In re Wright
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the Review Panel which accepted the 60-page report and recommendation of the special master, Mark W. Forsling, and recommended a one-year suspension with conditions on reinstatement as discipline for the violations by Respondent Murble Anita Wright (State Bar No. 778525) of Rules 1.4, 1.5 (c) (2), 1.15 (I) (b) and (c), and 1.15 (II) (b), see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). Wright has filed exceptions to the Report and Recommendation, and, for the reasons that follow, we agree with the Review Panel and recommend a one-year suspension with conditions on reinstatement as discipline for Wright’s Rule violations.
The special master, who was in the best position to observe the parties’ demeanor and determine the witnesses’ credibility, see In the Matter of Ballew,
With regard to the May 2007 automobile collision representation, Wright, who has
In the Fall of 2007, the couple signed a Memorandum of Engagement hiring Wright to represent them for an hourly fee in connection with their company’s alleged failure to pay the rent as due under a lease agreement and their liability under their personal guaranties of the company’s obligations under that agreement. That Memorandum provided that they would receive periodic itemized statements for fees and costs which should be remitted within ten days and that they “MAYALSO SIGN AN ATTORNEYLIEN AGAINST ANY PROCEED [sic] THAT [THEY] REALIZE IN [THEIR] PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS AS PAYMENT FOR LEGAL EXPENSES AND FEES FOR THIS ACTION.” (Capitalization in original.) Although the couple understood the language to mean that Wright could use the settlement funds from the personal injury matter to pay legal costs in the landlord/tenant matter if they failed to pay those costs, they never signed any documents constituting an attorney lien. The landlord eventually sued the couple and their business and sought summary judgment. Although Wright defended the suit and filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, the court granted the landlord’s motion. In early December 2008, Wright sent the couple a letter offering to represent them in an appeal of the judgment if they paid additional legal fees, but advising them that she could not continue to work on the contingency arrangement that would allow them to pay her legal fees once they received their settlements from the personal injury suit, because her fees now far exceeded $10,000. This was the first indication that the couple had as to the fees they owed in the landlord/tenant case since Wright had never provided them with periodic itemized statements.
In mid-December 2008, Wright prepared an itemized statement showing a balance of $14,725.75 due in the landlord/tenant case, but it is unclear when that statement was mailed to the couple. The evidence presented at the hearing included a letter dated December 22, 2008 which was addressed to the couple and their daughter. That letter indicates that it is a follow up to “a telephone conversation that we had” informing the family that the settlement offers in the personal injury case had been accepted with their permission, but that Wright would retain all proceeds realized to defray her fees in the landlord/tenant litigation. It is unclear if and when the family received this December 22 letter, but Wright admits that she only spoke to the husband and that she did not get a separate agreement from the wife allowing her to retain the proceeds of her personal injury settlement. Although Wright testified that the daughter called her to provide authority to retain the proceeds, the daughter unequivocally testified that she never did so, and the special master specifically credited the daughter’s testimony over Wright’s in this regard and specifically found that Wright fabricated her testimony about the telephone call with the daughter. The record contains another letter dated January 9, 2009 which is also addressed to the entire family. That letter again indicated that the husband agreed that the settlement funds could be applied toward Wright’s fees in the landlord/tenant suit, but the husband denied seeing this letter until April 2009 and the wife and daughter did not recall seeing it prior to these disciplinary proceedings. Shortly after the January 9 letter, Wright transferred the entirety of the family’s settlement
In February 2009, Wright sent the husband and wife a bill for her services in the landlord/tenant action, but it contained no indication that the entirety of the settlement proceeds had been applied. The husband responded to the letter by calling Wright to inquire about the status of the settlement proceeds and in that call, the husband claims to have vigorously denied Wright’s contention that the family authorized her to retain the proceeds. In March 2009, the family sent Wright a certified letter demanding a copy of their files and requesting a billing statement for all services. Wright admits that she ignored their request and that she did not provide the family with copies of their files until the State Bar contacted her in connection with this disciplinary matter and told her to do so. Instead, Wright filed three lawsuits in the Magistrate Court of Fayette County, Georgia: one against each family member seeking to recover the contingency fee from the personal injury cases, plus fees and expenses. The family members filed counterclaims seeking the full amounts of their settlement funds. The magistrate allowed Wright to retain essentially 35% of the settlement proceeds that the daughter was seeking. The magistrate found in Wright’s favor on the couple’s counterclaims, finding that the couple had waived any right to the settlement proceeds to which they thought they were entitled, but it found in the daughter’s favor on her counterclaim and awarded her essentially 65% of the settlement proceeds that were attributable to her claim in the personal injury lawsuit. The couple did not appeal, but Wright appealed the judgment in the daughter’s case. Wright later initiated a separate action in magistrate court seeking to recover fees she contended were due on the landlord/tenant case, but the magistrate court found that action barred by res judicata and Wright’s subsequent appeal was withdrawn.
Based on those facts, the special master found that the State Bar had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Wright violated Rule 1.4 by failing to provide the family with a copy of their file in March 2009 when they requested it by certified letter; violated Rule 1.5 (c) (2) by failing to promptly send settlement statements to the family upon conclusion of the personal injury matter; and violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) by retaining the entirety of the settlement funds belonging to the wife and daughter. He rejected Wright’s contention that she was entitled to retain the funds, noting (1) that the Memorandum of Engagement that she signed with the couple with regard to the landlord/tenant matter provided retention of the settlement funds, via a lien, as a possibility if the couple failed to pay Wright’s fees as due, but Wright’s failure to send the couple the periodic statements required by the Memorandum of Engagement, prevented them from paying as due; (2) Wright never pursued a lien or had the couple sign any lien documents and the Memorandum of Engagement did not otherwise provide authorization to retain the funds; and (3) even if Wright obtained a verbal agreement from the husband to retain all of his settlement funds, she never obtained permission from the wife or daughter to retain more than 35% of their settlements. The special master also found that Wright violated Rule 1.15 (I) (c) by moving all of the settlement funds of the wife and daughter out of her trust account when she knew or should have known that those women disputed her claim to the entirety of the funds or, at least, had not agreed to her proposal to retain the funds. Finally, the special master found that, for the same reasons that support the finding of violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (b) and (I) (c), Wright also violated Rule 1.15 (II) (b). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.15 (I) or 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment, and the remainder of the violations can be punished by a public reprimand.
The special master held a separate hearing to hear evidence as to mitigation and aggravation of punishment. Wright presented evidence from various individuals who testified as to her trustworthy nature, her volunteer activities, and her reputation as an honest, responsible, and thorough person and attorney. Wright herself testified as to her education, her experience, which included her service as a juvenile court judge in Clayton
Wright sought review by the Review Panel, but it specifically adopted and incorporated the special master’s factual findings and conclusions. The Review Panel adopted the recommendation for a one-year suspension, but it did not adopt the recommendation for a separate public reprimand, and it altered the first condition on reinstatement so as to require payment only to the daughter. Wright filed exceptions to the Review Panel Report and Recommendation, asserting that the special master and the Review Panel erred by overlooking facts in the record, by crediting the clients’ testimony over hers; by finding a violation of any Bar Rule; and by finding suspension appropriate for any such violation.
As an initial matter, we find the evidence supports the conclusion that Wright violated Rules 1.4 and 1.5 (c) (2) in her dealings with these clients. As to the remaining violations, we note that the special master was in the best position to determine the witnesses’ credibility and that his findings of facts with regard to the violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and (II) do not appear to be unreasonable, given the testimony in this case. Accordingly, we agree with the Review Panel’s conclusion that Wright violated Rules 1.4, 1.5 (c) (2), 1.15 (I) (b), 1.15 (I) (c), and 1.15 (II) (b). The maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.15 (I) or 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment, and the remainder of the violations can be punished by a public reprimand.
In mitigation, we note that Wright, who has been practicing law for many years, has no prior disciplinary history and that she generally is a person of good character and reputation who has served the community in many civic and religious activities, that she has held positions of respect and trust in the legal community and in her personal life, and that she mentors young people and new attorneys. In aggravation of discipline, we note that Wright shows no remorse and refuses to acknowledge the possibility of wrongdoing in her dealings with these clients. Although Wright contends that she acted under an honest belief that she was
One-year suspension with conditions.