In re Zakari W.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Clark, Moll, Wilson
Syllabus
The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother claimed that the court erred in concluding that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of the statute (
The trial court properly concluded that the respondent mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation such that, within a reasonable time and considering the age and needs of the minor child, she could assume a responsible position in his life, as the evidence adduced at trial, including evidence of the mother‘s repeated, ongoing failure to comply with her specific steps and her refusal to cooperate with the Department of Children and Families, was sufficient to support the court‘s finding by clear and convincing evidence as required by
Argued March 19—officially released June 6, 2025**
Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile Matters, where the case was tried to the court, Conway, J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent mother).
Emily Barigye, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
CLARK, J. The respondent mother, Tali B., appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her minor child, Zakari W. (Zakari).1 The respondent claims that the court erred in concluding that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of
The following facts, as found by the trial court or as are undisputed in the record, and procedural history, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Zakari was born in December, 2022, to the respondent and Zion W. (Zion). Zakari was born premature at thirty-three weeks and, as a result, needed assistance with breathing and feeding. Zakari spent twenty-four days hospitalized following his birth before being discharged.
The Department of Children and Families (department) first became involved with the family on the day of Zakari‘s birth after receiving a referral from staff at the hospital where he was born, which reported that the respondent and Zion lacked stable and appropriate housing. Within one day of Zakari‘s birth, Kristine Florio, an investigative social worker for the department, attempted to meet with the respondent and Zion at the hospital. The respondent told Florio that she was not in a position to speak with her because she first needed to speak with Zion, who was asleep in the hospital room. Over the next few weeks, Florio had difficulty maintaining communication with the respondent; she had one brief telephone conversation with the respondent and communicated with her via text message approximately two or three times per week, but was unable to arrange an in-person meeting despite repeated attempts. In the telephone and text message communications, the respondent acknowledged that she lacked appropriate housing and indicated that she would like Zakari placed with a friend of her family upon discharge from the hospital. On or about December 27, 2022, Florio attempted to contact the respondent to discuss a plan for Zakari‘s discharge from the hospital but received no response.
Upon Zakari‘s discharge from the hospital, the petitioner filed a neglect petition and obtained an ex parte order of temporary custody that same day, and Zakari was placed in fictive kin2 foster care with a friend of the respondent‘s godmother. On January 6, 2023, the respondent and Zion failed to appear at the hearing on the preliminary order of temporary custody, and the court, Conway, J., sustained the order of temporary custody. The respondent and Zion also failed to appear at the plea hearing on the neglect petition on February 14, 2023, and the court, Conway, J., entered a default judgment and committed Zakari to the custody of the petitioner. On the same day, the court ordered specific steps to facilitate reunification, which required the respondent, inter alia, to keep all appointments set by the department and cooperate with all home visits, to let the department know where she resided and inform the department of any changes to her contact information, to participate in counseling, to submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow any recommended treatment, to obtain and maintain adequate housing and a legal income, to visit Zakari as often as permitted, and to cooperate with service providers recommended by the department.
Kelly Thibault, a social worker for the department, took over the respondent‘s case on or about January 27, 2023. The trial court found that “Thibault attempted to meet with [the respondent] to assess [her] needs and to offer reunification services. Although . . . Thibault had text communications
“Retrospectively, at the termination trial, the [respondent and Zion] chronicled their 2022 through 2023 living situation in their trial testimony. While pregnant [with Zakari] in 2022, the respondent . . . and [Zion] resided with [Zion‘s father and his family] . . . in Waterbury. At some point, in late 2022 but before Zakari‘s . . . birth, [the respondent and Zion] left [that] residence and moved in with [Zion‘s mother] in New Haven. [The respondent and Zion] left that home in February, 2023, because of [their] ongoing arguments with [Zion‘s] mother. The [respondent and Zion] next resided for two weeks with [Zion‘s grandmother] in Ansonia before moving in March, 2023, to [the home of the respondent‘s mother] in Bridgeport. The [respondent and Zion] left that home in May, 2023, due to arguments . . . with [the respondent‘s mother]. In May, 2023, [the respondent and Zion] lived with [the respondent‘s] grandmother in Bridgeport for two weeks [until June, 2023, when they moved back in with Zion‘s mother] in New Haven. [The respondent and Zion] moved out of [that] home in New Haven in September, 2023, due to ongoing arguments with [Zion‘s mother]. In October, 2023, [the respondent and Zion] went to stay with [Zion‘s] cousin in Ansonia. From October to December, 2023, [or] January, 2024 . . . Thibault credibly testified [that] she believed the [respondent and Zion] were living back and forth between Ansonia and Waterbury. [The respondent and Zion] testified that, in very early December, 2023, they moved [back in with Zion‘s father and his family in Waterbury] . . . .
“[T]he predominant means of communication between . . . Thibault and [the respondent] throughout 2023 was via text messaging. . . . Thibault credibly testified that there were periods of time when [the respondent] did not maintain even texting communication. [The respondent] credibly testified that in 2023 there were ‘gaps’ of time when [she and Zion] did not have operable cell phones and/or cell phone service. Reliable cell phone operability was most recently an issue for [the respondent] in April, 2024. At the time of the termination [of parental rights] trial, [the respondent] testified that she [had] just obtained a new cell phone and [that it was operable], and [that] she [was] in frequent contact with . . . Thibault. . . .
“In early 2023 . . . Thibault sought to refer [the respondent] for a substance abuse evaluation/assessment and . . . to submit to a mental health assessment. At the time, [the respondent was] residing in Bridgeport and therefore a referral was made for [her] to attend South West Behavioral Health Systems. The respondent . . . scheduled an intake . . . but [did not follow] through. . . .
“When . . . Thibault learned of [the respondent‘s] relocation to Ansonia, she discussed with [her] engaging with Behavioral Health Care. Once again, [the respondent] did not appear for the intake appointment. In January, 2024, the [respondent] informed . . . Thibault of [her] relocation [back] to the . . . Waterbury residence [of Zion‘s father]. . . . Thibault identified Waterbury based Wellmore Counseling Services [(Wellmore)] as an appropriate referral for [the respondent] and . . . informed [the respondent] about Wellmore‘s walk-in hours. It [was not] until mid-April, 2024, two days prior to the start of the . . . trial, that [the respondent] went to Wellmore . . . . Wellmore recommended [that the respondent] be assessed by Wheeler Clinic, [which] also offers walk-in hours. By the conclusion of the . . . trial on May 1, 2024, [the respondent] had yet to engage with Wheeler Clinic.
“The department attempted to assist [the respondent] with housing. [The respondent was] encouraged to call 211 and, as far back as March, 2023 . . . Thibault assisted [the respondent] in completing a referral for supportive housing services. . . . Thibault repeatedly tried to explain to and discuss with [the respondent] what [she] needed to do for supportive housing eligibility purposes and for reunification purposes. [The respondent] would respond that [she] would do what [she] needed to do but then not do it or become angry and abruptly end the discussion.
“[The respondent was] offered weekly supervised visitation with Zakari. Throughout 2023, [the respondent] reported a lack of reliable transportation. In March, 2023, [the respondent and Zion] resided in Bridgeport. . . . Thibault transported . . . Zakari to the [respondent‘s] Bridgeport residence [which was in the apartment building of the respondent‘s grandmother]. At the [respondent‘s] direction, apparently because the department was not welcome to come inside the apartment, the supervised visit took place in the building‘s lobby. Subsequently, the department was successful in having Quality Parenting Center (QPC), a supervised visitation and parenting coaching/education provider . . . transport Zakari to visits in Bridgeport. However, once [the respondent] relocated to an undisclosed New Haven address . . . QPC deemed [the respondent] no longer eligible for QPC transport [due to the proximity of New Haven to QPC‘s location in Hamden and the availability of public transportation between the respondent‘s home and QPC‘s Hamden location]. From June [through] August, 2023, the respondent . . . attended five out of twelve scheduled visits . . . . [She was] unsuccessfully discharged from QPC on August 18, 2023, [due to inconsistency in attending visitation appointments]. . . . Supervised parent-child visits
“In the latter part of 2023 . . . Thibault understood the [respondent] to be living back and forth between Ansonia and Waterbury. In January, 2024 . . . Thibault referred [the respondent] to ‘r Kids, an agency that provides professional supervised visitation services and parenting coaching/education services. [The respondent] failed to attend the January 22, 2024 ‘r Kids intake appointment. Nonetheless, from February 2, 2024, to April 16, 2024, (the first day of the termination [of parental rights] trial), there had been ten scheduled ‘r Kids supervised visits. [The respondent] attended seven supervised ‘r Kids visits . . . missed one visit due to [the respondent] oversleeping . . . missed [another visit] because [the respondent] did not confirm ahead of time [her] intent to attend, and . . . missed [a third visit due to a miscommunication between the respondent and the department‘s central transportation unit . . . driver].
“The department attempted to assist the respondent with transportation [for the supervised visits]. Throughout the case the [respondent was] offered bus passes. When public bus transportation was not feasible, the department was amenable to purchasing train tickets for [the respondent but was unable to do so because the respondent was] not forthcoming about [her] location and/or [was] too transient to know from what train station [she was] traveling to and from. . . . [From] early 2024 [through the time of trial] . . . the [respondent was] provided with department based . . . transportation to and from ‘r Kids.” (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted.)
On January 3, 2024, the petitioner filed a petition to terminate the respondent‘s parental rights, alleging that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Zakari and that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to
On May 17, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the petition. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with Zakari, that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation to encourage the belief that within a reasonable time she could assume a responsible position in Zakari‘s
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred in concluding that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.4 The respondent argues that because her “rehabilitation was dependent on housing, and because whether the respondent‘s housing was suitable for [Zakari] was easily determined within a short period of time, the trial court erred in determining [that] the evidence was sufficient to terminate [her] parental rights . . . .” The petitioner argues to the contrary that the respondent faced “many obstacles to reunification with Zakari [that] spanned beyond housing and remained unaddressed at the time of trial,” and that the court properly considered all of the relevant factors in determining that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate. We agree with the petitioner.
The following legal principles and standard of review govern the respondent‘s claim. “In the adjudicatory phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding,5 the court must determine whether one of the . . . statutory grounds that may serve as a basis for termination of parental rights exists. . . . Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of [the] statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to
“Personal rehabilitation as used in [
“A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court‘s factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in
In the present case, our careful review of the record leads us to conclude that the court‘s determination that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation is well supported by the evidence. The respondent‘s specific steps required her to obtain adequate housing, to keep the department informed about where and with whom she resided, and to “cooperate with home visits, announced or unannounced . . . .” As the court found, the respondent was transient from the time of Zakari‘s birth in December, 2022, until December, 2023, or January, 2024, around the time of the filing of the petition. Thibault testified that for most of that time the respondent refused to provide her with the address of her residence or the names of people with whom she resided but, instead, would only tell her in which town she was living and that she was staying with “family or friends.” Although the respondent testified that she moved to the Waterbury residence in early December, 2023, Thibault testified that the respondent did not inform the department of the move or provide the address until the end of January, 2024.
In addition, despite the respondent offering the Waterbury residence as a permanent home for Zakari, there was evidence in the record that called into question the permanency of that arrangement. As the court noted in its memorandum of decision, the respondent and Zion previously moved out of the Waterbury residence shortly before Zakari‘s birth, and the respondent did not provide a plausible explanation why they were welcome to reside there permanently at the time of trial but not at the time of Zakari‘s birth. Moreover, Thibault testified that, as of the first day of trial, the respondent still had not allowed her inside the residence to assess whether it was a suitable home. As the court found, although “the [respondent] testified that [she] understood the need to permit the department access to any residence proffered as a suitable home for Zakari,” Thibault was “denied access to the [Waterbury residence] by the respondent . . . allegedly because [Zion‘s
The respondent‘s specific steps also required her to “visit [Zakari] as often as permitted,” but the evidence indicates that the respondent repeatedly missed scheduled visits. A social study submitted by Thibault in support of the termination petition, which was admitted into evidence, indicates that the respondent attended only six of seventeen weekly visits that were scheduled at the department‘s New Haven office. Thibault testified that, when the department referred the respondent to QPC for visitation and parent coaching, she was unsuccessfully discharged after attending only five of twelve scheduled visits. Thibault further testified that, when the department referred the respondent to ‘r Kids for visitation services after she moved to the Waterbury residence, she failed to attend the intake appointment and then missed three of ten scheduled visits. As Thibault testified, the department took various steps to address the respondent‘s transportation issues, including transporting Zakari to Bridgeport so that the respondent could visit with him close to home, arranging to provide the respondent with bus passes and train tickets, and providing transportation to and from visits via the department‘s centralized transportation unit. Despite these efforts, the respondent continued to miss scheduled visits with Zakari throughout the pendency of the case.
Thibault further testified that the respondent‘s lack of cooperation with the department and failure to engage in recommended services prevented the department from fully assessing the respondent‘s needs. Thibault testified that the respondent had reported feeling depressed and was concerned about possible postpartum depression. The respondent‘s specific steps required her to “[t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals” and indicated that those goals were “[to be determined] upon further assessment.” In addition, the specific steps required the respondent to “[s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment . . . .” Thibault testified that between March, 2023, and January, 2024, she referred the respondent to several different service providers depending on where the respondent was living at the time, but the respondent repeatedly failed to attend her intake appointments. During her testimony, the respondent acknowledged that she did not engage with any of the recommended service providers until four days before the first day of trial when she went for an initial assessment at Wellmore, which referred her to Wheeler Clinic. Although Wheeler Clinic offers walk-in hours, the respondent acknowledged that she had not followed up on that referral as of the conclusion of the trial.
The respondent‘s specific steps also required her to “[k]eep all appointments set by [the department] . . . .” Thibault testified, however, that the respondent attended only one of three scheduled administrative case reviews, which are held to discuss the progress of the case and explain the department‘s expectations with respect to the reunification plan. Thibault further testified that when she attempted to discuss with the respondent the importance of engaging with recommended services, the respondent would resist those efforts by either stating that she did not need the services or abruptly ending the conversation. The social study submitted by Thibault
We disagree with the respondent‘s contention that the court could not conclude that she failed to rehabilitate merely because she claimed to have obtained permanent housing by the time of trial. First, the court was not required to credit the respondent‘s testimony concerning the suitability or permanency of her residence at the time of trial. On the contrary, given the respondent‘s long history and pattern of transience throughout the period of the department‘s involvement in the case and the respondent‘s continuing refusal to grant the department access to her residence at the time of the trial, there was more than sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that the respondent had not obtained and likely would not remain in a permanent and suitable housing environment.7
Second, the respondent‘s argument also ignores the fact that the court‘s determination that she failed to rehabilitate relied on more than just her lack of permanent housing. Rather, the memorandum of decision indicates that the court relied on the totality of the evidence regarding the respondent‘s overall failure to address the issues that led to Zakari‘s commitment to the petitioner‘s custody, finding that “[the respondent] repeatedly eschewed the department‘s attempts to connect [her] with services and providers that were essential for reunification.” The court further found that “[t]he evidence and testimony does not support giving [the respondent] additional time to become compliant with the court-ordered specific steps and/or to afford [the respondent] further time to decide whether to more fully collaborate with the department.” In light of the aforementioned evidence of the respondent‘s repeated, ongoing failure to comply with her specific steps and refusal to cooperate with the department, the court‘s determination in that regard was well supported by the record. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the respondent failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation such that, within a reasonable time and considering the age and needs of Zakari, she could assume a responsible position in his life.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.