In re Zac McV.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Donnelly
{1} This case poses the issue of whether the children’s court has jurisdiction to modify a prior disposition and commitment, pursuant to a motion filed by the Child several months after the court had found the child to be delinquent and had transferred his custody to the Children, Youth, and Families Department (the CYFD). We conclude that under the circumstances presented here, the children’s court is without authority to modify its prior disposition and commitment, and thus, affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
{2} In a prior proceeding, the Child admitted to the delinquent act of carrying a firearm onto school property. See
{3} The State moved to revoke the Child’s probation, and following a hearing the Child admitted violating probation. On April 8, 1997, the children’s court entered its judgment and disposition (corrected by amendment on June 9, 1997), found that the Child needed care or rehabilitation, transferred his legal and physical custody to the CYFD, and ordered that the Child be committed to the New Mexico Boys’ School for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years.
{4} On August 4, 1997, the Child filed a motion for the children’s court to reconsider the commitment because he alleged that he had been victimized and abused at the Springer facility. The Child also asserted that the commitment was too harsh a penalty for the probation violation of shoplifting. The children’s court concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the matter because the Child’s motion to modify was filed beyond the thirty-day period specified in
DISCUSSION
{5} We review the ruling of the children’s court de novo to determine whether as a matter of law the Delinquency Act provisions,
{6} The Child maintains that the children’s court is invested with jurisdiction under the provisions of
A. A judgment transferring legal custody of an adjudicated delinquent child to an agency responsible for the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children divests the court of jurisdiction at the time of transfer of custody, unless the transfer of legal custody is for a commitment not exceeding fifteen days pursuant to the provisions of Section 32A-2-19[ (B)(4) ]....
D. Prior to the expiration of a long-term commitment, as provided for inSection 32A-2-19 NMSA 1978 , the court may extend the judgment for additional periods of one year until the child reaches the age of twenty-one if the court finds that the extension is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public interest.
F. The court may dismiss a motion if it finds after preliminary investigation that the motion is without substance. If the court is of the opinion that the matter should be reviewed, it may, upon notice to all necessary parties, proceed to a hearing in the manner provided for hearings on petitions alleging delinquency. The court may terminate a judgment if it finds that the child is no longer in need of care, supervision or rehabilitation or it may enter a judgment extending or modifying the original judgment if it finds that action necessary to safeguard the child or the public interest.
G. A child may make a motion to modify a children’s court or adult disposition within thirty days of the judge’s decision. If the court is of the opinion that the matter should be reviewed, it may, upon notice to all necessary parties, proceed to a hearing in the manner provided for hearings on petitions alleging delinquency.
{7} The Child also contends that the meaning of Subsection F is ambiguous, necessitating that we discern the legislative intent underlying the enactment of this provision. See Rowell, 121 N.M. at 114, 908 P.2d at 1382 (to give effect to intent of Legislature, courts look to objectives of statute and wrong sought to be remedied). As provided in Section 32A-2-2(A), the purpose of the Delinquency Act is to protect “the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the adult consequences of criminal behavior, but to still hold children ... accountable for their actions to the extent of the child’s age, education, mental and physical condition, background and all other relevant factors, and to provide a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation....” Additionally, the Act is intended “to provide effective deterrents to acts of juvenile delinquency!.]” Section 32A-2-2(B).
{8} The Child maintains that in enacting Subsection F, the Legislature intended that the children’s court retain jurisdiction over delinquent children placed in the custody of the CYFD in order to monitor whether such children are being provided with an appropriate program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation. See § 32A-2-2(A); State v. Jonathan M., 109 N.M. 789, 790, 791 P.2d 64, 65 (1990). In advancing this argument, the Child argues that Subsection F was intended to permit the children’s court to modify or terminate a commitment if such action is consistent with the goal of rehabilitating children previously adjudicated as delinquent. The Child posits that consistent with the objectives of the Code, Subsection F is an exception to Subsections A and G which places express limits on the children’s court’s jurisdiction. Thus, he argues that Subsection F enables the children’s court to determine whether a previously ordered commitment continues to serve the Child’s best interests and, if so, whether the court should modify its prior disposition.
{10} We agree with the Child that the statute is ambiguous. See Leo v. Cornucopia Restaurant, 118 N.M. 354, 357, 881 P.2d 714, 717 (Ct.App.1994) (whether statute is ambiguous poses question of law); State v. Elmquist, 114 N.M. 551, 552, 844 P.2d 131, 132 (Ct.App.1992) (statute is ambiguous if reasonably well-informed persons could differ on its meaning). In resolving the issue of the meaning of
{11} The Child, relying on Jonathan M., 109 N.M. at 790, 791 P.2d at 65, and Carlos A., 1996-NMCA-082, 122 N.M. 241, 923 P.2d 608, asserts that the function of the children’s court is to fashion a remedy for the delinquent child that benefits both the child and society. In Carlos A., 1996-NMCA-082, ¶¶ 10, 13, 122 N.M. 241, 923 P.2d 608, the children’s court, without objection from either party, expressly reserved jurisdiction to hear the child’s motion to modify a commitment well beyond expiration of the thirty-day period for filing motions to reconsider as prescribed in Subsection G. There, however, the child moved for reconsideration of the commitment within the specified thirty-day period, and the children’s court, in its initial commitment, announced that any future modification would be based on the child’s intervening behavior. Id. ¶ 13. This Court determined that under those circumstances, the children’s court had jurisdiction to entertain and act on the motion even though the procedure may have deviated from the statutory scheme. See id. ¶ 15.
{12} When the disposition of the children’s court involving a delinquent child has resulted in a commitment, and the court transfers legal custody to the CYFD, the commitment is “subject to limitations and modifications set forth in
{13} The central question then becomes whether the exceptions delineated in Subsections F and G would enable the children’s court to exercise jurisdiction under the circumstances presented here. We conclude that Subsection F does not extend the children’^ court’s jurisdiction to hear the motion in this ease because the motion to modify the commitment was not filed within thirty days of the court’s decision as prescribed in Subsection G. Although the children’s court may make a recommendation to the CYFD concerning the Child’s placement, the Code explicitly provides that once legal custody is transferred, the CYFD becomes responsible for the Child’s care and rehabilitation, and the CYFD is to determine the appropriate placement, supervision, and rehabilitation program for the Child. See
{15} This Court has previously determined that the Code does not authorize the children’s court to exercise authority over the terms and conditions of the delinquent child’s supervision and rehabilitation once the court transfers custody to the CYFD. See In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. at 771, 764 P.2d at 1329; see also § 32A-7-8(A) (investing Juvenile Parole Board with authority to consider granting parole “after the entry of a judgment transferring legal custody to an agency for the care and rehabilitation of delinquent children”);
{16} Our reading of Subsection G is consistent with long-standing law that absent statutory law or a rule to the contrary, final judgments and decrees of the district courts remain under their control for thirty days after entry, or for such further time as may be necessary to enable the court to rule on a motion filed during those thirty days. See
{17} In sum, we conclude that Subsection F does not confer jurisdiction on the children’s court to consider the Child’s motion under the facts existing here because such consideration of the motion exceeds the scope of the court’s authority as provided in Subsection G. The Child’s motion is in the nature of a motion for reconsideration, and thus must be filed within thirty days of the children’s court’s disposition. See
{18} We appreciate the serious nature of the Child’s allegations of abuse. The Child’s remedy, however, is not under
take immediate steps to ensure prompt investigation of the report. The investigation shall ensure that immediate steps are taken to protect the health or welfare of the alleged abused or neglected child, as well as that of any other child under thesame care who may be in danger of abuse or neglect....
Subsection D of Section 32A-4-3 further provides that:
If the child alleged to be abused or neglected is in the care or control of or in a facility administratively connected to the department, the report shall be investigated by local law enforcement. The investigation shall ensure that immediate steps are taken to protect the health or welfare of the alleged abused or neglected child, as well as that of any other child under the same care who may be in danger of abuse or neglect.
CONCLUSION
{19} We conclude that
{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.
APODACA and ARMIJO, JJ., concur.