51 Wis. 101 | Wis. | 1881
The judgment of the circuit court rests upon two propositions of fact found by the court. These are — first, that the witnesses to the instrument propounded as the iast will of Michael Lewis affixed their signatures thereto before it was signed by Lewis; and second, that when the instrument was so signed by the witnesses, the alleged testator was unable to understand and comprehend what they were doing; that is to say (as we understand the finding), that he had not at that time sound disposing mind and memory.
1. The question of testamentary capacity will first be considered; and for that purpose we shall consider the findings of the circuit court as equivalent to a finding that the deceased had not testamentary capacity when he executed the instrument in question.
The test of testamentary capacity as stated by Judge Davies in Delafield v. Parish, 25 N. Y., 9, has been approved by this court in Holden v. Meadows, 31 Wis., 284; Burnham v. Mitchell, 34 Wis., 117; In re Will of Susan Jenkins, 43 Wis., 610; In re Will of Blakely, 48 Wis., 294. See, also, In re Chafin's Will, 32 Wis., 558. Judge Davies says: “It is essential that the testator has sufficient capacity to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were or should or might have been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will. He must, in the language of the cases,
It appears that Michael Lewis was a bachelor, and was probably about sixty years of age when he died. He was born in Ireland, but had been in this country more than twenty years. About twenty years ago he came to Wisconsin from the state of Hew York, where his brother, the contestant, resided and still resides, and purchased forty acres of land in Manitowoc-county. He made some improvements upon this land, and owned it at the time of his death. He traveled about the country considerably, stopping in Wisconsin but a small part of the time. He was a close, prudent man, not liberal with his money, and at the time of his death had, besides his land, between $2,000 and $3,000 in notes against various parties. He was a laboring man, with but little education, but possessed a fair degree of intelligence for one of his class.
Early in January, 1879, after an absence of several years, he returned to Manitowoc county for the avowed purpose of selling his land. He also expressed an intention to return to his native country. Erom the time he so returned until about two weeks before he died, he lodged at the house of one Patrick Burnes. He then went to the hotel of one Michael Herr, a few miles distant, where he remained until he died. When he came to Burnes’ he was suffering from a severe cold, and his health remained impaired to the time of his death.
During the afternoon of March 11, while in conversation with some person relative to a sale of his land, he was suddenly seized with a fit and became unconscious. His malady was probably epilepsy. His consciousness soon returned,
On his cross-examination the witness further testified: “ "When I commenced the conversation, I said to him it would be prudent for him to have a will made. The money was not taken out and counted. Only what I mentioned before was taken out. He included the land in the amount of property he was worth. I asked him: ‘Didn’t you promise that land to Mr. Burnes the evening before? ’ lie said he wanted to sell the farm; that is the answer he made me. He didn’t say whether he promised it to Mr. Burnes or not. All he said was, he wanted to sell the land. I next spoke about his making some provision in his will for charitable purposes. He said he would see me again; that he wanted to sell the land, and would see me afterwards. . . . The will was all written prior to the witnesses’ coming in. I read the will over to myself first, then I read it for him, and then I called in the witnesses and read it for him and the witnesses. After the witnesses had come in, and I had read it aloud in the presence of the witnesses, the testator signed first, then the witnesses signed. ... I asked him could he write. He said he could. Then he signed his name. I don’t know how he could write before. He had not much effort; had a little effort at the pen. I told him I could write his name, and he could make his mark. He said he could write. He then wrote his name, and then the witnesses signed. The pen was not giving the ink right, and he made some effort that way.”
On redirect examination the witness further testified: “ Before the witnesses came in, he had given me a brief sketch of his former life, .about his'living in Hew York, and how he had deposited his money in a seminary or college, and so on.
The above quotations constitute but a small portion of the testimony of Mr. Butler, but it is believed that they contain the substance of his testimony in respect to the mental condition of Michael Lewis when the instrument in question was executed by him. The fit which prostrated the deceased just after the execution of the will, passed off, and consciousness returned; but he sank rapidly thereafter, and on the morning of the 14th of March he died.
Were the testimony of Mr. Butler undisputed, there could be no doubt that it proves the deceased possessed testamentary capacity when he executed his will. It shows that he comprehended perfectly the extent and condition of his property, his relations to those who might naturally expect to. become the objects of. his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his will; and that he was able to collect and hold these elements in his mind without prompting, to perceive their bearing upon each other, and to form a rational judgment in relation to them. This, we have already seen, is sufficient to establish testamentary capacity. The fact that he became unconscious soon after the execution of the will, is not very significant. It is well understood that epileptic attacks are often — perhaps usually — very sudden, and so a physician testified on the hearing. It is doubtless within the knowledge
Several witnesses besides Mr. Butler gave testimony hearing upon the mental condition of the deceased. There were Pep-pard and Burnes, the attesting witnesses to the will, and Mr. and Mrs. ITerr. The most of their testimony consists of details of incidents in the history and conduct of the deceaséd during the last two months of his life, which, it is claimed, show a want of testamentary capacity. Eor example, they testify that he mistook squirrel tracks for rabbit tracks, when there were no rabbits in the vicinity, and followed the tracks without any reasonable means at command to capture the game. He talked to himself, and was restless when he slept. He believed there was mineral in the earth on his land, because, as he alleged, there were places on it where the compass would not work. He once talked of going to an Indian camp and getting a squaw, but the witness was not sure but he was joking-. On the day that the will was executed, he denied recollection that he was negotiating for a sale of his land when seized with the fit the day preceding. However, he admitted to Mrs. Herr, on the morning of March 12th, that he had promised to devise his laud to Burnes. These incidents, and others of like character, come far short of proving want of testamentary capacity. They all may have occurred as the witnesses state, and yet the deceased may have fully comprehended what he was doing when he executed his will.
The most important testimony in that direction is that of Peppard and Burnes tending to show that the deceased was in a semi-comatose state when the will was signed; yet they do not materially controvert the testimony of Butler as to specific facts and circumstances. The chief difference is, that those witnesses gave more weight to the appearance of the deceased at that time than did Butler. Peppard and Butler alone of
Moreover, Peppard propounded the will for probate, and in his sworn petition to the county court in that behalf he stated that Michael Lewis died testate, and that he believed the instrument so propounded is the last will and testament of the deceased.
These decisive acts of Peppard, which are entirely at variance with his testimony, and which were performed when he knew the mental condition of the deceased as well as he did afterwards, greatly weaken the force of his testimony. Indeed, ■we can give but little weight to his opinion that the deceased was in an unconscious state when the instrument was signed. That the deceased was entirely competent to make a testamentary disposition of his property when he gave Mr. Butler directions to draw his will, is established by an overwhelming • preponderance of proof. The presumption is, that he contin-. ued competent to do so until the will was executed. After careful consideration of all the testimo¡:y on the subject, we think the contestant has signally failed to overthrow that pre
2. The next question to be determined is, Does the evidence support the finding that the attesting witnesses subscribed their names to the instrument before the testator signed it? The instrument is attested as a will in due and usual form. Such attestation is of itself not on\j primeo facie evidence that the instrument was properly executed, but it raises a strong presumption that it was so executed. Had the witnesses deceased before the probate of the instrument, mere proof that the attesting signatures were their handwriting would have established the will. And the rule would be the same although the signatures of the witnesses were not preceded by any attesting clause or certificate. To defeat probate, the strong presumption of regularity thus appearing upon the face of the instrument must be overcome by proof.-Remsen v. Brinckerhoff, 26 Wend., 325; Ela v. Edwards, 16 Gray, 91; 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 126; Burling v. Paterson 9 Car. & P., 570.
In view of this presumption, and considering also the infirmity of human memory, it seems most reasonable that a will purporting on its face to be legally executed should not be defeated on any doubtful or inconclusive parol proof that it was-not legally executed. The opposite rule would greatly imperil the testamentary right; for under such a rule almost any will1 might be defeated by the dishonesty or imperfect memories of' the attesting witnesses. Hence, in the present case, if the fact that the witnesses subscribed the instrument before the testator defeats the probate thereof as the will of the testator, the ■ fact should not be found, against the presumption of regularity, without very clear and convincing proof. It only remains to • consider the evidence in the light of this rule.
Three witnesses only testified as to the order in which the respective signatures were affixed to -the instrument. These-
Peppard alone swears positively that the witnesses signed first. The same considerations which impelled us to receive his testimony with caution on the question of testamentary capacity, are operative here, where he seeks to destroy the will by impeaching the order and mode of its execution. They are also applicable, in part, to the testimony of Burnes. Considering all of the evidence, and all the reasonable probabilities of the case, we believe, and so hold, that the positive testimony o'f Mr. Butler that the testator signed first (notwithstanding his subsequent inability to recollect the fact), outweighs the adverse testimony of Burnes (if he gave any) and of Peppard. It follows that the presumption that the will was legally executed is not overcome by the oral evidence. It must be held, • therefore, that the will was legally executed.
3. The question whether, if the witnesses signed first, the will is invalid for that reason was argued by the respective counsel with great ability. The conclusion we have reached, that the evidence fails to prove that they did sign before the testator, renders it unnecessary to determine that question. We therefore express no opinion on the subject.
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded with a direction to that court to affirm the judgment of the county court.