment to terminate was erroneous because the charges of failure to rectify and mental condition were not proven by sufficient evidence, and that the evidence failed to support a finding that termination of her rights was in the best interest of the minor. In order to overrule the decision of the trial court, the appellant must show that there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment, the judgment is against the weight of the evidence, or the judgment erroneously declares or applies the law. In re Adoption of W.B.L.,
The authority seeking termination must prove one or more of the statutory grounds for termination by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Juvenile Office v. M.E.J.,
We find sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that C.S. suffered from a mental condition which rendered her unable to form an intent and to act knowingly, and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the condition was reversible. The result of this condition is that C.S. is unable to give the child M.L.S. necessary care and protection. There was clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the condition which justified the juvenile
Because the issue of appellant’s mental condition is supported, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether appellant’s claim that her failure to rectify these conditions was based on the failure of D.F.S. to render reasonable, diligent and continuing services to C.S.. As long as one of the grounds for termination is sufficiently supported, then the termination must stand. B.J.D.B. v. J.B.G.,
The decision of the juvenile court may also stand only if this court finds that the termination was in the best interest of M.L.S. Appellant attacks this finding on two grounds: (1) the evidence fails to prove that termination is in the child’s best interest; and (2) the termination of C.S.’ rights to M.L.S. will separate M.L.S. from a fourteen-year old brother, J.S., not involved in this litigation. Both children are currently living together in a foster home.
The concept of “best interests of the child” must be applied on a case by case basis and must be applied under “imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge.” Santosky v. Kramer,
The second attack on the finding of best interests concerns the brother-sister relationship between M.L.S. and J.S. J.S. is the fourteen-year old brother of M.L.S. The separation of brother and sister is a relevant factor to consider when determining whether termination is in the best interests of M.L.S. See In re Adoption of G,
We find the grounds for termination of parental rights of the natural mother were established by the requisite measure of proof, particularly the allegation of disabling mental condition. We also find that the determination and judgment of the trial court is consistent with the best interests of the child under the facts in evidence.
Affirmed.
Notes
. We recognize that this statutory provision has since been amended in § 211.447 RSMo Non Cum.Supp.1985. The applicable statute, however, is § 211.447 RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984 based on the date the appeal was filed.