In the Interest of J.M.M., S.A.M., and N.R.M., Children v. the State of TexasIn the Interest of J.M.M., S.A.M., and N.R.M., Children v. the State of Texas
Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice, H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 5, 2026
AFFIRMED
In seven issues, appellant M.R.M. (“Father“) appeals the trial court‘s order terminating his parental rights to his children, J.M.M. (born 2018), S.A.M. (born 2020), and N.R.M. (born 2021), and appointing the children‘s mother, K.N.O. (“Mother“) as their sole managing conservator.1 We affirm the order of termination.
BACKGROUND
In May of 2024, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department“) removed the children due to domestic violence between Mother and Father and
Beginning on November 3, 2025, the parties tried the Department‘s termination petition to the bench. By the first day of trial, the Department had changed its permanency goal for the children to reunification with Mother and termination of Father‘s parental rights. It asked the trial court to approve steps that would lead to a monitored return of the children to Mother‘s custody. The children returned to Mother‘s home on December 22, 2025, where they remained for the rest of this case. The trial then continued on January 13, 2026, and the evidence presented that day focused primarily on Mother‘s and the children‘s progress after reunification. The parties reconvened for the third and final day of trial on March 6, 2026.
During the three days of trial, four witnesses testified: the original caseworker, Videlia Acosta; the then-current caseworker, Michelle Villarreal; Father; and Mother. On March 20, 2026, the trial court signed a final order that: (1) appointed Mother as the children‘s sole managing conservator; (2) dismissed the Department as the children‘s conservator; and (3) terminated Father‘s parental rights pursuant to
Section 263.4011
In his first issue, Father argues the trial court lost jurisdiction over this proceeding because it did not comply with
Here, while the trial commenced on November 3, 2025, the trial court did not sign a final order until March 20, 2026. Accordingly, the trial court did not comply with
In his second, third, fourth, and fifth issues, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court‘s predicate findings under
To terminate parental rights pursuant to
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply well-established standards of review. See
Ordinarily, when the trial court terminates a parent‘s rights on multiple predicate grounds, we may affirm on any one ground. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d 606, 611–12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). However, because termination under subsections (D) or (E) may have implications for a parent‘s parental rights to other children, we must address issues challenging a trial court‘s findings under those subsections. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 236–37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). Therefore, we will consider Father‘s sufficiency argument as to subsection (E) before we turn to his challenge to the other predicate findings.
A. Applicable Law
Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent‘s rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]”
“‘Due process requires meaningful appellate review of orders terminating parental rights.‘” In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 n.6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied) (quoting In re G.M., No. 04-19-00080-CV, 2019 WL 3432088, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (Watkins, J., concurring)). Recognizing our duty to perform this review, we have “repeatedly expressed concerns about underdeveloped records in parental termination appeals.” In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d at 829 n.6 (listing cases).
The witness testimony and argument of counsel regarding Father‘s conduct comprises less than 30 pages of the three-volume, 86-page reporter‘s record. The Department did not present any exhibits. Father‘s conduct was briefly discussed on the first day of trial, but the court expressly recognized that “the testimony would be very limited with regards to” him that day due to unspecified problems with arranging his participation from prison. The second day of trial focused almost entirely on the monitored return of the children to Mother; again, Father was discussed only briefly. While the parties were scheduling the third and final day of trial, the Department announced that it believed it would only need an additional 25 minutes to present its remaining evidence regarding Father. The reporter‘s record of the final day of trial is 34 pages long, and approximately half of that slim volume contains evidence and argument regarding Father‘s conduct.
We remind both the trial court and the Department that while they are no doubt well acquainted with the full history of the proceedings in this and other parental termination proceedings, we are not. The only evidence we have before us comes solely from the reporter‘s record of the three days of trial. And in this case, the reporter‘s record appears to show that the trial court severed Father‘s relationship with his children based on less than 30 minutes of
“Evidence of domestic violence is relevant to endangerment, even if the violence is not directed at the child.” N.K. v. Tex. Dep‘t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00028-CV, 2022 WL 2673236, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Department presented evidence that Father and Mother engaged in domestic violence in front of the children on more than one occasion. Father did not dispute that these incidents occurred, and he agreed that he “messed up in the past.” Although there was no evidence that any violence was directed at the children, the trial court heard evidence that the oldest child, J.M.M., remembers the violence and “is afraid of dad.”
In his brief, Father questions the trial court‘s determination that this evidence of domestic violence was sufficient to terminate his rights but was insufficient to prevent Mother from being appointed sole managing conservator. He correctly notes that the evidence showed he and Mother
However, there was no direct testimony that the children were afraid of Mother herself. Additionally, Mother completed all of her services, including those related to domestic violence, and she articulated plans to keep herself and the children safe from future violence. The trial court also heard testimony on the second day of trial—i.e., after the children returned to Mother—that all three children were “doing really good” and “seem very happy.” Villarreal testified that Mother had “learned from her violence course and her parenting class” and “demonstrate[d] behavioral change.” On this record, we cannot agree with Father‘s implication that the domestic violence evidence was equally damning against both parents.
Furthermore, Father was incarcerated on May 7, 2024, approximately a week before the Department obtained temporary conservatorship over the children. He remained incarcerated throughout this case, with a projected release date of June 14, 2027 and a possibility of release as soon as September 2026. “Criminal activity that exposes a parent to incarceration is relevant evidence tending to establish a course of conduct endangering the emotional and physical well-being of the child.” In re R.L.L., No. 04-18-00240-CV, 2018 WL 6069866, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 21, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). While a parent‘s incarceration, standing alone, is not sufficient to support an endangerment finding under subsection (E), “incarceration does support an endangerment finding if the evidence, including the imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312–13 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A parent‘s criminal history—taking into account the nature of the crimes, the duration of incarceration, and whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists—can support a finding of endangerment.” Id. at 313.
Father testified that his incarceration resulted from his “past criminal activity for methamphetamine usage and—in 2019, 2018 and 2017, and also fraud behavior, going on 20—or, 15 addresses, and I.D. info and credit and debit possession/usage.” This testimony established that Father‘s criminal behavior began before the children were born and continued through at least J.M.M.‘s birth in 2018. The trial court could have rationally found that this evidence “shows a pattern of escalating [criminal] conduct, not an isolated incident.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 315; see also In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. 2025) (identifying the “drug possession” and “credit card abuse” offenses at issue in J.F.-G. as “serious crimes” that could support an endangerment finding). The trial court also could have found that this past conduct exposed the children to the risk of “a life of uncertainty and instability[.]” In re K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278, at *5.
Additionally, “[a] parent‘s lack of contact with a child and his or her absence from the child‘s life endanger the child‘s emotional well-being.” In re Y.W., No. 02-22-00334-CV, 2022 WL 17841830, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, Father‘s incarceration resulted in his absence from the children‘s lives for more than two years. Because the children were 4, 6, and 7 years old at the time of trial, a reasonable factfinder could have considered the length of that absence to be significant and relevant to the endangerment ground.
When viewed through the applicable standards of review, the evidence described above would permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that Father engaged in conduct that endangered the children‘s physical or emotional well-being.
Best Interest
In his sixth issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court‘s finding that termination was in the children‘s best interest.
A. Applicable Law
When considering the best interest of the child, we recognize the existence of a strong presumption that the child‘s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). The Department has the burden of rebutting this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. “[T]he best interest standard does not permit termination merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere.” In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the Department satisfies its burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several statutory factors4 for courts to consider regarding a parent‘s willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme Court has provided a similar list of factors5 to determine a child‘s best interest.
A best interest finding does not require proof of any particular factors. In re G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child‘s best interest[.]” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Evidence that
B. Application
Much of the evidence described above in our discussion of the endangerment finding, particularly the evidence regarding Father‘s drug use, Father and Mother‘s history of domestic violence, and J.M.M.‘s fear of Father, is also relevant to the best interest finding. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28;
In addition to the evidence described above, Mother testified that she believed it was in the children‘s best interest for Father‘s parental rights to be terminated. Villarreal agreed, testifying that she did not believe Father would be able to meet the children‘s emotional needs because of his “continued criminal involvement.” See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. She added that Mother “wants to protect” the children and that Mother did not feel the children “would be safe around
After reviewing the evidence under the applicable standards of review, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father‘s parental rights was in the best interest of his children. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We therefore hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court‘s best interest finding and overrule Father‘s sixth issue.
Conservatorship
In his seventh and final issue, Father asks us to review the portion of the trial court‘s order regarding conservatorship of the children. We review a trial court‘s conservatorship rulings for abuse of discretion. See In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). In making a conservatorship decision, a trial court has broad discretion in determining a child‘s best interest. In re J.J.R.S., 607 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020), aff‘d, 627 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2021). We may not reverse a trial court‘s conservatorship ruling unless it was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.
The Texas Family Code requires a child‘s parent to be appointed managing conservator “unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child‘s physical health or emotional development.”
We overrule Father‘s seventh issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of termination.
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice