In the Interest of A.N.S., M.A.W., K.K.S., S.N.W., and A.E.S., Children v. .In the Interest of A.N.S., M.A.W., K.K.S., S.N.W., and A.E.S., Children v. .
Delivered and Filed: August 5, 2026
AFFIRMED
Mother appeals the trial court‘s order terminating her parental rights to her five children, A.N.S., M.A.W., K.K.S., S.N.W., and A.E.S.1 Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court‘s best interest determination under
BACKGROUND
The Department of Family and Protective Services became involved with Mother and her children, A.N.S., M.A.W., K.K.S., S.N.W., and A.E.S.,2 after receiving reports of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and negligent supervision. Corrina De La Rosa, the Department investigator assigned to the case, testified the Department initially received allegations involving sexual abuse of the oldest child, A.N.S., by a cousin while the family was living outside Texas. De La Rosa made initial contact with Mother, discussed the allegations, and provided resources for A.N.S.‘s mental health. De La Rosa testified that Mother did not address A.N.S.‘s mental health issues. She further testified that the family was living in a hotel room and that the Department had concerns about lack of transportation and unstable housing. There was further Departmental concern that the school-aged children were not in school.
Following this initial encounter, the Department received an additional referral alleging physical abuse by Mother. When De La Rosa responded to this second referral, she arrived at the hotel to find heavy police presence. Mother was detained by police while De La Rosa and other investigators spoke with the children. De La Rosa testified that Mother had left the children alone in the hotel room and that the hotel room was in disarray, smeared with food and trash, and had a foul odor. The youngest child, A.E.S., was in a heavily soiled diaper. During the investigation, the children reported that Mother had punched one-year-old A.E.S. in the stomach, twisted her arm, and slammed A.N.S.‘s head into an air conditioning unit. Mother denied the allegations. The children were referred to ChildSafe for forensic interviews.
The evidence showed the children entered care with substantial emotional and behavioral needs. A.N.S., the oldest child, experienced significant trauma-related emotional and behavioral issues throughout the case. She moved through multiple placements before eventually being placed in a residential treatment center in Austin. The testimony reflected ongoing mental-health struggles requiring intensive services and therapy. Likewise, S.N.W. moved through several unsuccessful familial placements before being reunited with her younger sisters in foster care.
The Department developed service plans for Mother and the fathers. Mother‘s plan required her to maintain stable housing and employment, complete parenting classes, participate in anger-management services, complete a psychological evaluation, engage in individual counseling, and otherwise demonstrate an ability to safely parent the children. Mother initially engaged in services and visited the children without incident. However, as the case progressed, she began to miss visits and resist efforts to help her complete the remainder of her service plan.
Michelle Villarreal, the legal caseworker assigned to the case, testified Mother never successfully completed all the services necessary to address the Department‘s concerns. Villarreal acknowledged Mother completed some services but testified Mother failed to demonstrate stability throughout the case. According to Villarreal, housing remained a persistent problem. Mother
The evidence also reflected concerns regarding Mother‘s mental health. Villarreal testified Mother was hospitalized for psychiatric reasons during the pendency of the case. Although the Department requested information concerning Mother‘s diagnosis, treatment, and discharge recommendations, Mother refused to provide the requested documentation. Villarreal testified the Department remained unable to assess whether Mother‘s mental-health concerns had been adequately addressed so that reunification was feasible.
Mother‘s visitation history was another significant concern. Villarreal testified Mother attended approximately forty of seventy-five virtual visits and twenty of seventy-five in-person visits. Although Mother blamed transportation difficulties and her move to Houston for many missed visits, Villarreal testified the Department attempted to facilitate visitation through both virtual and in-person options. Villarreal further testified that Mother consistently declined the Department‘s offered transportation assistance, until Villareal personally drove her from Houston to San Antonio for some visits.
The Department also remained concerned about Mother‘s ability to protect the children from future harm. Villarreal testified that the Department‘s concerns regarding physical abuse and neglect had never been fully alleviated. In fact, during the pendency of the case, the Department received a new report involving allegations that one of the children had been physically abused by Mother while placed with the maternal grandmother. Villarreal testified that the child reported the grandmother allowed Mother to live in the home and that both women physically abused her. As a result, the Department removed the child from that placement.
Mother testified on her own behalf. She disputed portions of the Department‘s evidence and maintained she loved her children and wanted reunification. Mother denied the allegations of abuse and neglect, claiming that A.N.S. had coerced the younger children into making them. Mother acknowledged that she sought in-patient mental health treatment during the pendency of this case. She claimed that she had not provided her caseworker with documentation regarding her hospitalization because she was unable to obtain her discharge papers.
Mother further testified that she had substantially complied with her service plan, had obtained employment and had recently secured housing. She further testified that her move to Houston and the Department‘s failure to timely provide transportation impeded her ability to visit the children and finish completing her service plan. She requested that the court allow her additional time to complete reunification efforts.
The trial court effectively denied the request for additional delay and found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings, engaged in endangering conduct, and constructively abandoned the children. See
Involuntary termination of parental rights requires the Department to prove both that the parent committed a predicate act under
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting termination, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the trial court‘s finding. See A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630–31; J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We resolve disputed evidence in favor of the finding when reasonable and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.; In re J.L.B., No. 04-17-00364-CV, 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 1, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). If no reasonable factfinder could reach that
A factual sufficiency analysis, in comparison, requires us to weigh all the evidence—supporting, conflicting and contrary—to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding is true. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). If the contrary evidence is so significant that it prevents a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the finding, the evidence is factually insufficient. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014); In re M.T.C., No. 04-16-00548-CV, 2017 WL 603634, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). But when the evidence, viewed as a whole, permits a firm belief or conviction, we must defer to the factfinder‘s judgment. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009); C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26.
BEST INTEREST
In this case, Mother does not contest the trial court‘s findings regarding predicate grounds. Instead, she focuses her challenge on the best interest finding, arguing that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that termination of her parental rights is in her children‘s best interest. We therefore treat the unchallenged predicate grounds as binding and limit our review to the best interest determination. See A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 632; Interest of K.G.S., No. 04-25-00254-CV, 2025 WL 2408553, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 20, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
When considering the best interest of a child in the context of involuntary parental termination, a strong presumption favors preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). At the same time, the Texas Family Code presumes that prompt and
Courts evaluate best interest using a non-exclusive list of statutory factors.3
When evaluating a child‘s best interest, courts may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence along with the direct evidence. In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.); In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex.
A. The Children‘s Emotional and Physical Needs
The record reflects that all five children have significant emotional and physical needs stemming from physical abuse, neglectful supervision, and sexual abuse within the household. The evidence reveals that the children require considerably more than routine parenting. The children require substantial therapeutic and emotional support. All five children continue to participate in trauma-based therapy, and the Department remains concerned about issues stemming from the food insecurity, fear of abuse, and instability they experienced before removal.
A.N.S., the oldest child, experienced significant behavioral and mental-health issues during the case, resulting in multiple placement disruptions before ultimately being placed in a residential treatment center. While she is improving, she still struggles with substantial mental health and behavioral issues. M.A.W.‘s foster father testified that M.A.W. has required ongoing therapy and additional educational, medical, and dental attention since entering his care. The evidence showed that the three younger children likewise benefitted from structured environments, therapeutic services, and caregivers capable of consistently meeting their emotional and developmental needs.
The trial court could also consider Mother‘s testimony in evaluating whether she had demonstrated an ability to meet the children‘s needs. Although Mother expressed her love for the children and her desire to reunify with them, she offered little testimony demonstrating an
Given the children‘s ages, vulnerabilities, and trauma histories, the totality of the evidence permitted the trial court to reasonably conclude that they required caregivers capable of providing not only food, shelter, and supervision, but also safety, stability, therapeutic support, and informed parenting responsive to each child‘s emotional, psychological, and physical needs.
B. Present and Future Emotional and Physical Danger
The evidence also supports a determination that returning the children to Mother would expose them to continued emotional and physical danger. The Department became involved with this family after receiving allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglectful supervision. The Department was concerned with housing, transportation, and educational instability. When the Department became involved, it provided Mother with mental health resources for A.N.S., who was exhibiting signs of severe mental distress. However, Mother never sought treatment and continued to leave her remaining four children in A.N.S.‘s care.
In addition to her denial of the abuse allegations, Mother refused to acknowledge the underlying safety concerns. Mother testified that she disagreed with the Department‘s findings because she knew she had not abused the children and believed A.N.S. manipulated the younger children into making false accusations. She repeatedly maintained that A.N.S. influenced her siblings to say things that did not occur and continued to attribute the children‘s disclosures to A.N.S.‘s manipulation rather than to their own experiences. See D.N. v. Tex. Dep‘t of Family & Protective Services, No. 03-15-00658-CV, 2016 WL 1407808, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 8, 2016, no pet.) (considering father‘s denial of abuse and insistence that children were fabricating allegations of abuse in best interest analysis); see also In re H.S.V., No. 04-12-00150-CV, 2012 WL 3597211, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 22, 2012, pet. denied) (finding refusal to admit causing any physical harm to children probative of ability to protect children).
Mother likewise minimized the Department‘s concerns regarding A.N.S.‘s allegations of sexual abuse. Although Mother acknowledged that she knew allegations had been made, she testified that she believed one allegation had been recanted, was unaware the Department had reached a reason-to-believe finding concerning another allegation, and continued to distinguish
The evidence showed that many of the Department‘s safety concerns persisted throughout the case. These concerns were reinforced rather than alleviated as additional allegations of abuse arose during the pendency of the case. After the child S.N.W. was placed with the maternal grandmother, she reported that the grandmother had permitted Mother to reside in the home and that both Mother and the grandmother physically abused her, causing the child to be removed from the grandmother‘s care. See Interest of D.R.P., No. 04-21-00112-CV, 2021 WL 4555818, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 6, 2021, pet. denied) (considering history of abuse in best interest analysis).
Mother also experienced a psychiatric hospitalization four months before the hearing and failed to provide the Department with discharge information or documentation necessary to evaluate whether the concerns that led to the hospitalization had been adequately addressed and resolved. Mother claimed that she never provided the requested records because she had been “unable to retrieve” them. Such records are highly probative of Mother‘s ability to function safely as a parent, and her failure to provide them could be reasonably considered in evaluating the possibility of future danger to the children. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 363 (Tex. App.—
Viewed as a whole, the evidence permitted the trial court to conclude Mother had not developed the insight or protective judgment necessary to shield the children from future harm.
3. Mother‘s Parental Ability and Willingness to Effect Positive Change
The evidence also supports a determination that Mother failed to demonstrate meaningful behavioral change during the case. Although she completed many services, she failed to successfully complete the service plan in its entirety and to satisfy the requirements necessary to alleviate the Department‘s concerns for the children. The trial court was not required to measure Mother‘s progress by certificates of completion alone. Instead, it could evaluate whether those services translated into improved parenting abilities and greater protective capacity. See Interest of R.P., 708 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no pet.); In re A.C.B., 198 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (noting compliance with service plan does not preclude a finding that termination is in a child‘s best interest).
Mother‘s own testimony permitted the trial court to conclude that they had not. Although she described becoming more organized, Mother never testified that she learned to better recognize abuse, understand trauma, protect vulnerable children, or respond differently to the circumstances that resulted in removal. In fact, throughout her testimony, Mother continued to deny the abuse allegations, maintain that A.N.S. fabricated the abuse accusations, and insist that the younger children merely repeated what A.N.S. told them to say. In light of this testimony, the trial court could reasonably conclude Mother had not internalized the lessons the services were intended to teach and that Mother‘s partial compliance with services did not translate into the lasting
Further, housing and financial stability remained a persistent concern throughout the case. Mother moved to Houston during the case and resisted the Department‘s efforts to help her obtain housing. She did not demonstrate housing suitable for reunification for the eighteen months this case was pending. At trial, Mother testified that she had finally been able to secure a one bedroom residence approximately one week prior to trial. When asked where she and five children would sleep, Mother responded that they would all stay in the bedroom and eventually explained that she intended to use bunk beds.
Mother also acknowledged that her income was “probably not” enough to support five children, but that she would “figure it out” and “make it happen.” The trial court could reasonably distinguish Mother‘s sincere desire to regain custody from concrete evidence demonstrating she possessed the present ability to safely and consistently provide for and parent five traumatized children. See In re J.H.G., 313 S.W.3d 894, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (holding parent‘s vague plan for children‘s future relevant to best-interest analysis).
Significantly, Mother failed to consistently engage in visitation with the children. She missed half of the virtual visits offered and three-fourths of the in-person visits. She likewise failed to appear at a visit scheduled after one of her children had surgery. Although Mother attributed missed visits to communication problems, transportation difficulties, and her relocation to Houston, the Department offered virtual visits, arranged transportation assistance from Houston, and attempted to facilitate continued contact between Mother and the children. The trial court was
Overall, the entirety of the evidence supports the conclusion that Mother‘s partial compliance with services did not translate into the lasting behavioral changes necessary to ensure the children‘s safety and stability.
4. Stability of Proposed Placements and the Department‘s Permanency Plans
The evidence concerning the children‘s placements likewise supports the trial court‘s best interest finding. The children had been in the Department‘s care for approximately eighteen months by the time of trial. During that period, they began receiving therapy, educational assistance, medical care, and structured environments designed to address their trauma and developmental needs.
M.A.W. has lived with her foster family since the case began and has become strongly bonded with the family and views the placement as her home. The family wishes to adopt M.A.W. The younger children were likewise thriving in their placements and receiving services necessary to address their emotional and behavioral needs. The foster families work together to preserve sibling relationships through regular contact and visitation. A.N.S.‘s placement remains more complicated because of her trauma-related and mental health needs, but she is making progress,
In light of this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude termination would allow the Department to continue pursuing permanent placements for all five children while ensuring that they receive consistent, appropriate treatment for their needs. See In re A.M.M., No. 04-19-00806-CV, 2020 WL 2139308, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 6, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (indicating evidence the child is “thriving in the current placement” supported the trial court‘s best-interest determination).
By contrast, Mother requested additional time at trial to attempt to accomplish reunification. The trial court could reasonably conclude that, after approximately eighteen months of litigation, the children‘s need for permanence and stability outweighed Mother‘s request for further delay. See In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 548 (Tex. 2003) (noting that timely resolution of termination cases is essential to a child‘s well-being as delay in permanency can have significant adverse psychological effects).
5. Mother‘s acts and omissions
Finally, the trial court could consider Mother‘s conduct throughout the case. Mother points to evidence that the children were bonded with her, that visits were appropriate when they occurred, that she completed some services, and that transportation from Houston was difficult. Although that evidence is relevant and Mother clearly desires reunification, the trial court was not required to conclude those facts outweighed the remaining evidence. Such evidence showed Mother failed to maintain stable housing, failed to complete all services, missed a substantial number of visits, failed to provide information regarding her psychiatric hospitalization, and was the subject of additional abuse allegations during the pendency of the case. Viewed collectively,
Mother acknowledged the children had remained in care for a significant time and agreed it was her responsibility to remedy the conditions leading to removal. Yet, throughout her testimony, she consistently attributed the lack of reunification to external factors—including transportation and communication issues, the Department, her caseworker, and A.N.S.‘s alleged manipulation of the younger children. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Mother accepted responsibility in theory but failed to demonstrate the insight, accountability, and protective judgment necessary to safely parent the children. See In re J.C.B.G., No. 04-25-00675-CV, 2025 WL 4862158, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 17, 2025, no pet.) (finding that continued externalized blame supported an inference that mother had not fully addressed conduct that led to removal).
The trial court was entitled to weigh Mother‘s sincere expressions of love and commitment against her continued minimization of abuse allegations, her lack of a plan for future stability, her incomplete compliance with Department requests, her inconsistent visitation, and the evidence that significant safety concerns persisted throughout the case. Viewing the evidence under the appropriate legal and factual sufficiency standards and in light of the relevant Holley and statutory factors, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother‘s parental rights was in the children‘s best interest. As such, we conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court‘s best interest finding.
Mother further contends that the Department failed to sufficiently prove it made reasonable efforts to return the children to her as required by the Texas Family Code. Subsections 161.001 (f) and (g) require the trial court to make written findings describing the Department‘s reasonable efforts to return a child to her parents following removal.
We conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court‘s finding under subsections (f) and (g). The trial court‘s order contains a separate section titled “Reasonable Efforts to Return the Children.” In that section, the court found the Department made reasonable efforts but that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger remained in the home. First, the order specifically identified that the Department developed a family service plan tailored to the circumstances leading to the children‘s removal. Implementation of a family service plan is generally considered a reasonable effort to return a child to the parent. In re M.N.M., 708 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied). Additionally, the order indicated that the Department referred Mother to services, provided and paid for services, maintained contact with her throughout the case, facilitated transportation assistance for in-person visits, and explored a number of relative placements.
Mother focuses primarily on alleged shortcomings in the Department‘s transportation and housing assistance. But the question is not whether every reunification effort was successful or whether additional efforts could have been made. Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether the evidence supports the trial court‘s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts under the circumstances. See In re J.A.V., No. 04-25-00569-CV, 2026 WL 1970659, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—
The Department was not required to prove perfect efforts, only reasonable ones. On this record, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children to Mother and that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger prevented that return.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of termination is affirmed.
H. Todd McCray, Justice