In re Y.V.
{¶ 1} Appellant F.V.1 appeals from the order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated his parental rights and granted permanent custody of the child Y.V. to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“the agency“).
{¶ 2} Appellant presents one assignment of error. He argues the juvenile court‘s order lacks an adеquate basis in the evidence. Since this court disagrees, his assignment of error is overruled, and the juvenile court‘s order is affirmed.
{¶ 3} The record reflects the child was born on November 20, 2008. At that time, the child‘s mother was serving a prison sentence for a probation violation; therefore, the agency assumed emergency temporary custody of the child. The agency рlaced the child in a foster home where her two siblings also previously had been placed.
{¶ 4} On July 1, 2009, the juvenile court adjudicated the child as neglected and dependent. On Octobеr 6, 2009, after conducting a hearing, the court placed the child into the agency‘s full temporary custody.
{¶ 6} However, on March 31, 2010, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody. The agency alleged Y.V. had been in its temporary custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period, and that an award of permanent custody to the agency was in Y.V.‘s best interest.
{¶ 7} According to the soсial worker‘s affidavit attached to the motion, Y.V.‘s natural mother had failed to obtain any of the case plan objectives, had “a severe cocaine problem” that rеmained unresolved, had never successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program, and had her parental rights involuntarily terminated as to her two other children basеd on the same facts.
{¶ 8} The affidavit also stated that appellant failed to support Y.V. since her birth and failed to establish paternity. Furthermore, the affidavit alleged appеllant had completed only that portion of the case plan that required him to complete a mental health assessment; appellant had obtained
{¶ 9} On September 30, 2010, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the agency‘s motion. Y.V.‘s natural mothеr did not attend. The agency presented the testimony of the social worker assigned to the case, and introduced several exhibits into evidence. Appellant elected to present no evidence.
{¶ 10} Following the hearing, the juvenile court granted the agency‘s motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 11} Appellant appeals the foregoing judgment, raising onе assignment of error for review.
“I. The trial court‘s order granting permanent custody to the [agency] was not based upon sufficient clear and convincing evidence.”
{¶ 12} Appellant аrgues the juvenile court‘s decision is unsupported by the record. This court disagrees.
{¶ 13} In order to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a county agency, the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the following: 1) the existence of one of the conditions set forth in
{¶ 14} The “best interest determination” focuses on the child, not the parent. In re Awkal (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424. The discretion that the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of permanent сustody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court‘s determination will have on the lives оf the parties concerned. Id., at 316.
{¶ 15} In this case, the juvenile court determined, pursuant to
{¶ 16} The juvenile court also was required to determine that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Pursuant to
{¶ 17} The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing in this case, and considered the testimony and evidence presented. In determining whether a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in Y.V.‘s best interest, the court considered the factors listed in
{¶ 18} The juvenile court recognized that Y.V. had been in the agency‘s custody since November 2008, that no suitable relatives existed with whom Y.V. could be placed, and that the agency had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Appellant did not rebut testimony that indicated that, at the time of the hearing, he lived in a single room with his girlfriend, and that, while he occasionally worked in construction, he lacked permanent employment.
{¶ 19} Thus, even though appellant had completed a part of the case plan, he had obtained neither stable housing nor a verifiable stable income. Moreover, appellant had not established рaternity of Y.V. and had not resolved his immigration status in this country, which, at that time, was as an illegal alien.
{¶ 21} The juvenile court considered the social worker‘s testimony that the agency had placed Y.V. in a foster home “with her siblings and she ha[d] a very good relationship with the foster рarents and her siblings,” that Y.V. had “really bonded” with her current family, and that Y.V. seemed “happy and healthy” in her current placement. The social worker explained that Y.V.‘s foster parents provided for all of her health and physical and speech therapy needs, and that they wished to adopt her as they had adopted her siblings. Based upon the testimony and the reсommendation made by Y.V.‘s guardian ad litem, the juvenile court found that permanent custody was in Y.V.‘s best interest.
{¶ 23} A “PPLA” is an order by which the juvenilе court grants legal custody of a child to an agency without terminating parental rights.
{¶ 24} The supreme court recognized that a “[PPLA] is to be considered as a last resort for the child,” reflecting “the General Assembly‘s goal is to avoid allowing children to languish indefinitely in foster care.” Id. at ¶36. This court also has recognized that “[a] child‘s best interests require permanency and a safe and secure environment.” In re Holyak (July 12, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78890.
{¶ 25} A review of the record shows clear and convincing evidence supports the juvenile court‘s determination that permanent custody is in the
{¶ 26} Appellant‘s sole assignment of error, accordingly, is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is оrdered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR