In Re Zimmerman
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Lead Opinion
EN BANC OPINION REGARDING THE ALLOWANCE OF LATE CLAIMS IN CHAPTER 13 PROCEEDINGS
JO ANN C. STEVENSON, Bankruptcy Judge.I.Introduction.
This court has taken the unusual measure of sitting en banc to decide an unusual issue: whether late claims must be allowed in chapter 13 cases. This question gained attention as the result of another en banc decision, In re Hausladen, 146 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Minn.1992). That court made a facially appealing argument that lateness is not a basis for disallowance under
II.Factual Background.
This is a contest of legal theories; the facts of the cases are straightforward. In Zimmerman, the debtor commenced his chapter 13 proceeding on December 13, 1991. His plan of reorganization was confirmed on April 6, 1992. The state of Michigan was scheduled as a creditor, but failed to file a claim before the May 10, 1992 bar date. A late claim was filed by the Michigan Department of Treasury (the “Department”) on October 1, 1992 in the amount of $2,315.51 for withholding and single business tax liabilities to which the debtor objected.1 The only argument advanced by the Department of Treasury in support of allowing its claim is that this court should adopt the reasoning set forth in Hausla-den.
The Neuman chapter 13 case was filed on March 26, 1992 and the plan confirmed on June 22, 1992. The bar date for claims was set as August 16, 1992. On December 29, 1992 the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) filed a claim in the amount of $42,536.97. This claim was based upon a civil penalty assessed against debtor Larry Neuman as a responsible person for the failure of Star-Con, Inc. (a corporation in which he was an officer) to pay employment taxes. As in Neuman, the debtors objected to allowance of the claim on the basis of lateness. The Service raised Hausladen in defense of the claim, but it also asserted that certain fact issues exist as to whether the notice it received of the bankruptcy was sufficient to apprise it of the debtor’s relationship to Star-Con, Inc.2 At hearing counsel for the Service attempted to make an offer of proof as to this and other fact issues, but was not allowed to do so on the basis that such an offer was premature. Counsel was informed that if this court declined to adopt Hausladen the Service would have an opportunity to address the factual peculiarities of its case at a later date outside the en banc setting.
III.Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction exists in this matter under
In Hausladen the Minnesota en banc decision addressed the exact issue which now confronts this court: “[Whether a claim filed in a Chapter 13 case after the 90-day deadline set by
(a) A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.
(b) [I]f such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim . . . and shall allow such claim . . . except to the extent that — [the section continues by enumerating eight exceptions].
The Minnesota court read
(a) NECESSITY FOR FILING. An unsecured creditor or an equity security holder must file a proof of claim or interest in accordance with this rule for the claim or interest to be allowed....
(c) TIME FOR FILING. In a chapter 7 liquidation, chapter 12 family farmer’s debt adjustment, or chapter 13 individual debt adjustment case, a proof of claim shall be filed within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors called pursuant to § 341(a) of the Code....
The court stated that
This erroneous reading arose when the drafters of the newRule 3002 hastefully copied the substance of old Rule 302 without paying any attention to the major change in the underlying statute. Under the Bankruptcy Act, late claims were explicitly disallowed. Section 57(n) of the Act provided that . . . “[cjlaims which are not filed within six months after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors .shall not be al-lowed_”11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979) (emphasis added). The old Bankruptcy Rule implemented this time bar. However, a time bar does not expressly exist under the Code or Rules.
Hausladen, 146 B.R. at 559 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
The Minnesota court stated that the 90-day filing deadline established by
The reasoning of Hausladen parallels the reasoning of two cases decided after the Code was enacted but before the current Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were promulgated. See In re Corbett, 27 B.R. 442 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1983), rev‘d, 68 B.R. 480 (W.D.Mo.1984); In re Collins, 33 B.R. 203 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1983); but see In re Pennetta, 19 B.R. 794 (Bankr.D.Colo.1982); In re Foster, 11 B.R. 476 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1981); In re Walter, 10 B.C.D. 791, 29 B.R. 449 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1982) (late claims disallowed under old rule 13-302). During this transitional period, § 405 of the Reform Act of 1978 provided that the rules in effect when the Code became effective would continue to the extent the old rules were not inconsistent with the Code. These cases held that old Rule 13-302, which did not allow late claims, was inconsistent with
Courts ruling on the late filing of claims in chapter 13 cases in the wake of Hausla-den have split on whether that case is correctly decided. Only two cases to date have been decided on similar facts. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Judkins (In re Judkins), 151 B.R. 553 (Bankr.D.Colo.1993), follows Hausladen, while In re Bailey, 151 B.R. 28 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1993) takes the opposite view. Other cases not involving the factual scenario now before the court have also cited Hausladen favorably. Two such cases decided in the context of late claims filed by the IRS in chapter 7 cases are Lastra v. Blood Services Program of the American Red Cross (In re Corporacion de Servicios Medico-Hospitalarios de Fajardo, Inc.), 149 B.R. 746 (Bankr.D.P.R.1993), and In re Rago, 149 B.R. 882 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992). In re Stoecker, 151 B.R. 989 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993) also involved a late claim filed by the IRS in a chapter 7 ease but declined to follow Hausladen‘s reasoning. Other courts have cited Hausladen in passing but have failed to reach the Hausladen issue because of defects in the notice given to the creditor. See Internal Revenue Service v. Barton (In re Barton), 151 B.R. 110 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1993); Internal Revenue Service v. Cole (In re Cole), 146 B.R. 837 (D.C.Colo.1992).
Because the Hausladen interpretation of
V. The Interrelation of §§ 501, 502 and
One procedural requirement § 501 contemplates is a time limit in which to file claims. Section 501(b) states that “[i]f a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor’s claim, an entity that is liable to such creditor with the debtor . . . may file a proof of such claim.” Section 501(c) states that “[i]f a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor’s claim, the debtor or the trustee may file a proof of
Federal court rules are promulgated under the authority of an enabling statute. The enabling statute for the federal rules of bankruptcy procedure gives the United States Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules which do “not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”
More fundamentally, because of the rigorous adoption process there is a strong presumption that the rules correctly reflect the dichotomy between substantive law and procedural law. This distinction has historically proved troublesome because procedural rules often have substantive outcomes. For example, a failure to timely file an answer in a civil case may result in a default. While the default is procedurally mandated, the outcome of a default judgment against the defendant is most definitely substantive. The federal courts have wrestled with this conundrum since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the Supreme Court’s decision that same year of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). When the Supreme Court decided the Hanna case it intended to put to rest the practice of invalidating procedural rules where they overlapped into matters that were arguably substantive, except in the most compelling cases:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471, 85 S.Ct. at 1144. More recently the Court reaffirmed this holding in Burlington N. Railroad v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6, 107 S.Ct. 967, 970, 94 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987):
[T]he study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review before taking effect, see28 U.S.C. § 2072 , give the Rules presumptive validity under both the constitutional and statutory constraints.
While Erie and its progeny generally dealt with the conflict between federal procedure and state law, the same principles apply where a court is called upon to consider the validity of a federal rule of bankruptcy procedure. This is so because of
By virtue of this process, the Rules, once they have become effective, carry a presumptive validity: any possible intrusions upon substantive rights presumably have been thoroughly considered; whatever balancing is required between procedural objectives and substantive policy concerns, it may be assumed, already has been done.
The relationship between
It is upon this point that Hausladen commits its first error. In order to reach the conclusion that it did, the Hausladen court had to deal with the language of
The legislative history of § 501 explicitly recognized that the task of setting time limits would fall to the Bankruptcy Rules and further envisioned those time limitations as constituting a bar to the filing of late claims:3
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will set the time limits, the form, and the procedure for filing, which will determine whether claims are timely or tardily filed. The [former] Rules governing time limits for filing proofs of claims will continue to apply under section 405(d) of the bill. These provide a six-month bar date for the filing of claims.
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 351 (1977); S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 5787, 5847, 6307 (emphasis added). As the foregoing passage demonstrates, Congress envisioned the procedural aspects of claims filing being governed by the Bankruptcy Rules, not the Code.
Despite the clear language of both the legislative history and
With all due respect to that observation the plain reading ofFed.R.Bankr.P. 3002(a) requires this Court to reach the conclusion that that Rule emphaticallyrequires the filing of a proof of claim within the period prescribed under Fed. R.Bankr.P. 3002(c) as a condition precedent to allowance.
Bailey, 151 B.R. at 31, fn. 2. While
VI. The Semantics of
The second error which the Hausla-den court made resulted from an unfortunate double meaning which bankruptcy courts and practitioners commonly attach to the term “disallowed.” Although that term appears nowhere in
Section 502 . . . sets out eight specific grounds for disallowing claims. Tardy or late filing is not one of them. The statute says what the statute means: “the court . . . shall allow . . . claim[s] . . . except . . .”11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (emphasis added). The words are clear; “lateness is not a ground for disallowance undersection 502 of the Code.” In re Horner, 1991 WL 353297 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 21, 1991) (dicta); J. Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, § 7.24 at 7-59 (Sept. 1992 galley proof).
Hausladen, 146 B.R. at 559. This statement is accurate to the extent it describes the decision-making process under the specific provisions of
Another term frequently employed with regard to late claims is the word “bar.” This is perhaps more accurate when referring to late claims, as the effect of
All of this has been compounded by attorneys, judges and commentators who have carried forward the old Act habit of referring to the date set for filing claims as the “bar date.” Under Section 57(n) of the Act it was a bar date; however underSection 502 of the Code it is not. Continued mischaracterization of the time period has led to reliance on the words themselves without actually understanding them or what the statute actually says.
Id. Ironically, the confusion to which Hausladen alludes is the result not of the use of the term “bar date” to refer to the treatment of late claims under
VII. Policy Considerations.
Our holding that
Policy considerations strongly support the necessity of a bar date in bankruptcy reorganizations. As stated by the court in In re Nohle, 93 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988):
Bankr.R. 3002(c) is strictly construed as a statute of limitations since the purpose of such a claims bar date is “to provide the debtor and its creditors with finality” and to “insure the swift distribution of the bankruptcy estate.” See In re Johnson, 84 B.R. 492, 494 (Bankr.N.D.Oh.1988) [other citations omitted].
Although Nohle was decided in the chapter 12 context, the policy is equally applicable in chapter 13. A bar date is necessary so that a reorganization plan may more easily be formulated. Furthermore, a plan can only be administered after all claims against the estate have been filed. In chapter 13 cases, once the claims have been filed, the parties can determine with certainty the dividend percentage to be paid to holders of allowed unsecured claims. In some cases, application of the
VIII. Conclusion.
The only defense raised by the Department to the debtor’s objection in the Zimmerman case was Hausladen. Accordingly, under
Notes
. Counsel for the Department stated that it was not the Department’s practice to file late claims on the theory that the filing of a claim might operate as a waiver of the right of the Department to pursue claims for trust fund taxes (for example, unpaid withholding taxes for which the taxpayer was a responsible person) after the chapter 13 has been completed. As a consequence of its non-filing policy, other taxes for which no claim has been filed are normally written off. The claim filed in Zimmerman was submitted in derogation of this policy.
. This relationship apparently became clear only when the Service attempted to levy upon the debtors’ bank account to satisfy the Star-Con, Inc. liability.
. The court is aware that legislative history may be resorted to only when a statute is ambiguous. See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242-43, 109 S.Ct. at 1030-31. It is this court’s position that §§ 501 and 502, when read in conjunction with
. The Bailey court‘s entry in this verbiage derby is the word “expunge.” 151 B.R. at 32. With due respect, we do not find this term entirely satisfactory, either. “Expunge” carries with it the connotation that the claim will be removed from the court record, which is not accurate. The late filed claim will remain on the docket; it is merely ineffective as a claim because it cannot move forward toward allowance under
. The Supreme Court has referred to the timely claims allowance deadline as the “bar date” in the chapter 11 context. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).
. This result does not effect unsecured creditors who do not have notice of the bar date. The Sixth Circuit has stated that the claims of unsecured creditors who do not have notice of the bar date could not be disallowed because disal-lowance would result in an unconstitutional taking of their property. IRS v. Century Boat Co. (In re Century Boat Co.), 986 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir.1990); see also Barton, supra.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I agree with the en banc decision. The Bankruptcy Code and Rules must be harmonized unless it is impossible to do so.
The Supreme Court has also recently addressed untimely filed claims in a case involving the “excusable neglect” exception. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). In Pioneer Investment, the Court held a late filed proof of claim in a chapter 11 case may be allowed under certain circumstances by reason of “excusable neglect” under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1). Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1492. In its discussion, albeit dicta, the Court noted that the “excusable neglect” exception is restricted by the Bankruptcy Rules. “Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of [Bankruptcy] Rule 9006 enumerate those time requirements excluded from the operation of the ‘excusable neglect’ standard. One of the time requirements listed as excepted in Rule 9006(b)(3) is that governing the filings of proofs of claim in Chapter 7 cases. Such filings are governed exclusively by
Bankruptcy
. Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void unless—
(1) such claim was disallowed only undersection 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.