J. O. was adjudicated delinquent and in need of treatment and rehabilitation, OCGA § 15-11-33, as the result of an assault upon the victim with a shotgun, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). J. 0. was age sixteen at the time. The order of commitment was entered by thе juvenile court on July 21, 1988.
On August 2, 1988, a “Motion for New Trial,” called by the court a motion to “reconsider,” was filed. It asserted the general grounds and that the State had failed to prove guilt beyond a reаsonable doubt, based on the judge’s oral statement that he made his finding “by a preponderance of the evidence — I believe is the requirement now. . . .” The judge had asked the parties if that wаs correct, to which the State replied affirmatively. Counsel for J. 0. did not respond.
On November 8, 1988, thе court entered a “Ruling On Juvenile’s Motion To Reconsider.” It stated that while a juvenile court may nоt entertain a motion for new trial, it has the inherent power to modify or reconsider its judgment during the pendency of the juvenile’s time for appeal, citing
In re P. S. C.,
1. In every case, this court is required to ascertain whether it has jurisdictiоn, even if it is not raised by either party.
Patterson v. Flint,
Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only thоse powers specifically conferred upon them by statute.
West v. Hatcher,
The court traveled, instead, at least nоminally on a motion to reconsider. However, the power to act recognized by In re P. S. C. had еnded on the thirtieth day after the initial order of July 21, according to the analysis adopted in that case. The trial court there had acted within thirty days to vacate the initial order, in effect, by granting a rehearing before a different judge. Here the court did not exercise this “inherent” power until well beyond the appeal period.
A & D Barrel, supra, was based on the wording of OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) and gives no separate basis for tolling in the juvenile court context.
OCGA § 15-11-42, on the other hand, provides the vehiсle for correction of juvenile court orders. It sets no time limits. Relief may be sought by the petition of onе of a wide variety of persons involved with the child. See subsection (c). A hearing is to be held, subsection (d), and the original order of the juvenile court “shall be set aside if: (1) [i]t appears that it was obtained by . . . mistake sufficient therefor in a civil action; . . .” Subsection (a) (1).
The “motion for new trial” in this case was in effect a petition under this remedial law. The “motion” challenged the original Order аs having been based on the wrong standard of proof in the trial, an alleged mistake of law. The сourt did hold a hearing and addressed the issue raised. Following this it entered a new order which stated that it “supersedes” the original order, resulting in the original order’s being set aside.
The fact that the court denominated the child’s “motion” as a “motion to reconsider” is not controlling. It is substance and not nomenclature which governs.
Birt v. State,
2. The first enumeration alleges that the juvenile court commitment should be reversed because the court applied the incorrect burden of proof in the adjudicatory phase. In ruling on the petition, the court explained that its remark at trial was a mere lаpsus linguae and that it knew and had applied the correct standard of proof. It exprеssly wrote that “the evidence addressed at the adjudicatory hearing shows, beyond a reasоnable doubt, that the juvenile did in fact
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commit the delinquent act of aggravated assault.” It enterеd a new order stating that it found the delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt. See OCGA § 15-11-33 (c);
In the Interest of C. D. L.,
There having been no error in the standard of proof actually applied, the enumeration fails to achieve reversal and remand for furthеr findings. Cf.
In the Interest of C. T. L.,
3. Complaint is also made here that the fact that J. 0. was already on probation for anоther violation was improperly considered by the court. On the two occasions when this was rеferred to, however, no objection was voiced below. It will not be considered here for the first time.
Hall v. State,
Judgment affirmed.