IN THE INTEREST OF: C.E.H., a Minor Appeal of: C.E.H.
No. 1522 MDA 2016
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
July 21, 2017
170 A.3d 1152 | 2017 PA Super 234
LAZARUS, J.
Submitted June 5, 2017
Moreover, upon review of the certified record, we cannot conclude that the evidence tending to show that Appellant intentionally or knowingly injured CO Bonenberger was so overwhelming as to overcome the prejudice caused by the erroneous jury instruction.2 The testimony offered by the Commonwealth does not clearly support the conclusion that Appellant acted intentionally or knowingly. Rather, it tends to show that Appellant merely fell backwards onto CO Bonenberger while he was being restrained by two other officers. See N.T. Trial, 7/15/13, at 107-114, 122. Indeed, CO Bonenberger herself testified as to the mechanism of her injury, stating, “[a]ctually, we went all crashing down. I had three men fall on top of me.” Id. at 122.
Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the evidence of Appellant‘s guilt was so overwhelming that the outcome of the trial would not have been different if trial counsel had objected to the erroneous jury charge. In light of the nature of legal error in question, and the verdict rendered herein, we find that Appellant has established that trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness had an adverse impact on the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the PCRA court. As the particulars of this case raise a question of law, we do not need to remand this matter to the PCRA court for an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 874 A.2d 12, 23 (2005) (reversing Superior Court order to remand to PCRA court for further evidentiary hearing since, regardless of facts found on remand, issue raised a question of law). Rather, we remand for a new trial.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Ann Targonski, Assistant District Attorney, Sunbury, for Commonwealth, appellee.
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:
C.E.H., a minor, appeals from a dispositional order entered following his adjudication of delinquency for simple assault1 (M2), aggravated assault2 (F1), obstructing administration of law or other governmental function3 (M2), and two counts of disorderly conduct (M3).4 C.E.H. was placed on probation under the supervision of the Northumberland County Juvenile Court, ordered to participate in all treatment programs deemed necessary and appropriate, and directed to complete 20 hours of community service. After careful review, we affirm.
On July 27, 2015, Chief Officer Todd Owens and Officer Matthew Dillman responded to a disturbance at 437 East Water Street, Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania, where they took C.E.H.‘s stepfather, J.F.S., into custody. While attempting to take Stepfather into custody, C.E.H. became irate. C.E.H. ran around the scene shouting obscenities at the police, jumped on the back of Chief Officer Owens, and impeded the police from escorting Stepfather to the police cruiser.
During C.E.H.‘s attempt to impede Stepfather‘s escort to the police cruiser, Gary Hixon intervened. Hixon is a former member of the Mt. Carmel rescue squad for which he had served for eighteen years, currently serves on borough council, is a friend of Chief Officer Owens, and an acquaintance of Officer Dillman. On the day in question, Hixon was driving to his mother‘s house at 409 North Locust Street when he noticed people in the street at the scene of the incident. Hixon then exited his vehicle, observed C.E.H. “trying to get [Chief Officer Owens], like grabbing the officer from behind,” grabbed C.E.H., and pushed him away from the police. N.T. Adjudicatory Hearing, 8/17/2016, at 17. C.E.H. continued to direct obscenities at the police. The incident lasted approximately 45 minutes.
On August 17, 2016, the juvenile court heard testimony from four eyewitnesses, and adjudicated C.E.H. delinquent on five charges. Counsel for C.E.H. filed a timely notice of appeal and a
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Was the juvenile properly adjudicated delinquent on the offenses of simple assault, aggravated assault, obstructing administration of law or other govern-mental function, and two counts of disorderly conduct, based on a claim that the Commonwealth lacked sufficient evidence in establishing a finding of delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt?
C.E.H. argues there was insufficient evidence to prove his delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, with regard to the delinquency of simple and aggravated assault, C.E.H. argues there was insufficient evidence to establish an intent to attempt to cause bodily injury. Additionally, C.E.H. argues that he was precluded from developing a defensive theory of bias based on the relationships among Hixon, Chief Officer Owens, and Officer Dillman, because opposing counsel‘s objections to further questioning such relationships were sustained. Lastly, C.E.H. argues his claim was against the weight of evidence because the trial court relied on the testimony of less credible witnesses.
When reviewing a claim that the trial court erred in determining evidence was sufficient to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt, an appellate court must assess evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence most favorably to the verdict winner, Commonwealth v. Whitacre, 878 A.2d 96, 99 (Pa. Super. 2005). As long as the fact-finder could use such evidence and inferences therefrom to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is sufficient. Id. Further, the Commonwealth can meet its burden of reasonable doubt “by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. Only when “as a matter law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances,” is the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt not met. Id. Ultimately, the fact-finder resolves all questions of doubt and is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Newsome, 787 A.2d 1045, 1047-1048 (Pa. Super. 2001).
During the adjudication proceedings on August 17, 2016, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of four eyewitnesses. The four eyewitnesses provided consistent testimony that described a scene where C.E.H. contacted Officer Owens by jumping on his back and tugging at his waist area, while continuously shouting obscenities at law enforcement in an attempt to prevent the arrest of his Stepfather. The testimony of the four eyewitnesses corroborated these events.
A person is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any of the officers” listed in subsection (c) of section 2702.
C.E.H.‘s next issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that the Commonwealth presented evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he obstructed the administration of law or other governmental function and that his actions constituted disorderly conduct. A person obstructs the law “if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law...by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle.”
C.E.H. was also charged with two counts of disorderly conduct under sections 5503(a)(1) and (a)(4). A person is guilty under
C.E.H. also claims that the trial court prevented him from developing a defensive theory of bias based on the relationships among Hixon, Chief Officer Owens, and Officer Dillman. Specifically, he claims that the Commonwealth‘s objections to further questioning such relationships were improperly sustained during the adjudicatory hearings. Although the court
Lastly, C.E.H. argues his claim was against the weight of evidence because the trial court relied on the testimony of less credible witnesses. We find this claim waived.
An appellant must raise a weight of evidence claim with the trial court first to preserve appellate review of the claim. In Re J.B. v. Commonwealth, 630 Pa. 124, 106 A.3d 76, 95 (2014). Generally, a weight of evidence claim is “addressed to the discretion of the judge who actually presided at trial.” Id. Once a trial court judge rules on a weight of evidence claim in the first instance, an appellate court can then review the trial court‘s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Unlike Rule of Criminal Procedure 607, which requires a weight of the evidence claim be raised prior to sentencing or in a post-sentence motion, the Juvenile Rules of Court Procedure do not have any equivalent rule specifying how a juvenile adjudicated delinquent must present a weight of the evidence claim to preserve it for appellate review. In In Re J.B., supra, the juvenile presented a weight of evidence claim in his
Unlike the facts in J.B., however, here C.E.H. did not raise his weight claim in his
Order affirmed.
President Judge Gantman joins the Opinion.
Judge Platt concurs in the result.