365 A.2d 157 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1976
Lead Opinion
These cases involve appeals to our Court from adjudications of delinquency of both appellants based upon their having committed conspiracy, burglary and criminal mischief. The challenge in each case is only to the finding by the hearing judge that the appellants had committed a burglary, not to the other findings.
In Lansdale, Pennsylvania, two companies, the J. W. Rex Company and the Spraonic Company, occupied different parts of the same building. Their quarters were separated by a fire door secured by a chain lock. On or about 6:00 P.M., November 24, 1974, Timmothy Meyers, the Division Superintendent of the Rex Company, receiv
After being properly advised of his rights, Lester Golden disclosed that he, the appellant Dale Hemmons and Joseph and Dominic Malander had driven in Joseph Malander’s car to the yard of the Spraonic Company, had entered Spraonic’s part of the building, taking with them three (3) quart bottles of beer. They had cut the chain lock which secured the fire door, with an acetylene torch, and made their way into the Rex Company’s part of the building. They had started to drink the beer and they had smashed the vending machine and cigarette machine to get access to the contents of the machines.
At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing on December 4, 1974, the hearing judge found the appellants had committed conspiracy, burglary and criminal mischief on November 24, 1974, with respect to the Spraonic Company and the Rex Company Building.
As we stated hereinabove, the challenge to the adjudication of delinquency is solely to the finding that the appellants committed burglary. They claim that the crimes they intended to commit, i. e., criminal mischief with damages less than $500.00 and under age drinking of intoxicants, were summary offenses and that such criminal offenses are not contemplated as crimes within the description of the offense of burglary as defined in the Crimes Code. The Crimes Code defines the offense of burglary as follows: “a person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.”
The definition of a crime is embodied in the Crimes Code itself. The Code expressly tells us that: “An offense defined by this title for which a sentence of death or of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime.”
The Minority of our Court would have us interpret the Crimes Code in such a way that the word “crime” does not encompass summary offenses. To so interpret the Statute would mean that persons could break into one’s home or building, vandalize it to the extent of $500.00, leave it and if apprehended could be charged only with a summary offense. The Minority claims that such an interpretation would further the purposes of the Crimes Code. Such an interpretation would make it easy for persons to break into buildings and do substantial damage inside of them. We believe that the Legislature never intended such a result in drafting its definition of burglary and that such an interpretation would not be furthering the purposes of the Crimes Code.
The Minority of the Court further implies that the only summary offense committed by the juveniles in these cases was drinking intoxicants while under the age of 21 years. Such is far from the case. Serious criminal mischief
The Minority of our Court stresses the fact that summary offenses are not listed under the classes of crime as set forth in § 106(b) of the Crimes Code. Section 106 lists all classes of criminal offenses. Summary offenses are listed as one of the classes of these offenses. When used in their general sense, crimes are no differént
The hearing judge properly found in his adjudication that appellants committed a burglary and the adjudication is affirmed.
. There was no evidence that any of the contents of the coin machines had been taken other than sandwiches out of the food vending machine.
. The record reflects other charges against appellant but these were the subject of other hearings and are not pertinent to this case.
. Crimes Code, Act of 1972, Dec. 6, No. 334, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).
. Crimes Code § 106, supra.
. Crimes Code § 1105, supra.
. Crimes Code, § 105, supra.
. It is worthy of note that criminal mischief as a summary offense is still called “criminal” in the Crimes Code.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
Because I believe a complete examination of the statutory history of the Crimes Code
Our role in construing statutory provisions is well-established: “A court may not alter, under the guise of ‘construction’, the express language and intent of the Legislature. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 213 A.2d 277 (1965); Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Board of Finance & Revenue, 376 Pa. 476, 103 A.2d 668 (1954); Commonwealth v. One 1939 Cadillac Sedan, 158 Pa.Super. 392, 45 A.2d 406 (1946). While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed, 1 Pa. S. § 1928(b)(1) (Special Pamphlet 1973), the principle of strict construction does not permit a court to delete a clear and specific crime from the criminal code. A statute must be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions, making the entire statute effective and certain. Id. §§ 1921(a), 1922(2); see Lynch v. Owen J. Roberts School District, 430 Pa. 461, 244 A.2d 1 (1968); Whitemarsh Township Authority v. Elwert, 413 Pa. 329, 196 A.2d 843 (1964); Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899 (1955).” Commonwealth v. Pope, 455 Pa. 384, 388-89, 317 A.2d 887, 889 (1974).
To best determine the legislative intent regarding summary offenses, a comparison should be drawn between the Crimes Code as originally proposed and as enacted. An examination of the Proposed Crimes Code for
As late as 1971, this provision remained in the Crimes Code. See, Proposed Changes in the Criminal Law of Pennsylvania, Report to the Pennsylvania Bar Association House of Delegates, January 26-30, 1971. The Crimes Code as enacted, however, revised this section. While § 106 of the Crimes Code
In amending § 106, the legislature changed the punishment for a summary offense from a fine to a term of imprisonment, and specifically eliminated the provision that “[a] summary offense does not constitute a crime and conviction of a summary offense shall not give rise to any legal disadvantage . . . . ” Had the legislature intended only to impose a term of imprisonment and not to include a summary offense within the definition of a “crime”, it would not have eliminated this provision. Thus, by authorizing a term of imprisonment for a summary offense, and by continuing to define a “crime” as an offense for which a term of imprisonment is authorized, the legislature clearly intended to identify a summary offense as a “crime”.
Finally, Professor Toll supports this reading of the Crimes Code: “Although not listed among the ‘classes of crime’ listed in subsection (a), summary offenses are nevertheless ‘crimes’ under the Code, because a ‘crime’ is defined in subsection (a) as ‘an offense defined by this title for which a sentence of death or of imprisonment is authorized.’ ” Toll, Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated, § 1.06 at 23 (1974). Thus, I concur.
. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq.
. Proposed Crimes Code for Pennsylvania, Joint State Government Commission (1967).
. Section 1.07 of the Proposed Crimes Code now corresponds to § 106 of the Crimes Code.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
Appellants, both juveniles, were adjudicated delinquent after being found guilty of conspiracy, burglary, and criminal mischief. The evidence, which is not disputed at this time, established that appellants at approximately 6:00 p.m. on November 24, 1974 entered without permission a building used for manufacturing purposes. Within the building, the boys illegally consumed alcoholic beverages and also smashed open a cigarette machine and a vending machine. Appellant Golden who was caught by a guard inside the building implicated appel
The only conviction challenged by appellants on appeal is the one for burglary. The lower court found appellants guilty of burglary because they entered the building with the intent to illegally consume alcoholic beverages and commit acts of criminal mischief therein. Consumption of alcoholic beverages by persons under the age of 21 is a summary offense. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6308 (1973). Because the amount of damage to the vending machines did not exceed $500.00, the criminal mischief involved also constituted only a summary offense. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a) (2). Counsel for appellants argued to the lower court that entry into a building with the mere intent to commit summary offenses therein was not sufficient criminal intent to justify a conviction for burglary under the present Crimes Code. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq. '(1973). The lower court ruled against appellants on this issue and the only question raised on appeal is whether entry into a building with the intent to commit a summary offense therein constitutes the offense of burglary.
“Burglary at common law [was] the breaking and entering, in the nighttime, of the dwelling house of another, with intent to commit a felony therein.” 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure 24 (1957). The crime was one quite serious in nature and a convicted burglar could expect to “suffer death, without benefit of clergy.” Hackett v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. 95, 98 (1850). Statutory revisions enlarged the scope of the crime so that un
The present Crimes Code
It has been observed by one authority that “[i]n view of the fact that theft offenses involving less than $2,000 have now been reduced to misdemeanors [see § 3903 of the Crimes Code], it would not be consistent to confine the definition of burglary to entering a building to commit a felony.” Jarvis, Pennsylvania Crimes Code and Criminal Law, Discussion of § 3502 (1974). However, did the legislature intend to punish a person with the crime of burglary, a first degree felony, for merely entering a building to commit a summary offense?
It is apparent in § 106 that the general definition of crime is inconsistent with the specific classifications of crimes. Under these circumstances the Statutory Construction Act of 1972
Moreover, throughout the Crimes Code, under the different sections pertaining to homicide, assault, kidnap
The Crimes Code itself has a section on principles of construction which provides, inter alia:
§ 105. Principles of Construction
The provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this title and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.
Section 104 of the Crimes Code sets forth several purposes of the act. One of the purposes of the Crimes Code is “ [t] o safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment.” I believe that construing summary offenses as not being crimes would further this purpose. Entry into a building with the intent to engage in underage drinking or minor acts of mischief should not be a first degree felony with a possible term of imprisonment of twenty years. Burglary un
It is also a purpose of the Crimes Code “[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses, and to differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment.” Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 104(5) (1973). It is difficult for me to justify placing a person who entered a building with the intent to illegally drink alcoholic beverages or commit some other summary offense in the same category with one who entered the dwelling of another with the intent to murder, rape, or rob. But according to the majority’s definition of burglary, both persons are first degree felons.
In conclusion I am convinced that the rules of statutory construction as well as the purposes of the Crimes Code require the courts to distinguish between “crimes” and “summary offenses.” I would hold that the entry into a building with the intent to commit a summary offense therein is not burglary. Nevertheless, my holding which would reverse the lower court’s finding of burgla
. Act of June 24,1939, P.L. 872, § 901,18 P.S. § 4901 (1963).
. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 ct seq. (1973).
. § 106. Classes of offenses
(а) General rule. — An offense defined by this title for which a sentence of death or of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime. The classes of crime are:
(1) Murder of the first degree or of the second degree.
(2) Felony of the first degree.
(3) Felony of the second degree.
(4) Felony of the third degree.
(5) Misdemeanor of the first degree.
(б) Misdemeanor of the second degree.
(7) Misdemeanor of the third degree.
. Act of Nov. 25, 1970, P.L. 707, No. 230, added Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3, 1 Pa.S. § 1501 et seq.
. Why did the legislature draft such a broad definition of “crime” which would include summary offenses but then organize the classes of crime to exclude summary offenses? My research has disclosed that the Crimes Code definition of “crime” (as well as that for burglary) is word for word the same as the definition of “crime” (and burglary) set forth by the Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) in § 1.04. The Model Penal Code in that same section classifies crimes as felonies, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors, all of which carry a term of imprisonment. The Model Penal Code, however, does not have any category called “summary offenses” but instead has a fourth group of offenses called “violations”. Model Penal Code, § 1.04(5). A prison sentence may not be imposed for a violation although fine and/or forfeiture may be imposed. Id. Therefore, a violation is not a “crime" under the Model Penal Code, and an entry into a building to commit a violation would not be burglary. It appears to me that our Legislature adopted the Model Penal Code definition of “crime” but failed to adopt its “violation” category which carries with it no possible imprisonment. Instead, they adopted the “summary offense” category which like a violation is generally a minor offense but the legislature also provided for summary offenses the possibility of minimal imprisonment. This theory would explain the inconsistency of having summary offenses fall under the general definition of “crime” yet not be listed as a class of crime.
. See note 7 infra.
. Unfortunately these lofty purposes of the Crimes Code, to guard against disproportionate punishment and to rationally differentiate between offenders, are stifled by the broad coverage of several of the offenses in the Crimes Code. For example, there is no statutory differentiation in punishment or treatment between one who breaks into a dwelling occupied by people with the intent to commit acts of violence therein and one who breaks into a warehouse to steal a case of beer. Even under my restrictive interpretation of “crime”, both acts would constitute burglary because a theft where the amount involved is less than $50.00 is a third degree misdemeanor, which is a crime. Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903(b)(2) (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Carter, 236 Pa.Super. 376, 384 n. 3, 344 A.2d 899, 900 (1975) (dissenting opinion by HOFFMAN, J.). Similarly, it is difficult to justify the legislative decision to make one who steals property of another valued at less than $50.00 guilty of a third degree misdemeanor while at the same time making one who causes loss to another by criminal mischief in the amount of less than $500.00 guilty of only a summary offense. Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3304(b), 3903(b)(2) (1973).