636 S.E.2d 47 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2006
Appellant mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to H. E. M. O., challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an order terminating parental rights, this Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, here the Bartow County Department of Family and Children Services (the “Department”), and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent’s rights have been lost. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses but defer to the trial court’s factfinding and affirm unless the evidence fails to satisfy the appellate standard of review.1
Properly viewed, the evidence shows that H. E. M. O., who was born on October 28, 1998, was placed into the Department’s custody along with her younger brother
The court entered a final dispositional order on August 9, 2004, incorporating the provisional order awarding temporary custody to the Department. The following year, on May 26, 2005, the court entered an order extending custody in the Department. The mother, who was incarcerated in Alabama, attended the hearing by telephone and consented to the order. The permanency plan for H. E. M. O. was changed to adoption following termination of parental rights, with the petition to be filed by August 25, 2005. The court concluded that the mother had made insufficient progress on the case plan to continue reunification efforts.
The petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to H. E.M. O. was filed on September 7, 2005, and the hearing was held on November 15, 2005. At the time of the hearing, the mother had been jailed for two weeks for violating the conditions of her probation by using cocaine; she admitted that she had previously been incarcerated in Alabama for six months and had not been drug free, as required by her case plan, “on several occasions”; that she failed a random drug screen in March 2005; that she had not enrolled in an inpatient drug treatment program, although recommended as part of
The psychologist who evaluated the mother at the Department’s request, John Azar Dickens, testified that the mother had reported that she began using drugs at the age of 14, including methamphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, “acid,” and alcohol, most of which she admitted to using within 60 days of the evaluation. The mother also reported to Dickens that she began treatment for mental health issues when she was six years old; and that she had been in a number of psychiatric hospitals due to “nervous breakdowns” but currently took no medications because she could not afford them. Dickens performed psychological testing, after which he diagnosed the mother with mental illnesses, specifically poly-substance dependence, post-traumatic stress disorder, bi-polar disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Dickens assessed her ability to function in life as “significantly low.” He recommended a long-term residential drug and alcohol treatment program that included mental health treatment. He testified that her prognosis would be “extremely poor” without treatment. Based on the mother’s failure to complete residential treatment and her admission to using cocaine earlier in the year, Dickens opined that he would be “very concerned” about her ability to parent safely.
Meredith Burns, the child psychologist who treated H. E. M. O. from January through August 2005, testified that the child initially was having behavioral and emotional problems, such as stealing, lying, frequent temper tantrums, defiance at home and at school, nightmares, wetting incidents, and crying spells. H. E. M. O. reported that she had been sexually abused by two older siblings. Eventually,
Moore, the mother’s case manager, testified that H. E. M. O.’s foster home is a “pre-adoptive” home; that Moore visited the home four times and observed the four biological children there interact with each other and H. E. M. O. comfortably; and that H. E. M. O. appears strongly bonded with her foster parents. The foster mother has obtained psychiatric care for the child. Moore also confirmed that H. E. M. O.’s biological mother had not completed the goals of her case plan. She was resistant to entering an inpatient treatment facility and became “very volatile” in Moore’s office on two occasions when Moore made referrals to facilities. The mother was asked to leave a homeless shelter because she had been so difficult to handle. She did not remain out of jail long enough for the Department to assist her with entering an inpatient facility. Also, her drug screen in March 2005 was positive for cocaine; she never achieved the goal of safe, stable housing; she only attended one parenting class despite being referred to two different programs; the last time she visited H. E. M. O. was March 5, 2005, and she visited the children only seven times out of a total of nineteen opportunities; and the mother did not keep the Department abreast of changes in her address. The court interviewed the child, and she expressed a desire to remain with her foster family. The guardian ad litem recommended terminating the mother’s parental rights.
1. The termination of parental rights is a two-step procedure.
(a) The child is deprived. Appellant is bound by the juvenile court’s prior deprivation orders, which were never appealed.
(b) Lack of proper parental care or control caused the deprivation. There are six conditions the juvenile court must consider in making this determination, including “[a] medically verifiable deficiency of the parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to provide adequately for the physical, mental, emotional, or moral condition and needs of the child”
Here, the court properly determined that both conditions exist. Evidence showed that the mother suffered from medically diagnosed mental illnesses, specifically poly-substance dependence, post-traumatic stress disorder, bi-polar disorder, and borderline personality disorder. A psychologist concluded that her ability to function in life was significantly low, and without inpatient treatment, to which she was resistant, her prognosis was poor. Evidence also showed repeated, unrehabilitated, illegal drug use for which she was incarcerated after losing custody of H. E. M. O. and at the time of the hearing, causing the psychologist grave concern about her ability to parent safely. Such evidence supports a finding that H. E. M. O.’s deprivation resulted from a lack of proper parental care and control.
Further, as established by the testimony of the case manager and the mother herself, the mother failed miserably at meeting the specified goals of the court-ordered reunification plan: resolving pending legal issues, refraining from further violations of the law, remaining drug free, completing a treatment program, maintaining stable housing and stable employment, and completing parenting classes, among other things.
(d) Continued deprivation is likely to cause serious harm to the child. As to the fourth factor, that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child, the same circumstances that authorized the juvenile court’s determination that the child was deprived due to lack of proper parental control or inability and that such deprivation was likely to continue further provided clear and convincing evidentiary support for the conclusion that such continued deprivation will, or is likely to, cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child.
[w] e have held that evidence of a mother’s repeated failure to remain drug free and her failure to take the steps necessary to reunite with the children was sufficient to prove that the continued deprivation would cause the child serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm. Additionally, it is well settled that children need permanence of home and emotional stability or they are likely to suffer serious emotional problems.19
As set forth above, the mother has failed to refrain from violating the law, to remain drug free, to maintain a meaningful and consistent
2. Best interest of the child. After finding clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, the juvenile court must then determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest, considering her physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs, including the need for a secure and stable home.
Judgment affirmed.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of S. L. B., 265 Ga. App. 684(595 SE2d 370) (2004).
The Department is not seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights to this child.
OCGA § 15-11-94 (a).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) (4) (A) (i)-(iv). S ee In the Interest of D. L. S., 271 Ga.App. 311, 312-313 (609 SE2d 666) (2005).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (a). See In the Interest of A. L. E., 248 Ga. App. 213, 216 (1) (546 SE2d 319) (2001).
See In the Interest of T. P., 270 Ga. App. 700, 704 (1) (608 SE2d 43) (2004).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) (4) (B) (i). See In the Interest of S. W. J. P. D., 279 Ga. App. 226, 229 (1) (b) (630 SE2d 824) (2006); In the Interest of A. L. E., supra at 216-217 (1).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) (4) (B) (ii). See In the Interest of K. A. P, 277 Ga. App. 794, 796-797 (1) (b) (627 SE2d 857) (2006).
See In the Interest of S. W. J. P. D., supra; see also In the Interest of T. L., 279 Ga. App. 7, 12 (1) (630 SE2d 154) (2006) (undisputed evidence that the mother continuously used a variety of illegal drugs supported finding of deprivation); In the Interest of B. B., 268 Ga. App. 858, 860 (3) (a) (603 SE2d 333) (2004) (mother’s mental illness coupled with refusal to seek treatment showed parental inability).
In the Interest of A. C., 272 Ga. App. 165, 167 (1) (c) (611 SE2d 766) (2005), citing In the Interest of S. L. B., supra at 688 (1).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) (4) (C) (i).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (b) (4) (C) (iii).
See In the Interest of K. N., 272 Ga. App. 45, 52 (a) (2) (611 SE2d 713) (2005) (mother did not develop and maintain a parental bond where she attended only 38 out of 79 scheduled visits for which the child was made available).
See In the Interest of D. L. S., supra at 313 (1) (b) (failure to meet case plan goals supported finding of lack of parental care or control).
See In the Interest of A. R. A. S., 278 Ga. App. 608, 613-614 (2) (d) (629 SE2d 822) (2006) (mother admitted that she failed to complete case plan goals).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of K. N., supra at 53 (a) (3).
In the Interest of A. B., 274 Ga. App. 230, 232 (617 SE2d 189) (2005) (cause of the deprivation is likely to continue where mother “highly likely” to continue using illegal drugs and failed to achieve financial and residential stability, as required by her case plan).
In the Interest of A. R. A. S., supra at 614 (2) (d).
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) In the Interest of J. S. T. S., 273 Ga. App. 221, 225-226 (614 SE2d 863) (2005). Accord In the Interest of T. L., supra at 13 (2).
In the Interest of A. R. A. S., supra at 615 (2) (d).
See In the Interest of M. E. M., 272 Ga. App. 451, 455 (612 SE2d 612) (2005) (mother’s failure to maintain contact with children, to support them, or to provide housing supported court’s findings as to the fourth factor).
OCGA § 15-11-94 (a). See In the Interest of A. L. E., supra at 216 (1).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of D. D., 273 Ga. App. 839, 842 (2) (616 SE2d 179) (2005).
See In the Interest of M. E. M., supra; In the Interest of A. C., supra at 168 (2); In the Interest of M. L. P., 236 Ga. App. 504, 510 (1) (d) (512 SE2d 652) (1999) (juvenile court has broad discretion in determining how the interest of the child is best served).