Aрpellant, Rebecca Whitener, appeals the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to D. I. W.
D. I. W. was placed in thе emergency custody of the DeKalb County Family & Children Services (DFCS) at birth by court order on September 13, 1991. The DFCS’ initial concerns were that Whitener wаs mentally unable to provide care to her child and that her brother, a convicted child molester, lived in the home she intended to return tо upon her release from the hospital. On December 2, 1991, the juvenile court adjudicated D. I. W. deprived in that Whitener, among other things, lackеd the abstract thinking skills necessary to understand that her brother’s presence in the home represented potential danger to D. I. W. On September 8, 1993, the juvenile court extended DFCS’ custody of D. I. W. to July 13, 1995, because of Whitener’s failure to satisfy the goals established in DFCS’ plans directed at the rеunification of her family. Whitener concurred in the extension.
On November 19, 1993, DFCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights under provisions of OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (B) (i) for medically verifiable deficiency of Whitener’s mental or emotional health of such a duration or nature which rendered her unable to provide adequately for D. I. W.’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition needs. The juvenile court heard the petition оn February 9, 1994, and ordered Whitener’s parental rights terminated eight days later. 1 This appeal followed.
*645 1. Whitener first contends that there was insufficient evidence to terminatе her parental rights in that neither parental misconduct nor inability was shown by clear and convincing evidence.
“ ‘The termination of parental rights under OCGA § 15-11-81 is a two-step process. First, the court determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence of parental miscоnduct or inability. Second, the court considers whether termination is in the best interest of the child.
In the Interest of G. K. J.,
Parental misconduct or inability is determined by finding: 1) that the child is deprived; 2) that the lack of proper parental сare or control is the cause of the deprivation; 3) that such child’s deprivation is likely to continue or will not be remedied; and 4) that cоntinued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional or moral harm to the child. OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A). Among the factors relevant to a child lacking proper parental care and control is a medically verifiable deficiency of the parent’s mental or emotional health of such duration or nature as to render the parent unable to provide adequately for the child’s needs. OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (B) (i). Another is а parent’s unjustifiable failure to significantly comply with a court-ordered plan to reunite the child with the parent for one year or longer. OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (C) (iii).
In the case sub judice, an unappealed order entered by the juvenile court on December 2, 1991, established that D. I. W. was a deprived child within the meaning of OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (i). See
In the Interest of B. P.,
While Whitener argues that she would never give her brother access tо D. I. W. in the future, “[t]he decision as to a child’s future must rest on more than positive promises which are contrary to negative past fact.”
In the Interest of J. L. Y.,
In light of the foregoing, we find the evidence clear and convincing that D. I. W. is currently deprived due to parental inability, that such deprivation will likely continue in the future or will not be remedied, and that continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional or morаl harm to the child.
“In considering the child’s best interest, the trial court may consider the child’s need for a stable home situation and the detrimental effects of prolonged foster care. Further, the Juvenile Code is to be liberally construed toward the protection of the child whose well-being is threatened.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of M. R., supra at 464. In addition to his testimony referenced above, Dr. Ritz testified that Whitener would nеed three to five years of treatment before she could begin to address parenting issues. He was unable, however, to say that she would rеspond to treatment. There is no evidence in the record below that Whitener completed any of the court-approved DFCS goals developed to facilitate family reunification. She failed to appeal the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removing the child from his home. As a consequence, she is now bound thereby. In the Interest of B. P., supra. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding thаt the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child was also authorized by clear and convincing evidence. Since further insecurity regarding D. I. W.’s parental situation would likely be detrimental to him, we find that the court below did not abuse its discretion by terminating Whitener’s parental rights to D. I. W.
2. In her second enumeration, Whitener contends that the court abused its discretion in finding that the DFCS made reasonable efforts to make it possiblе to return the child to the home. We do not *647 reach this enumeration of error in light of our disposition of Division 1.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The juvenile court terminatеd the parental rights of D. I. W.’s father, Daniel Disharoon, for failure to file a petition to legitimate the child within thirty days of the DFCS’s petition to terminate parental rights and for neglecting and abandoning the child for a period of one year immediately preceding the filing of such petition.