In the Interest of B.G.C., A Child, C.C., Natural Mother, Appellant. In the Interest of B.G.C., D.O.B.: 02-08-91, A Minor Child, R.D. and J.D., Appellants. D.S., Intervenor-Appellee.
Nos. 91-476, 92-49
Supreme Court of Iowa
Sept. 23, 1992
Rehearing and Stay Denied Nov. 20, 1992
As Corrected Oct. 15, 1992. As Revised May 17, 1993.
496 N.W.2d 239
Gary L. Robinson of Klinger, Robinson, McCuskey & Ford, Cedar Rapids, for R.D. and J.D.
Richard Boresi of King, Smith & Boresi, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for B.G.C.
M. Kathryn Miller and Onita Mohr, Des Moines, and Leticia L. Valdes, Legal Intern, for amicus curiae Youth Law Center.
LARSON, Justice.
This case is, we observe thankfully, an unusual one. It involves the future of a baby girl, B.G.C., who was born on February 8, 1991. Her mother, Cara, who was not married, decided to give up the baby for adoption and signed a release of parental rights as provided by
Cara moved to set aside the termination, asserting that her release was defective for several reasons. She also asserted, for the first time, that the real father was “Daniel,” not Scott. She informed Daniel that he was the father of her child, and Daniel intervened in the adoption proceeding to assert his parental rights. The juvenile court denied Cara‘s motion to set aside the termination of her parental rights, and she appealed.
In the meantime, the adoption case proceeded. The district court found that Daniel was in fact the real father, that he had not released his parental rights, and that he had not abandoned the baby. The court denied the adoption and ordered the baby to be surrendered to Daniel. R.D. and J.D. appealed and obtained a stay of the district court‘s order transferring custody. The baby has remained in the custody of R.D. and J.D. virtually from the time of her birth.
The court of appeals reversed the termination of Cara‘s parental rights and remanded the case to the juvenile court. We granted further review of that decision and consolidated it with R.D. and J.D.‘s appeal in the adoption case.
We agree with the court of appeals that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to rule on Cara‘s motion to vacate the order terminating her parental rights and conclude that the court erred in refusing to resolve the motions on their merits. The termination case must therefore be remanded for further proceedings. We agree with the district court in the adoption case that Daniel proved he was the father, that he had not abandoned the baby, and that the adoption proceeding was therefore fatally flawed. Custody of the baby is ordered to be transferred to Daniel.
As tempting as it is to resolve this highly emotional issue with one‘s heart, we do not have the unbridled discretion of a Solomon. Ours is a system of law, and adoptions are solely creatures of statute. As the district court noted, without established procedures to guide courts in such matters, they would “be engaged in uncontrolled social engineering.” This is not permitted under our law; “[c]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers more advantages.” In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1977).1 We point out that this case does not invalidate an adoption decree. Adoption of the baby was denied by the district court because the father‘s rights were not terminated.
I. Termination of Cara‘s Parental Rights.
Under
[a]n adoption petition shall not be filed until a termination of parental rights has been accomplished except in the following cases:
No termination of parental rights is required if the person to be adopted is an adult. - If the stepparent of the child to be adopted is the adoption petitioner, the parent-child relationship between the child and the parent who is not the spouse of the petitioner may be terminated as part of the adoption proceeding by the filing of that parent‘s consent to the adoption.
The adoption petition alleged that the parental rights of Cara and Scott had been terminated, although, of course, it did not allege the termination of Daniel‘s parental rights because he was not identified as the father at that time.
Cara‘s motion to vacate her release of custody asserted that the release was procured by fraud, coercion, and misrepresentations of material fact. See
The juvenile court did not pass on the merits of Cara‘s motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because a petition for adoption had been filed at the time Cara filed her posttrial motions. See
A. Juvenile court jurisdiction.
If an order is issued [terminating parental rights], the juvenile court shall retain jurisdiction to change a guardian or custodian and to allow a terminated parent to request vacation of the termination order if the child is not on placement for adoption or a petition for adoption of the child is not on file. The juvenile court shall grant the vacation request only if it is in the best interest of the child.
(Emphasis added.)
Considering the substance of Cara‘s “Request to Revoke Release of Custody or Vacate Orders,” we consider it as a motion for new trial. See Kagin‘s Numismatic Auctions v. Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979) (“We look to the substance of a motion and not to its name. . . .“). Cara‘s motion was filed within the ten days provided by
Under this interpretation of
This court routinely remands cases in which a notice of appeal is filed, prematurely, while posttrial motions are pending. See, e.g., Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc. v. Igram, 319 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Iowa 1982); Loudon v. Hill, 286 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Iowa 1979). See generally
We believe
In interpreting a statute, one of the considerations is the practical effects of a particular interpretation. If the filing of an adoption petition divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction to rule on new-trial motions, this would normally require an appeal to this court and a limited remand back to the juvenile court to rule on the pending mo-
In re Adoption of M.M.B., 376 N.W.2d 900, 902 (Iowa 1985), must be distinguished because that case did not involve a challenge to the termination order within the ten days provided by
We agree with the court of appeals that the juvenile court did not lose jurisdiction to rule on Cara‘s posttrial motions.
B. Interpretation of section 600A.4. Under
[a] release of custody:
. . . .
d. Shall be signed, not less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child to be released, by all living parents.
(Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that Cara‘s release did not satisfy the seventy-two-hour requirement of
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 2, an agency or a person making an independent placement may assume custody of a minor child upon the signature of the one living parent who has possession of the minor child if the agency or a person making an independent placement immediately petitions the juvenile court designated in
section 600A.5 to be appointed custodian and otherwise petitions, either in the same petition or within a reasonable time in a separate petition, for termination of parental rights undersection 600A.5 . Upon the custody petition, the juvenile court may appoint a guardian as well as a custodian.
(Emphasis added.)
Again, the statute is not clear. Does
We believe that subsection 3, by streamlining the procedure for obtaining custody, simply allows a person to be granted temporary custody without following all of the requirements of subsection 2, and without the necessity of seeking out absent, and perhaps unknown, fathers. Granting of temporary custody without the formal requirements of subsection 2, however, does not amount to a release of parental rights. Such a release is still required to follow the formal requirements of
We do not suggest that a mother cannot waive the seventy-two-hour requirement of
Waiver is generally a fact question, but the juvenile court made no findings with
We agree with the court of appeals that the case should be remanded to the juvenile court for its ruling on the combined motions by Cara to set aside the termination order and to revoke her consent, as well as on R.D. and J.D.‘s claim of waiver. We discuss the law applicable to the termination case for the benefit of the juvenile court in its further proceedings.
C. The constitutional argument. Cara argues that
The interest of parents in their relationship with their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982) (state “must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures [in termination cases]“).
Our statutes are accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality, Heritage Cablevision v. Marion County Bd. of Supervisors, 436 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Iowa 1989); and the burden of proving the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt is on the party challenging it. Id.
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question becomes what process is due. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600-01, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 (1972).
The termination statute itself provides additional safeguards.
It is true, as R.D. and J.D. point out, that the statute does not require that the signing party be “fully informed,” nor does it require that the parent be advised that no release of custody is valid if obtained within seventy-two hours of the birth. While these factors bear upon the voluntariness of a release, the failure of
We conclude that
II. The Adoption Case.
R.D. and J.D., as prospective adoptive parents petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Daniel, the “second” father. The district court heard the petition for termination in conjunction with its hearing on the petition for adoption. The district court therefore acted in a joint role as juvenile court and district court. According to the order of Judge Kilburg, the adoption proceedings by J.D. and R.D. were fatally defective because Daniel es-
R.D. and J.D. challenge this ruling on the grounds that (1) the best interests of the child dictate that she remain with R.D. and J.D., (2) Daniel did not prove his paternity, and (3) he had abandoned the baby.
A. Best interests of the child. The argument that the best interests of the baby are best served by allowing her to stay with R.D. and J.D. is a very alluring argument. Daniel has had a poor performance record as a parent. He fathered two children prior to this child, a son, age fourteen, and a daughter born out of wedlock, now age twelve. The record shows that Daniel has largely failed to support these children financially and has failed to maintain meaningful contact with either of them.
In contrast, as the district court found, R.D. and J.D. “have provided exemplary care for the child [and] view themselves as the parents of this child in every respect.”
What R.D. and J.D. ask us to do, however, is to bypass the termination requirements of chapter 600A and order the granting of the adoption without establishment of any of the grounds for termination specified in
Their argument is that, although Daniel was not a party to the original termination hearing under chapter 600A (in which Scott was named as father), his rights could, and should, have been terminated by the court in the chapter 600 adoption proceeding. Under chapter 600, they argue, specific grounds for termination need not be established; the best interest of the child determines the issue of termination in an adoption case. We do not believe that our law is capable of this interpretation. Whatever our adoption law was prior to 1976, it is clear that since 1976 termination of parental rights “shall be accomplished only according to the provisions of this division [now chapter 600A].” 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1229, § 3 (now
The intention of the legislature to link the termination provisions of chapter 600 and 600A is apparent from the fact that the same 1976 Act that made chapter 600A the exclusive vehicle for termination also amended the adoption statute, ch. 600, to require a termination of parental rights prior to the filing of an adoption petition. 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1229, § 12 (now codified in
The general rule is that
[t]he state cannot interfere with the rights of natural parents simply to better the moral and temporal welfare of the child as against an unoffending parent, and, as a general rule, the court may not consider whether the adoption will be for the welfare and best interests of the child where the parents have not consented to an adoption or the conditions which obviate the necessity of their consent do not exist. However, where a parent by his conduct forfeits the right to withhold consent, but nevertheless contests the adoption, the welfare of the child is the paramount issue.
2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 67, at 491 (1972).
Our case law is in accord with this view; statutory grounds for termination must be established in addition to establishing the child‘s best interests in order to terminate. In re L.H., 480 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Iowa 1992); In re B.L.A., 357 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1984).
We agree with the district court that under
B. Paternity. R.D. and J.D. argue that Daniel should not have prevailed in the adoption case because he failed to establish
Paternity must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Marriage of Schneckloth, 320 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Iowa 1982); Moody v. Christiansen, 306 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Iowa 1981). Within days after Cara signed her release she stated in an affidavit supporting her motion to vacate the termination that Daniel, not Scott, was the father. This was supported by blood tests, which showed a 99.99% probability that Daniel was the father and a 0% chance that Scott was the father.
We agree with the district court that, based largely on the result of the blood tests, Daniel proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is the father of the baby.
C. Abandonment. R.D. and J.D. contend that the court should have terminated the parental rights of Daniel on the ground that he had abandoned the child (one of the grounds for termination under chapter 600A). We agree with the district court that the evidence falls short of establishing abandonment.
While it is true that Daniel has not shared in any of the expenses in connection with the birth, he was never requested to do so. Nor was there any need to pay the expenses until he learned that the child was his. Abandonment is defined as the relinquishment or surrendering of parental rights and includes both the intention to abandon and the acts by which the intention is evidenced.
Abandonment must be shown by clear and convincing proof.
We agree with the district court that abandonment was not established by clear and convincing evidence. In fact, virtually all of the evidence regarding Daniel‘s intent regarding this baby suggests just the opposite: Daniel did everything he could reasonably do to assert his parental rights, beginning even before he actually knew that he was the father.
III. Conclusion.
We empathize with the district court, which observed that:
The court had an opportunity to observe [R.D. and J.D.] at the time of hearing and the court is under no illusion that this tragic case is other than an unbelievably traumatic event. . . . While cognizant of the heartache which this decision will ultimately cause, this court is presented with no other option than that dictated by the law in this state. Purely equitable principles cannot be substituted for well-established principles of law.
The parental rights of this father may not be dismissed without compliance with our termination statute, and the court correctly ordered that the petition for adoption be dismissed. We therefore affirm the adoption case.
In the termination case, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals, reversing
In termination case, No. 91-476, DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT OF JUVENILE COURT REVERSED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. In adoption case, No. 92-49, JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
SNELL, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The evidence is sufficient to show abandonment of the baby by Daniel. The record shows he has previously failed to raise or support his other two children. He quit supporting his son, born in 1976, after two years. From 1978 to 1990 he saw him three times. He has another daughter whom he has never seen and has failed to support. He stated he just never took any interest in her. In every meaningful way, he abandoned them.
Daniel knew that Cara was pregnant in December 1990. He saw her in the building where they worked for the same employer. The child was born in February 1991. Having knowledge of the facts that support the likelihood that he was the biological father, nevertheless, he did nothing to protect his rights. The mother, Cara, who knew better than anyone who the father was, named Scott as the father. The legal proceedings logically and reasonably were based on these representations. The termination of parental rights as known to exist at the time were legally completed and an adoption process was commenced.
Daniel‘s sudden desire to assume parental responsibilities is a late claim to assumed rights that he forfeited by his indifferent conduct to the fate of Cara and her child. The specter of newly named genetic fathers, upsetting adoptions, perhaps years later, is an unconscionable result. Such a consequence is not driven by the language of our statutes, due process concerns or the facts of this case.
I would remand for termination of Daniel‘s parental rights based on abandonment and denial of Cara‘s motions. The intervention petition of Daniel in the adoption case should be dismissed on remand and the adoption proceed.