MEMORANDUM OPINION CONFIRMING CHAPTER 13 PLAN
This matter came before the Court on August 15, 2007, for confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan of reorganization (the “Plan”) of the above-referenced debtor (the “Debtor”) as described in the Notice and Proposed Order of Confirmation filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee (the “Trustee”) on April 19, 2007. John A. Meadows appeared on behalf of the Debtor, and Vernon J. Cahoon appeared on behalf of the Trustee. The Trustee objects to confirmation on the basis that the Plan violates Section 1325(b)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires the Plan to provide that all of the Debtor’s projected disposable income during the applicable commitment period (five years in this case) be applied to pay claims of unsecured creditors. The Trustee argues that the projected disposable income of an above median income debtor is not determined exclusively by the calculation rendered by Form B22C and that, based on Schedules I and J, the Debtor is not proposing to commit all of her projected disposable income to the Plan for the benefit of her unsecured creditors. The Trustee also argues that the Social Security income of the Debtor’s non-filing husband should be included in the calculation of projected disposable income pursuant to Section 1325(b)(1)(B) as determined by Schedule I. The Debtor argues that the projected disposable income of an above median income debtor is determined solely by the calculation rendered by Form B22C, and that Schedules I and J are not relevant to such a determination. If her Schedules I and J are considered by the Court, then the Debtor argues that Section 101(10A)(B) prohibits the Court from considering the Social Security income of the Debtor’s non-filing husband. After consideration of the Plan, the evidence presented at the hearing, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, the Court will overrule the Trustee’s objection and confirm the Plan.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 and 1334, and the General Order of Reference entered by the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina on August 15, 1984. This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L), which this Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine.
II. FACTS
On March 9, 2007, the Debtor, although married, filed individually for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. On April 19, 2007, the Plan was filed. It provides for a plan payment of $750.00 each month for 60 months. 1
The Debtor’s original Schedule I showed monthly income, including that of the Debtor’s non-filing spouse, less payroll *303 deductions, of $4,850.45. This amount included $1,000.00 of the non-filing spouse’s Social Security income and was reduced by, among other things, a voluntary payroll deduction of $514.78 for a Section 403(b) retirement plan. Expenses on the Debtor’s original Schedule J totaled $2,878.50, leaving net monthly income of $1,971.95. On July 17, 2007, the Debtor filed amended Schedules I and J. The Debtor’s amended Schedule I, still including the non-filing spouse’s Social Security income and a voluntary payroll deduction for a Section 403(b) retirement plan, of $496.90, 2 reflects decreased income of $4,668.44. 3 The amended Schedule J indicates that the Debtor’s monthly expenses increased to $3,258.84. However, this amount included a $345.00 installment payment for an automobile that was already included in the proposed Plan payment. With this adjustment, Schedule J reflects that the Debtor has $1,774.60 available each month to pay her creditors.
The Debtor filed a Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Disposable Income, Official Form B22C (the “Form B22C”), as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(b)(6). The Form B22C showed that the Debtor and her non-filing spouse were above median income earners for a household of two, 4 with a current monthly income (“CMI”) of $6,219.70. 5 The Debtor took $5,827.18 of deductions, which were determined pursuant to Section 707(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. In contrast to Schedule J, Line 58 of the Form B22C shows a monthly disposable income of $392.52. The Debtor is required to pay sixty payments of $392.52 for a total of $23,551.20.
On July 18, 2007, the Plan came before the Court for confirmation. The Trustee objected to confirmation (the “Objection”) based on the disposable income requirement of Section 1325(b)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. The confirmation hearing was continued to allow all parties to file briefs addressing whether the Social Security income received by the Debtor’s *304 spouse should be considered by the Court in evaluating whether the Debtor is contributing all of her disposable income to the Plan. The Trustee and the Debtor timely filed briefs.
The net monthly income of the Debtor, as reflected on adjusted Schedule J, is $1,774.60, 6 which exceeds the proposed monthly plan payment of $750.00 by $1,024.60. Form B22C shows a monthly disposable income of $392.52, which is less than the proposed monthly plan payment. Section 1325(b)(1)(B) requires a plan to provide that all of the Debtor’s projected disposable income during the applicable commitment period be applied to pay claims of unsecured creditors. The Trustee urges the Court to consider Schedules I and J, including the Social Security income of the Debtor’s non-filing husband, to determine if the Plan complies with Section 1325(b)(1)(B). The Trustee argues that the Debtor is not proposing to commit all of her projected disposable income to the Plan for the benefit of her unsecured creditors. The Debtor argues that any consideration of her Schedules I and J for the purpose of determining projected disposable income would be contrary to clear legislative intent, would render the definition of “disposable income” irrelevant, and would be a strained interpretation of the statute.
III. DISCUSSION
The interpretation of any statute must begin with the language of the statute itself.
7
If the text of a particular statutory provision is clear and unambiguous on its face, the text must assume overriding importance, and the court is to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute. However, the court should not construe the provision in a vacuum.
8
It
*305
must look to the other relevant provisions of the statute to construe the statutory provision at issue in context.
Hartford Underwriters,
A. The Statutory Framework
Before the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (“BAPCPA”), bankruptcy courts commonly used bankruptcy schedules I and J as the primary source of evidence of a debtor’s disposable income under Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code.
E.g., Pak,
Section 1325 now provides that if the Chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless
the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2005). The term “projected disposable income” was not changed by BAPCPA. However, BAPCPA changed the definition of “disposable income” in Section 1325(b)(2). Pre-BAPCPA, “disposable income” for an individual debtor was defined as “income received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended” for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1986). PostBAPCPA, “disposable income” for an individual debtor is defined as “current monthly income received by the debtor ... less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended” for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (2005).
The term “current monthly income” is completely new. For debtors that file schedule I, it is defined, in relevant part, as “the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives ..., derived during the 6-month period ending on ... the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(A)(I) (2005).
9
Thus, “disposable income” is calculated historically, during the six months prior to bankruptcy.
In re Purdy,
BAPCPA also added Section 1325(b)(3), which provides that “[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2) ... shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if the debtor has current monthly income” that is above the median income 11 for a family of the same size. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2005). Section 707(b)(2) sets forth a means test for determining whether a Chapter 7 case is presumptively abusive. Subsection (A) provides that the
debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2005). 12
B. Determining Income for Above Median Income Debtors
As has been noted by several courts, the proper interpretation of “projected disposable income” has been “hotly debated,”
Austin,
use[ ] the number on the debtor’s B22C Form as the “projected disposable income” unless the debtor or some other *307 party can show that there has been a substantial change in circumstances such that the figures on the B22C Form are not commensurate with a fair projection of the debtor’s budget in the future.
In re Ross,
1. The Minority Interpretation: Alexander and Its Progeny
Over twenty different courts, beginning with the
Alexander
court,
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have adopted what has become the minority view. These courts hold that “projected disposable income” is the disposable income calculated on Form B22C extrapolated over the applicable commitment period.
See, e.g., In re Frederickson,
Courts that have adopted the minority view make several statutory construction arguments in support of their interpretation of Section 1325(b). The most common argument is that Section 1325(b)(3) provides that “[ajmounts reasonably necessary to be expended under paragraph (2) [which defines ‘disposable income’] shall
14
be determined in accordance with subpara-graphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2), if’ the debtor’s income is above the median income, which forces a court to use the calculation of CMI provided by Form B22C to determine disposable income.
See Stubbs,
No. 07-61165,
Several courts have argued that the placement of the definition of “disposable income” in Section 1325(b)(2) indicates that current monthly income, which is included within the “disposable income” definition and defined by Section 101(10A), should be used in calculating “projected disposable income.”
Frederickson,
Some courts argue that if “disposable income” is not linked to “projected disposable income,” then it is just a meaningless,
*308
floating definition.
Green,
A few courts have noted that Congress provided no definition of “projected disposable income”; these courts argue that had Congress intended its meaning to be different than “disposable income,” it could have provided a separate definition.
Frederickson,
Some minority courts explain that “projected” simply means “multiplied,” meaning that the debtor’s disposable income is extrapolated over the life of the plan.
See, e.g., Alexander,
One of the primary criticisms of the minority position is that it does not take into consideration the actual income of the debtor on the date of petition. Historical CMI may have no relationship to the debt- or’s actual income during the course of the Chapter 13 case.
Pak,
Another primary criticism of the minority interpretation is that it denies Chapter 13 relief for otherwise qualified debtors, while it allows other debtors to avoid paying their creditors when they have an actual ability to do so.
Pak,
Still another criticism is that the minority interpretation of Section 1325(b)(1) effectively rewrites the section without Congressional approval.
In re Briscoe,
2. The Majority Interpretation — Har- dacre, Jass, and Their Progeny
Courts in the majority consider schedule I to determine if above median income debtors meet the Section 1325(b)(1)(B) test.
Berger,
Several courts have concluded that the retention by BAPCPA of the word “projected” in Section 1325(b)(1)(B) is ambiguous.
Bee, e.g., Pak,
When a statute is ambiguous, courts should not adopt a construction which would lead to an absurd result.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Darling’s,
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would “compel an odd result,” Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,490 U.S. 504 , 509,109 S.Ct. 1981 , 1984,104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989), we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope. See also, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity, supra, [v. U.S.] 143 U.S., [457]at 472, 12 S.Ct., [511] at 516 [ (1892) ]; FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.,476 U.S. 426 , 432,106 S.Ct. 1931 , 1935,90 L.Ed.2d 428 (1986). “The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,” for example, “may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.” Watt v. Alaska,451 U.S. 259 , 266,101 S.Ct. 1673 , 1677,68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). Even though, as Judge Learned Hand said, “the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing,” nevertheless “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accom *311 plish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Cabell v. Markham,148 F.2d 737 , 739(CA2), aff'd,326 U.S. 404 ,66 S.Ct. 193 ,90 L.Ed. 165 (1945). Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,278 U.S. 41 , 48,49 S.Ct. 52 , 53,73 L.Ed. 170 (1928) (Holmes, J.). See also United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,310 U.S. 534 , 543-544,60 S.Ct. 1059 , 1063-64,84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be ‘no rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’ ”) (citations omitted).
Id.
at 454-55,
For the reasons stated above, several courts have concluded that the minority interpretation of Section 1325(b) renders an absurd result.
See Purdy,
It is axiomatic that a court must give meaning to every word in a statute, so as to avoid surplusage if possible. A court
*312
should not construe a statute in a way that renders a word or phrase meaningless.
Arsenault,
The word “projected” is forward looking.
20
It means to calculate, estimate or predict something in the future based on present data or trends.
See, e.g., Pak,
A forward-looking approach is also supported by other language in Section 1325(b)(1)(B). For example, the phrase “to be received” indicates that it refers to income that will be received in the future.
*313
See Warren,
No. 07-30721,
The phrase “effective date of the plan” means the date of confirmation, so if the debtor’s “projected disposable income” is to be determined at confirmation, which is months
after
the petition date, then it is difficult to justify tying that determination to the debtor’s income for the six months prior to bankruptcy.
Pak,
The term “projected disposable income” appears in five other places in the Code, none of which define it, and only one of which (i.e., Section 1129(a)(15)(B)) refers back to the definition of “disposable income” in Section 1325(b)(2).
Slusher,
The minority interpretation of Section 1325(b)(1)(B) would render two sections of the Bankruptcy Code superfluous. Pursuant to Section 1323(a), which was not changed by BAPCPA, a debtor can propose a plan modification before confirmation. However, if Section 1325(b)(2) is treated as an unalterable multiplier of disposable income as determined by Form B22C, then such a modification would be prohibited.
Pak,
Generally, courts may look to pre-amendment case law as informative when construing the Code.
Dewsnup v. Timm,
3. Adjustments to Income
Some courts hold that the calculation of disposable income for above median income debtors is tied not only to Section 707(b)(2)(A) under the means test, but also to Section 707(b)(2)(B), pursuant to which a court may consider special circumstances that make such adjustments to income necessary and reasonable.
See Pak,
Section 1325(b)(3), which governs the calculation of “[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended under [§ 1325(b)(2) ],” provides that such expenses “shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 707(b)(2),” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (emphasis added). But this incorporation of the “special circumstances” exception only applies to the expense side *315 of the “disposable income” equation. Nothing in § 1325(b)(2), or § 1325(b) in general, permits a court to consider “special circumstances” that would lead to “adjustments of current monthly income” as contemplated by § 707(b)(2)(B).
Briscoe,
This analysis provides further support for the position that Congress intended for courts to consider schedule I in determining compliance with Section 1325(b)(1)(B). CMI is based on the debtor’s actual income over the six-month period prior to bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). If the debtor has special circumstances concerning her income, such as a serious medical condition or active military service, that make the debtor’s CMI substantially different from the income shown on schedule I, then the court should consider schedule I income to determine whether the debtor complies with the Section 1325(b)(1)(B) test. Since the debtor’s current income, as shown on schedule I, already is being considered, there was no need for Congress, in Section 1325(b), to reference Section 707(b)(2)(B) for purposes of adjustments to income, only to expenses. Briscoe, 374 B.R. at n. 19 (“The only ‘special circumstances’ that could ‘justify additional expenses’ would be circumstances not contemplated by § 707(b)(2)(A), which would not be included in a forecast of the debt- or’s monthly expenses if the debtor were limited to the expenses specified by § 707(b)(2)(A). It was therefore necessary for Congress to reference § 707(b)(2)(B) in § 1325(b)(3) (specifying what are reasonable expenses), but not in § 1325(b)(2).”).
4. The Legislative History
If the meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, then the court should turn to the legislative history of the statutory provision to discern its meaning.
In re BankVest Capital Corp.,
5. Policy Considerations
To aid in discerning the meaning of a statutory provision, a court may consider the policy underlying the statutory provision and the statute itself.
Wein-stein,
The fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow the debtor a fresh start.
Grogan v. Garner,
Many courts in the minority have argued that Section 707(b)(2) was meant by Congress to limit judicial involvement and discretion by making mechanical the determination of abuse under Section 707(b), and that the incorporation of the means test into Section 1325(b)(3) is meant to have the same mechanical effect.
See, e.g., Austin,
My adherence to the methodology set forth in §§ 1325(b)(2) and 1325(b)(3) renders moot the argument made by some critics of the Jass and Hardacre approach that “[o]ne of the aims of the means test was to limit judicial involvement-and so judicial discretion-by making mechanical the determination of abuse under section 707(b),” and that “[t]he means test in section 1325(b)(3) is meant to have the same mechanical effect.” In re Farrar-Johnson,353 B.R. at 229 . The discretion once exercised by courts in applying § 1325(b)(1) related entirely to the methodology used by courts to determine the total amount of income available for commitment to the chapter 13 plan and the reasonableness of the debtor’s expenses. That discretion is extinguished by faithful application of the methodologies set forth in §§ 1325(b)(2) and 1325(b)(3). No such discretion is exercised when, as contemplated by the term “projected disposable income,” the court permits parties in interest to show that the circumstances relevant to those methodologies-the variables to be placed in the fixed equations of §§ 1325(b)(2) and 1325(b)(3), so to speak-have changed or are likely to change since the time frame addressed by the completed Official Form 22C.
Briscoe, 374 B.R. at n. 24.
6. Conclusion
After considering the language of the statute, the legislative history, and the policies underlying the statute, this Court will join over forty other courts that conclude that Form B22C is simply the starting point for determining the debtor’s income for purposes of Section 1325(b)(1)(B).
See Pak,
The Court will presume that the debtor’s CMI, as determined by Section 101(10A) and reflected on her Form B22C, is correct.
See Lanning,
No. 06-41037,
C. Determining Expenses for the Above Median Income Debtor
Section 1325(b)(3) governs the determination of expenses for an above median income debtor. A solid majority of courts have ruled that they may not consider the debtor’s expenses as shown on her schedule J.
25
See Stubbs,
No. 07-61165,
D. Application of the Law to the Facts
The Debtor’s Form B22C shows that the Debtor and her non-filing spouse were above median income earners for a household of two, with CMI of $6,219.70. The Debtor took $5,827.18 of deductions, which were determined pursuant to Section 707(b)(2)(A). Line 58 of the Form B22C shows disposable monthly income of $392.52. Sixty payments of $392.52 total $23,551.20, which is what the Debtor proposes to pay to her unsecured creditors.
The Trustee argues that the Social Security income of the Debtor’s non-filing husband should be included in the calculation of the Debtor’s projected disposable income. Social Security income has certain protections under BAPCPA. It is specifically excluded from the definition of current monthly income under Section 101(10A). Most courts have held that debtors cannot be compelled to include Social Security income in the “projected disposable income” calculation of Section 1325(b)(1)(B).
Lanning,
No. 06-41037,
Pursuant to the Section 101(10A), the Debtor and her spouse have CMI of $6,219.70. The Trustee offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that this amount is correct. As for expenses, Form B22C shows that the Debtor took $5,827.18 of deductions, which must be determined pursuant to subsection (A) of Section 707(b)(2) unless “special circumstances” are shown pursuant to subsection (B). Thus, the correct calculation of the Debt- or’s disposable monthly income is $392.52, as shown on her Form B22C. Since the Plan proposes to pay sixty payments of $392.52, for a total of $23,551.20, the Plan meets the Section 1325(b)(1)(B) test.
TV. CONCLUSION
Form B22C is simply the starting point for determining compliance with Section 1325(b)(1)(B). Although the Court will presume that Form B22C correctly states the income of an above median income debtor, this presumption may be rebutted by consideration of the income shown on the debtor’s schedule I or other relevant evidence. On the other hand, expenses for the above median income debtor must be determined by Section 707(b)(2)(A) and (B), and may be adjusted by a showing of special circumstances. Within this statutory framework, a debtor, a trustee, a creditor, and any other party in interest may present evidence of the debtor’s true financial circumstances at the Chapter 13 confirmation hearing.
The Court agrees with the Trustee that the Court is not bound by the statement of CMI as reflected on the Debtor’s Form B22C. However, the Trustee failed to rebut the presumption in this case, so the Objection will be overruled and the Plan will be confirmed.
This opinion constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. A separate order shall be entered pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9021.
PARTIES IN INTEREST
Pecolia Wilson
John A. Meadows, Esq.
Kathryn L. Bringle, Trustee
Notes
. The Debtor proposes to pay her only secured creditor, Truliant Federal Credit Union, through the Plan.
.Although the Trustee argues that the voluntary retirement contribution is not a mandatory deduction, and as such, is not a proper deduction, voluntary contributions to qualified retirement plans should not be considered when calculating disposable income.
In re Devilliers,
Schedule I also shows that the Debtor takes a voluntary payroll deduction for a Section 403(b) loan repayment, which also should not be considered for purposes of the Section 1325(b)(1)(B) test. Prior to BAPCPA, it was widely held that, in the context of a chapter 13 plan confirmation, a debtor could not make voluntary payments toward a retirement savings plan in order to reduce her disposable income.
E.g., In re Berry,
No. 05-85079,
. This amount is net of payroll deductions totaling $2,307.05.
. Schedule I indicates that the Debtor has no dependants. The median family income for a family of two in North Carolina is $46,066.00. The Debtor and her non-filing spouse earn an annualized current monthly income of $74,636.40.
. This amount does not include the $1,000.00 of Social Security income received by the Debtor's non-filing spouse each month.
. This amount includes the monthly Social Security income of the Debtor’s non-filing husband of $1,000.00.
. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others .... [CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”
Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,
. The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to "not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”
Kelly v. Robinson,
. It also includes “any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor ... on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependants ... but excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act....” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B) (2005). A Chapter 13 debtor is required to file Form B22C, which serves, at least in part, to calculate a debtor’s current monthly income. Interim Fed. R. Bankr.Proc. 1007(b)(6).
.Congress allowed debtors to change their six-month period in order to more accurately reflect their true financial circumstances. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(ii). “If the debtor does not file a Schedule I, the debtor's 'current monthly income' may be determined using a period other than the six-month period immediately preceding his filing. The debtor's objective [is] to have his 'current monthly income’ calculated based on a six-month period other then the six months immediately preceding his bankruptcy so that it more accurately reflects his financial condition.”
In re McQueen,
No. 07-03011, slip op. at 2 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2007) (court struck debtor’s original schedule I and Form B22C and allowed debt- or to re-file both documents five months after the petition date);
In re Musselman,
. BAPCPA creates two distinct equations for determining projected disposable income, one for above median income debtors and one for below median income debtors.
In re Stubbs,
No. 07-61165,
. Subsection (B), as will be discussed below, provides that the presumption of abuse may be rebutted if the debtor demonstrates “special circumstances ... that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no alternative.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2005).
.
In re Barr,
. Emphasis added.
. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(I) (“multiplied by 60”); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) ("multiplied by 12”).
. Kevin R. Anderson, Disposable Income v. Projected Disposable Income: Identical Twins or Distant Relatives? 18 NACTT Quarterly 12, 17 (2006) ("Could Congress have deemed such debtors worthy of Chapter 13 relief even though they would pay a lesser amount to unsecured creditors?”).
. Allowing debtors with surplus income under schedules I and 1 to confirm plans that do not apply that surplus to unsecured creditors is at odds with the Congressional intent for debtors to pay creditors as much as they can afford.
In re Brady,
.
See also In re Sawdy,
. The minority courts argue that equating "projected disposable income” with "disposable income” does not make "projected” meaningless because "projected” merely explains the treatment of "disposable income.” Under Section 1325(b)(2), disposable income is calculated and projected or extrapolated over the term of the plan.
Frederickson,
. It was interpreted that way pre-BAPCPA.
Pak,
. See 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(2)(c) ("disposable income (determined) in accordance with section 707(b)(2)”); 11 U.S.C. § 527(c)(1) ("disposable income in accordance with section 707(b)(2)”); 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7) ("disposable income, as defined in section 1325(b)(2)”); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(f) (" 'disposable income' under section 1325").
. Courts should consider a statute in the context of prior case law.
In re Weinstein,
. In
Lamie,
.
Nance,
. As discussed above, the plain language of Section 707(b)(2)(B), incorporated into Section 1325(b)(3), allows the expenses of an above median income debtor to be adjusted if "special circumstances” exist. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B).