In Re WW
JUSTICE MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:
After a history of delinquency not relevant to this appeal, the circuit court of McHenry County adjudicated the respondent, W.W., delinquent and adjudged him a ward of the court. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections. Thе appellate court affirmed the committal by order (103 Ill. App.3d 1203) pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (73 Ill.2d R. 23). Thereafter, upon the State‘s motion, the appellate court assessed State‘s Attorney fees for defending the appeal against respondent in the amount of $50. We
There is but one question presented: Can a minor be assessed State‘s Attorney fees as costs for an unsuccessful appeal?
The State moved for the assessment of its attorney fees against respondent under section 8 of “An Act concerning fees and salaries * * *,” which provides in relevant part:
“State‘s attorneys shall be entitled to the following fees * * *:
* * *
For each case of appeal taken * * * to the Supreme or Appellate Court when prosecuted or defended by him, $50.
* * *
All the foregoing fees shall be taxed as costs to be collectеd from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction. But in cases of inquiry into the mental illness of any person alleged to be mentally ill, in cases on a charge of paternity and in cases of appeal in the Supreme or Appellate Court, where judgment is in favor of the аccused, the fees allowed the State‘s Attorney therein shall be retained out of the fines and forfeitures collected by them in other сases.”
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 53, par. 8 .
The allowance and recovery of costs, being unknown at common law, rests entirely upon statutory provisions which must be strictly cоnstrued. (People v. Nicholls (1978), 71 Ill.2d 166, 173.) In Nicholls, a criminal defendant challenged the appellate court order assessing State‘s Attorney fees as costs on appеal. This court found basic authority for assessing prosecution costs against criminal defendants in the criminal costs statute, which provides:
“When аny person is convicted of an offense under any statute, or at common law, the court shall give judgment that the offender pay the cоsts of the prosecution.” (
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 180-3 .)
After quoting this statute, section 8 of the fees and salaries act (
Respondent asserts there is no provision similаr to the criminal costs statute in the Juvenile Court Act (
The State argues section 8 alone provides sufficient authority to assess such costs. It emphasizes the statutory language which provides that State‘s Attorneys are entitled to fees “[f]or each case of appeal taken * * * to the Supreme or Appellate Court” and that ”[a]ll the foregoing fees shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction.” (Emphasis added.) The State points out the legislature provided three specific instances in which State‘s Attorneys were to obtain their fees from fines and forfeitures collected in other cases. Those concern cases inquiring into the alleged mental illness of any person, cases on a charge оf paternity and cases of appeal in which the State does not prevail. The State stresses the legislature failed to include as an exception cases on appeal from delinquency proceedings in which the State prevails.
Relying on the rule of statutory construction that an expression of certain exceptions in a statute is to be interpreted as an exclusion of all others, thе State maintains the legislature did not intend to exempt juvenile delinquents
Even if a statute has remedial features but is in derogation of the common law, it will be strictly construed when determining what persons come within its operation. (Cedar Park Cemetery Association, Inc. v. Cooper (1951), 408 Ill. 79, 82-83; Lites v. Jackson (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 374, 376.) Moreover, such statutes will not bе extended any further than what the language of the statute absolutely requires by its express terms or by clear implication. Walter v. Northern Insurance Co. (1938), 370 Ill. 283, 288-89; 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes sec. 288 (1974).
In strictly construing section 8 in favor of the minor, we do not find a clear legislative expression in its language imposing State‘s Attorney fees for an unsuccessful appeal against minors. In addition, there is no juvenile costs statute similar to the criminal costs statute which, when read with section 8, would indicate a lеgislative scheme authorizing assessment of such costs. Nor do we believe such an assessment is clearly implied from the provisions in section 8.
Section 8 specifically provides that State‘s Attorney fees are to be taxed as costs and collected from the “defendаnt,” if possible, upon “conviction.” In In re Beasley (1977), 66 Ill.2d 385, 389, this court said juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature. As such, a minor is neither “convicted” nor considered a “defendant” or an “accused.” Nor is a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act denominated a “conviction.” (In re R.R. (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 494.)
We do not believe assessing a minor $50 for an unsuccessful appeal would further the purposes and policy expressed in the Juvenile Court Act. Nor do we find the legislature, through section 8, necessarily intended such an assessment. As this court said in Nicholls: “In light of prеsent-day county budgeting and accounting procedures, the provisions of section 8 (
For the reasons stated, the appellate court‘s order assessing State‘s Attorney fees against the respondent is vacated.
Order vacated.