In re Bobby Wayne WOODS, Movant.
No. 05-51310.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided Nov. 17, 2005.
132
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Richard Alley, Fort Worth, TX, for Movant.
PER CURIAM:*
Bobby Wayne Woods, a Texas inmate sentenced to death based upon his conviction for capital murder, seeks authorization to file a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on two issues related to his allegation that he is either mentally retarded and therefore cannot be executed under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), or too mentally ill to be executed under the
We grant Woods permission to file before the district court his Atkins claim that his sentence of capital punishment violates the United States Constitution because he is mentally retarded. However, we make no evaluation of this claim other than to hold that Woods has made the prima facie showing required under
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 1998, Woods was convicted of kidnapping two children, an approximately eight-year-old boy and a girl, age eleven, from their home, and he was sentenced to death for the capital murder of the kidnapped girl. Woods‘s conviction and sentence were appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the “TCCA“) and affirmed on June 14, 2000. Woods v. State, No. 73,136, slip op. (Tex.Crim.App. June 14, 2000).
Woods filed his initial application for habeas relief in the courts of Texas on September 15, 1999, and the TCCA adopted the lower court‘s findings and denied relief. Ex parte Woods, No. 44,856-01, slip op. at 2 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 13, 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished). The Supreme Court of the United States denied Woods‘s petition for writ of certiorari on February 20, 2001. Woods v. Texas, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S.Ct. 1104, 148 L.Ed.2d 975 (2001).
On December 11, 2000, Woods filed his initial federal habeas application in the Northern District of Texas, alleging many of the same claims presented for state postconviction relief. See Woods v. Johnson, No. 4:00-CV-1563--A (N.D.Tex. Dec. 11, 2000). The cause of action was transferred to the Western District of Texas and was there denied. Woods v. Cockrell, No. A:01-CA-055-SS (W.D.Tex. Feb. 8, 2002). Woods appealed the denial of federal habeas relief to this Court, and a panel of this Court denied his request for a certificate of appealability on certain claims and otherwise affirmed the district court‘s denial of relief. Woods v. Cockrell, 2003 WL 1202760 (5th Cir. Feb.24, 2003) (unpublished).
Woods began the process of his successive petition for postconviction relief by filing an application with the TCCA on April 8, 2003, that raised two claims: (1) that his death sentence was unconstitutionally applied to him under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), because he is mentally retarded and (2) that his conviction and sentence violated the
The state court held a hearing on the issue of Woods‘s intellectual and functional capacity during which both Woods and the State presented testimony and evidence. In addition to submitted evidence of Woods‘s scores on multiple intelligence tests, the state court heard testimony from Woods‘s former grade school principal and two teachers who testified that while Woods suffered from learning disabilities, he was not mentally retarded. The state court found that Woods was not mentally retarded and recommended that relief under Atkins be denied. The TCCA adopted those findings and recommendations and denied relief. Ex parte Woods, 2005 WL 977024, No. WR-44,856-02, slip op. at 2 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr.27, 2005). Woods submitted his successive federal habeas application to the district court on September 27, 2005, and he now moves this Court for authorization to file that petition, which raises two claims for relief, in the district court.
DISCUSSION
Because Woods filed his federal habeas application after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA“), his initial habeas petition was subject to the provisions of that Act. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001); Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 775 (5th Cir.1999). Woods‘s instant motion for authorization to file a successive petition is likewise subject to AEDPA‘s requirements. See Graham, 168 F.3d at 775; see also In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir.2003).
Under AEDPA, this Court may authorize such a filing only if we determine that “the application makes a prima facie showing that the applicant satisfies the requirements” of
Woods presents two claims for habeas relief in his successive petition, arguing each meets the requirements of
We find that Woods has made a prima facie showing that the Atkins claim of his proposed successive petition for writ of habeas corpus raises a claim not previously presented in his prior application to this Court. We also find Woods has raised, as to his Atkins challenge to his sentence only, an issue that relies “on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” See
As to Woods‘s remaining claims, we deny authorization to present them to the district court. Woods challenges his sentence because he claims the determination that he is not mentally retarded was determined by a judge rather than by a jury. Woods argues the burden of proof with respect to mental retardation was improperly placed upon him as petitioner rather than upon the State. Woods challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the state court findings that he is not mentally retarded and argues that, even if he is not mentally retarded, the
The Supreme Court has clarified recently that the factfinder with respect to a
Woods claims that he was denied a jury determination of his status as mentally retarded under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). This claim does not meet the requirements of
Woods argues the burden of proof with respect to mental retardation was improperly placed upon him as petitioner rather than upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, no Supreme Court case created such a rule and applied it retroactively, as is required. Moreover, our Circuit has rejected this precise argument on a request for certificate of appealability. Webster, 421 F.3d at 311. Woods cannot make the prima facie showing required by
We also reject Woods‘s argument that he should be permitted to present his claim that he is mentally ill and, for that reason, cannot be executed in accordance with the Constitution.
Accordingly, we authorize the filing in district court of the Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus attached to Woods‘s motion only with respect to a portion of Issue One, that is, whether Woods is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty according to Atkins. For the reasons stated above, we deny the motion as to the remaining claims.
The district court, in its role as second gatekeeper, “must conduct a ‘thorough’ review to determine if the motion ‘conclusively’ demonstrates that it does not meet AEDPA‘s second or successive motion requirements.” Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 899 (citation omitted); see also
MOTION GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.